possible to gain a historical perspective of the valley in which 175
our interest centers. As late as 1702, he tells us, only a few individuals were settled there, and these were mainly hunters and herders, since the policy of that day, based on the official belief that the future of the valley lay in using to the full its grazing resources rather than in the development of agriculture, caused all agricultural activity to be prohibited. Two [177]
decades later, however, when the cultivation of indigo had been successfully introduced, agricultural development proceeded apace. In 1730, in addition to more than a score of indigo-production centers, the valley boasted of numerous coffee, cotton, and cocoa plantations, and by 1789 was a recognized agricultural region.

But for the fact that the great plantations are no longer 241
there, this aspect of life in Mirebalais has been little changed 178
by revolutions and the abolition of slavery. Indigo, of course, has lost its place as an important product, while maize is now among the most significant crops, as might be looked for in the change from a plantation system to one of small individual ownership which was brought about by Haitian independence. But cotton and sugar-cane are still major crops, and coffee, which grows well on the mountainsides, is largely cultivated.

Moreau de St. Mery, writing in 1789, speaks of the French 175
who peopled the valley as "still showing the traits which 648
marked the early colonials. They are good, frank, brave, and opposed to all coercion." In 1723 "they marched with others from the district of the Artibonite" in an uprising against the arbitrary policies of the French West Indies Company, which Charlevoix, one of the first historians of Haiti, so vividly described.[9] In 1729 and 1736 the folk of Mirebalais defended their eastern frontier against attacks by the neighboring Spaniards; eleven years later one hundred and ten of them helped with the defense of the town of St. Louis, which was menaced by the hostile maneuvers of the British admiral

175 648 Davers. In 1768 and 1769 they were "but tranquil spectators of the troubles caused by the re-establishment of the militia," the local military forces numbering at this time 260 whites and 291 affranchis, or free men of color.[3]

175 167 This white population was made up chiefly of those who came directly from France or were born in the colony, but also included were the Acadians, one of the most interesting groups who settled in Mirebalais. Fleeing from Newfoundland, they were brought to Haiti before they were sent to Louisiana, and in the course of this migration left some of their number in the valley. It is recorded that on the 26th day of October 1764, in consequence of "a Memorial presented by the Chamber of Agriculture of Port-au-Prince, which stressed the healthfulness of Mirebalais,"[4] each of a number of these Acadian families was allotted a plot of eight hundred square paces, not far from the town. The ending of this episode, however, was not happy, for, transported into a tropical climate that failed to measure up to the claims made for it, the Acadians paid so heavy a toll that soon all trace of them vanished.

175 569 But facts such as these tell little of the fundamental social and economic conditions of pre-Revolutionary Haiti, where Negro slavery constituted the foundation upon which the whole structure of life was erected. That Mirebalais was no exception to the prevailing economic regime is shown by Moreau de St. Mery's figures for the district, yet what stresses existed between the masters, the free persons of color, and the slaves, no record remains to show. Despite the fact that slaves and free men of color were accepted in the armed militia, the
175 567 669 situation was far from tranquil. When, after the French Revolution, there were signs that the decree[5] which accorded to the free men of color political rights equal to those of the whites was in danger of being nullified in practice, it was at Mirebalais that the colored men assembled to insist on the enforcement of this order.[6] Together with some slaves they freed, they formed the nucleus of an army "that under the leader-

North of the square stands the church, a substantial structure with rounded arches in the Roman style, roofed over, like most other buildings, with galvanized iron. Other public buildings are the town hall — the Mairie — and the "Hall of Justice"; near by are the stone walls of a public building begun some years ago as a school, but destined apparently to house what is known as the "Bureau of Contributions," a euphemism for the tax-collector's quarters. Despite the fact that Mirebalais was one of the most difficult regions for the American occupation to subdue during the Caco uprising of 1918–20,[10] it was one of the first districts where the Guarde d'Haiti was completely Haitianized, and from which all American Marine officers were withdrawn. Only a small detachment is stationed there at present. Its well-kept barracks are near the church, and the prisons form a part of the same compound, from whence issue daily the striped-suited prisoners, men and women, under guard or alone on parole, who do communal work in the town and the near-by countryside.

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The town awakens at dawn to the chattering of domesticated guinea-fowl and the crowing of cocks. Occasionally a camion rumbles through the principal thoroughfare; more rarely an automobile dashes by in great clouds of dust on its way to Las Cahobas, or Hinche, or Santo Domingo City. If it is a market day, the streets are early filled with country folk on their way to dispose of their produce, and the clatter from the market place behind the church is heard everywhere until the heat of the day brings a lull to all commerce, and drowsiness once more settles over everything. By mid-afternoon during the planting season, drums can be heard over the countryside. The sounds are not those of the "throbbing" *vodun* drums — though they have more than once been mistaken for them by travelers — but they set the rhythm for the communal work of the *combites*, which perform co-operative agricultural labor. As the rapid dusk follows the disappearance of the sun behind the mountains, the voices of

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about the square that precedes the principal mass of the day. 796 These processions, however, are as a mere rehearsal for the 788 great procession held during the festival of St. Louis, the patron saint of the town. At that time the statue of the saint, carried by the faithful — among whom can be seen more than one perspiring *vodun* priest and *bocor* — is taken triumphantly through the streets to insure a good year. The nearness 796 of the valley to the village of Ville Bonheur makes the [184] great religious festival of Saut d'Eau, where the "miracle of the Virgin" is believed to have occurred, almost a local matter. And though Saut d'Eau lies well over the mountains, July 15 finds most of the population of Mirebalais away from home celebrating the miraculous revelation with folk from other parts of Haiti. May Day is celebrated as the "Fête de 527 l'Agriculture," and two years ago a new day of rejoicing was added to the calendar of festivals. This is known as the "Festival of the Second Independence," the anniversary of the departure of the American Marines from Haiti, and is marked by the "illumination" of all houses the night before and a solemn discourse from the mayor after a Te Deum has been sung in the church.

Thus life in the valley of Mirebalais continues the course 175 it has followed for the past two hundred years. Though its [178] history, as we can reconstruct it, has been marked by turbulent periods, these have been far from the rule. It is true that because of its position it has always been a point to be defended, and often, both before and after the time of Haitian independence, it has been a region where decisive encounters with those who controlled the Spanish portion of the island have taken place. Not for many years, however, until the Caco 175 uprising against the American Marines, did Mirebalais ex- 648 perience military activities on any considerable scale. After the death of Charlemagne Perrault, when his successor selected the valley as a strategic point to be defended, a large force of Marines was encamped near the confluence of the

175 648 Artibonite and Tombe rivers just outside the town. Today Cacos who went through this campaign will tell how sniping was carried on from the "English fort" on the heights to the east of the town and will recount how dangerous it was made for Marines to go unguarded even to the river-banks to draw water. Yet after two or three years the overthrow of the Caco forces brought peace once more to Mirebalais. And while the intervention of the United States has caused significant changes in the larger aspects of Haitian economy and in the political life of the Republic as a whole, yet as concerns the inner life of the people of this valley it seems to have passed without any discernible effect.

175 211 Today in the *place* are found three records of its past. The first of these, in the middle of the square, is a tall palm tree, which in Haiti is the emblem of its attainment of freedom and independence, and near it a rostrum symbolizing the authority of the central government. 211 175 764 The second is the tomb of an overlord of Mirebalais when independent Haiti was not a republic. In florid lettering can be read the tribute engraved on its top:

Ici
Dort de l'éternel sommeil
Pierre Cazimir de Vincent
décédé le 13 Août 1856, à l'âge de 71 ans
de son vivant Duc de Mirebalais
et
Commandant de la 4ème Division
Militaire de la Province de
l'Ouest

"Passant, si tu admires les vertus militaires;
Revère les cendres de celui que repose en ce lieu."

De la part de son amie
Delphonnaise Delva.

refusal to accord Church burial to certain faithful followers 779
because of the inability of their surviving relations to pay for 798
their funeral masses. As expressed most clearly, it is felt that the Church is expensive, exacting fees for baptisms, marriage ceremonies, and funerals, while *vodun* worship, on the other hand, costs but little: a bit of *clairin*, the animals one must sacrifice — only, however, to insure the help of the *lòa* in causing the remaining ones to increase in number — and the "presents" to be given the gods, costs the less oppressive because they are usually shared by all members of one's family. Another source of discontent is said to be the failure of the Church to adhere to its agreement in the Concordat to "Haitianize" the clergy. This has been emphasized in Mirebalais because the priest of its church is one of the relatively few in Haiti who is himself a Haitian. One of the sentiments about the Church most frequently heard during this field-work, coming as it did just at the end of the American occupation, was: "The *Garde* has finally been Haitianized. Now it is the turn of the Church."

The attitude of the Church toward *vodun* is one of intran- 798
sigent hostility. The anger with which the priest preached 648
his sermon on the Sunday morning following a *vodun* dance held close enough to town so that the sound of the drums, plainly audible, "disturbed" him the night long, clearly indicates how deeply the priests of the Church resent the worship of the African gods. In Mirebalais they tell how, at the instance of the Church, *vodun* rites were unmercifully suppressed by the Americans during the occupation, to whom it was represented as a potential focus for revolt. In the *place* huge bonfires were made of *vodun* drums painted and "dressed" in elaborate manner. Everything found in the *humforts* and the private houses of worship was confiscated, and the "thunder stones," necklaces of the devotees, and other sacred objects that would not burn were thrown into the Artibonite River. Today the Church takes full advantage 000

776 [821] rainbow, and this is called an *arc d'alliance* between him and Aida Wedo, his wife, whose characteristic dress is blue and [171] white. Sobo, who in Dahomey is the god of thunder, is also believed in Haiti to give thunder, though he is not thought to live in the sky. As in Africa, his symbol is the ram. Aizan lives in the water, and is a favored deity because he gives his devotees the power of healing and of divining.

Erzilie, a *loa* of considerable importance, is envisaged as a pale, trembling woman who also inhabits the water. She constantly changes her dresses, of which she has many. All agree that she is a fabulously wealthy woman, who wears golden chains about her neck and has many rings, a characterization derived from her identification with Mater Dolorosa, whose chromolithographs depict her with many rich ornaments. As a Rada *loa* she "eats" the same food as Damballa, and wears white, like this other god, but has Friday as her sacred day. In her less pleasant manifestation of Erzilie Gé Rouge, the red-eyed one, she is a member of the Pétro "squad," and is held to be the wife of Simbi d'l'eau, with whom she is believed to get on especially well, since they "eat" different foods. Simbi, who is worshipped on Tuesdays and inhabits the mango and calabash trees, is said to drink heavily, however, and occasionally becomes so boistrous in his cups that he destroys the furniture and otherwise makes himself so objectionable that Erzilie is forced to leave him until he becomes sober.

[171] Ogun, in Haiti as in Nigeria, is the god of war. The Nigerian Shango is also found, though the Haitians conceive Shango as a *loa* who acts as the servant of the Ogun deities, [782] particularly Ogun Badagri and Ogun Batala. Ogun "eats" [822] red cocks and red beans mixed with rice, and his color, red, is worn by his devotees. To this fact may be referred the custom [114] of the Caco warriors who fought against the American Ma- [248] rines in 1918–20 to wear red as their distinguishing color, something referred to by Wirkus (pp. 22 ff.), though he

combines an explanation having an element of correctness — 776
"a charm against harm" — with entire misunderstanding [114]
when he speaks of the color as symbolizing a "declaration of [648]
a holy war against wrong and oppression." Some, but not all of the Ogun *loa* drink Haitian rum. Ogun himself is identified with St. James the Elder, and his sacred day is Wednesday. This *loa* is a *Nèg' défence* and protects his worshippers from bullets or wounds inflicted by weapons. Ogun Balandjo guards travelers, though he is not as strong as such others of the Ogun group as Ogun Badagri and Ogun Batala, with whom he shares the bamboo tree as a habitation. The former gives *connaissance* — knowledge — which permits those he possesses to prohesy; the latter endows with the ability to prepare healing baths. The Ogun *loa* Erzilie and Damballa are jealous gods. On the day sacred to each, a devotee puts fresh linen on his bed, places powder, soap, and a comb near by, and sleeps alone. If the devotee is a woman, her husband sleeps elsewhere; if a man, his wife must seek another place; otherwise the transgressor would die.

Agwe Woyo is god of the sea, but, as might be expected, 776
neither he nor his son and daughter, Agweto and Agweta 823
Woyo, figures as importantly in Mirebalais as in coastal areas. [84]
For the folk of Mirebalais the river-gods, particularly the spirit of the Artibonite River, are of much greater importance. This last-mentioned *loa*, named Clairmé, a Pétro deity like his wife and daughter, Mme. Clairmé and Clairmézine, lives in the deepest part of the stream with the other members of his "family." Similarly, the deepest parts, or *bassins*, of tributary streams hold the spirits of those waters. And since all these tributaries flow into the Artibonite, and the Artibonite empties into the ocean, it is said that when the river is in flood, Clairmé is engaged in inspecting his domain, being greeted by the spirits of all the smaller rivers as he passes their mouths. At this time the flow of the water in each tributary is arrested until he has gone by, when, in a great swirl,

rather starve than work. An Englishman, James Franklin, wrote in 181
1828, for example: 461

> Experiments may be tried, laws may be enacted, and encouragement given, but nothing short of coercion and want will impel the Haytian to labour; and I have my doubts as to the practicability of enforcing labour in Hayti until the people have been better instructed, and their characters become changed.

As Franklin summarized it: "Nature is too generous to the Haytian; he [464]
never wants, and so never works for hire, as do free labourers in other countries."[1]

The early nineteenth century saw a flood of such bitter comments 175
about the remains of the once rich and flourishing French colony of 433
St. Domingue. The vast productivity of Haiti under French rule had 648 ●
made that colony one of the richest in the New World. The country [257]
was dotted with sugar mills, brick-covered wells, and warehouses; and [312]
carefully built brick aqueducts, irrigation canals, locks, and dams assured [488]
water for the plantations. In 1790, under the slave system, Haiti had [567]
exported 163,000,000 pounds of sugar. In 1826, a quarter of a century [439]
after the revolution, it was reported to have exported 33,000 pounds.

This falling off in production and exports doubtless had many causes, 175
but one of the most significant was the Haitian's revolt not only against 461
slavery but also against continuing the same kind of work he had 466
performed as a slave. He saw not too much difference between forced, 423
unpaid labor and working for any large landholder at subsistence wages. 567
To the Haitian slave the inspiring battle cry of the French Revolution did not mean that all men would work together on another's man plantation and receive the same wages. It meant that every man would have his own garden to work for himself as he chose; every man would be a full citizen, with land of his own, free to come and go, to plant what he wished, to sell what he could. Despite long years under a colonial slave system, the Haitian still remembered a different way of life in Africa, where mass production for export was not the primary objective of labor.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of Haiti 175
was not much more than half a million—less than one sixth of what it 178
is today. There was plenty of land, and much of it had not yet been 311
wasted by constant tilling and erosion. When the French were driven [161]
out, the Haitian peasant re-created an economic world of his own liking. [648]
The plantation system which had poured out sugar and coffee and indigo for Europe faded away, and in its place there sprang up an agrarian system which has continued until the present day. In the early

[1] [Franklin, *The Present State of Hayti*, p. 362. Cf. p. 351, category 116. -- Analyst]

175 178 311 [643] [656] In the early years of independence, Emperor Henry Christophe in the north and President Pétion in the south tried to stem the disintegration of the magnificent plantations. Christophe's measures in the region he controlled were sometimes stern, according to legend; but the plantation system and the plantations themselves gradually fell into decay, along with the aqueducts, the warehouses, and the sugar mills. For the Haitian had returned to a tradition of landholding antedating his enslavement.

● 175 648 181 Europe's loss of the Pearl of the Antilles aroused bitter words from Frenchmen and Englishmen for the better part of the century. They accused the Negro of laziness and lack of ability, repeating endlessly that only as a colony could Haiti ever be of any use to anybody. The London *Times* deplored the Haitian's unwillingness to work for wages, speculating that he had "no desire for property strong enough to induce him to labor with sustained power." In the United States, antiabolitionist enthusiasts cited the Haitian situation as an example of what would happen to the American economy if the slaves were freed.

464 423 311 The Haitian's reluctance to work for wages did not reflect an aversion to owning property, however, as the London *Times* supposed. On the contrary, it was engendered by his desire for property. The land was there and waiting, only needing a house to be built upon it, and to be cleared and tilled. The typical Haitian wanted not dubious, seasonal wage work but a farm of his own. The more ambitious peasant aspired to two farms, or even three, with a homestead and a family on each.

423 595 178 583 If a man worked hard and made a success of one plot, he could put
away money and eventually buy a second. The additional land might be
separated by some miles from the original farm. On the new ground
the man would build another house and take another wife to take
care of it in his absence. Known as *plaçage,* this arrangement had complete community sanction. A man whose energies and good fortune
made an extra household possible was expected to make such an arrange-
[997] ment. It was not a new institution bred in the chaos following the
Revolution, nor was it, as some missionaries held, an evidence of moral
deterioration of the Haitian character. It was simply a persisting concept
of West African life.[2] The woman who occupied the second or third
household was not a concubine. Like the first wife, she had enhanced
prestige in her community. She had authority and responsibility. Her
work, her position, and her rewards were not essentially different from
those of the first wife.[3] It is true that her marriage was not consecrated
by a church or civil ceremony, but, ordinarily, neither was that of the
[581] first wife. Contrary to European misconceptions, such unions were true
marriages in the sense that they had full sanction of the community.

[2] [3] [Footnotes appear in Category 116, pp. 351-352. --Analyst]

For many Haitians, the struggle to obtain a piece of ground and to 423
hold onto it is the very heart of the struggle for existence. On Morne 691
l'Hôpital in 1932 I knew a man who owned ten acres of gardens. He had 511
it planted in bananas and plantains, yams, and cotton. He had two cows and a calf and a grove of mango trees and coconut palms. His house was clean, tidy, and by Haitian standards well furnished. Eighteen years later he had less than an acre of land, no trees, no cotton, and no cattle. His family had become impoverished. He had three grown children and virtually no land to leave to them except that on which the house stood. His troubles began with a lawsuit over his land title. He sold his cattle to raise money to pay his court expenses. He lost half of his land as a result of the lawsuit, most of it the part with the good trees. Later, he sold more land to raise "eating money," and then rented it from the new owner. He could not grow enough cash crops to pay the rent and was finally evicted. Today he has not enough ground left on which to grow food for himself and his wife the year round.

The diminution of adequate landholdings has resulted in the dis- 178
appearances of many of the *lacours* (hamlets) that were a familiar sight a 423
few decades ago. Young people traditionally built their houses near the 361
family homesteads until there were five, six, or a dozen houses in a 166
group. There was a natural family community which shared a common [596]
social life and the work of the fields. But as the population increased and [621]
the landholdings shrank, young people and old began to move away in search of new land, or work in the cities. Often where the lacour remains it is only as a settlement of landless house renters who work where they may for wages.

Economic refugees from rural areas seek wage work in the cities, 166
returning to their original homes only on special festive days for family 464
reunions. The men find employment as gardeners, servants, construction laborers, and stevedores. Some find work on the sugar and sisal plantations, others in craft industries making straw hats, baskets, shoes, chairs, and mahogany ware for export. The struggle in the big city of Port-au-Prince is for many of them worse than the poverty they left behind. There are the inevitable slums and the constant threat of hunger. It is in the big city that one hears most often the words *moin grand gout* (I am hungry), and least often the words *Bondieu bon* (God is good).

The land hunger increases, and the overflow of the mountain settlements continues to move cityward. In former years there was a trend 167
toward emigration across the eastern border into the Dominican Re- 175
public, which has a population density roughly one third or one fourth that of Haiti. This trend was checked, temporarily at least, in 1937 by [648]

167 175 a massacre in the western part of the Dominican Republic which took the lives of an estimated five thousand to fifteen thousand Haitians. ● [648] The survivors fled homeward, and many were settled in frontier areas by the government. Even so, today there are believed to be some sixty or seventy thousand Haitians still living east of the border. Large numbers of Haitians, particularly men, migrated to Cuba in the years following World War I, in search of better wages in the cane fields. By 1931 there were more than eighty thousand Haitians in that country.[6] But resentment by local Cuban labor and the onset of the depression combined to force the repatriation of great numbers of them. Thirty thousand Haitians came home from Cuba in the years 1936 and 1937 alone.

16 [842] Solution of Haiti's problem of overpopulation does not seem imminent. The obvious answers would seem to be birth control, emigration, wiser use of natural resources, and industrialization. Since the country is predominantly Catholic, and since much social value is placed on children, birth control seems unlikely. And as health facilities become more widespread and infant mortality drops, the pressure will become more acute. Emigration seems to offer no hope, since neighboring islands and countries [311] on the mainland give no encouragement. The Haitian may yet learn to conserve his land and to get more out of it, to stock his lakes with fish, and to [47] bring more fish in from the sea. But this will not suffice. Nothing is left but industrialization, and that seems to be a thing of the far-distant future.

181 167 461 Nevertheless, the character of Haitian life remains essentially agrarian. The displaced peasant, whether he is now a hotel "houseboy," a taxi driver, or a cane cutter, dreams of returning to the land some day and growing bananas, coffee, and cotton that will make him independent. In far-off places such as Havana and New York, Haitians work and save money with the expectation that one day they will come home, buy fifteen or twenty acres of ground, build a new house, and live out their [178] lives as decently prosperous *habitants.* The traditions of the agricultural society, along with Vodoun, continue to play a significant role in the life of the people.

476 241 One such tradition is the institution of the *coumbite,* a loosely knit coöperative work party of neighbors and friends. The word itself probably comes from the Spanish *convide,* or *convite,* meaning "to invite." A member of the group holds a coumbite by notifying his fellow members that on such-and-such a day his fields will require clearing or hoeing. There are several variants of the work gathering. One, called *carré* or *corvée,* meets at irregular intervals and only on special invitation. There are no regular reciprocal obligations in the *corvée;* the workers are

[6] [Simpson, "Haitian Peasant Economy," Journal of Negro History, October, 1940, p. 515. Cf. p. 352, Category 116. --Analyst)

And when the revolution came he produced for the Haitian armies 175
knives, gun parts, and wheels to transport cannon. By the tens of thousands 178
he made ingeniously devised metal objects to be thrown on the 326
roads, before the French cavalry troops—objects so shaped that, no 648 ●
matter how they fell, a single sharp point stood erect to cripple the
enemy horses. Yet knowledge of the West African uses of iron did not
altogether disappear, and during the first century of independence the
Haitian blacksmith created many old-style knives, spears, and ritual objects
for the cult temple.

Even today, some of this old-style work is to be found in hounfors in 326
the southwestern peninsula. One may see simple or ornate iron standards, 778
made to support ceremonial offerings or candles, strikingly similar to 178
standards in ancestral shrines in Dahomey. There are iron bells, both [184]
single and double, made in pure West African style; ornate ritual swords [534]
and sabers which are the crests of certain deities; coiled and uncoiled [171]
iron serpents representing the gods Damballa and Ayida; and stylized [776]
or semirealistic portraits of the deities. Many of these old pieces are
nineteenth-century survivals; others have been forged within the past
decade.[2]

An over-all impression of Haitian material culture is that artistic 322
decoration is almost entirely absent and that the prime emphasis is 531
on utility. Wooden cooking spoons are efficient in form, but missing
from them is the delicate decorative carving often found in West Africa.
The long wooden washing bowl, or *gamelle,* and the wooden mortar in
which grain is pulverized are likewise clean-cut but stark and plainly
utilitarian. Clay bowls, bottles, and storage jars are usually of simple, 323
uniform design, with only accidental variations; there is little use of
glazes, and the clay is often heavy and thick. Should there be a wari 524
gameboard in the peasant hut, the chances are that it is roughly made, 322
without legs or carved designs. Dugout canoes are usually crude in appearance, 501
heavy and thick-walled, and irregular in form.

Yet there are many evidences—though one must seek them out—that 531
esthetic impulses are quite alive. The gay peasant straw knapsack, or [517]
alfor, without which no mountain man makes a journey, has a charm [482]
and grace that is not diminished by familiarity and cheapness. Decorated [285]
with sisal braid and tassels, and colored with green and magenta [386]
dyes, each *alfor* on close inspection appears to be unique. In some communities 531
in the south and southwest, burlap squares also are painted 353
with these traditional dyes. About forty inches across, and made of sugar (184)
bags, these paintings swarm with geometric patterns and sometimes
with figures of flowers and animals. They are purely decorative, being

[2] [See plates 42-51, pp. 112-DD—112-FF.--Analyst]

presidents, and emphatically declared the army to be within and under the law. 175 642

The new President, finding his office without the prerogatives he had 175 expected it to have, openly complained of the restraints imposed on him 643 by the new constitution. He broke campaign promises he had made to 669 the peasants in the south and stirred up antagonisms on every side. Finally, while he was on a military expedition in the Spanish part of the island, revolution broke out at home. His army was beaten by the [648] Dominicans, too, which completely shattered his morale. He fled by ship to Jamaica, the traditional refuge of outgoing Haitian presidents. In 175 memory of his administration the peasants sang: 643 669 533* 539*

Rivière Président gainyain zyeux vairon!
Li dit l'ap piyé l'armé Bélanton!
Piyé lévé trésor!
Piyé lévé trésor!
Piyé lévé trésor!
Yo voyé Lambam depuis Lowinsor!

La Constitution cé trouva Colombe
Quand yo voit pays soufri trop misère!
Li dit yo fait comme Henry!
Li dit yo fait comme Henry!
Li dit yo fait comme Henry!
Pou' fai sang coulé pou' rangé pays!

Colonel Déro soldat Diplaro
Marché fanfaron comme un grand fantin!
Li cré qui li té roi!
Li cré qui li té roi!
Li cré qui li té roi!
'Pagnol chasse li, li couri con chien qui prend frai charogne!

President Rivière was cross-eyed!
He said that he was going to pillage Belanton's army!
Loot for treasure!
Loot for treasure!
Loot for treasure!
They sent everyone from Lowinsor to Lambam!

The Constitution was founded by Columbus
When the country suffered too much misery!
He said he would do like Henry [Christophe]!
He said he would do like Henry!
He said he would do like Henry!
Make blood run to poison the countryside!

175 Oreste Zamor, pressé pou' embarké!
643 Oreste Zamor, pressé pou' embarké!
269 Ou pas tendé l'armée Davilmar rentré pou' Gonaïves?

*533 Oreste Zamor, you'd better embark!
*539 Oreste Zamor, you'd better embark!
Haven't you heard Davilmar's army has entered Gonaïves?

Gonaïves seems to have been the crucial point for invading armies from the north. Whenever revolutionary troops entered this town, the president holding office prepared to leave. True to the tradition, the Zamors sailed for a foreign shore, and Davilmar Théodore became the new executive. Although his tenure was to last only three months, there was much excitement when he entered the capital:

À la théatre, à la bamboche!
Pou' djolle musique à droit à gauche!
La ville embrende ça qui gainyain,
C'est Davilmar kapé rentré!
Davilmar, dur, dur!
Manchete caco pas nen betise!
Papa Da dur, dur!
Manchete Leconte pas nen betise!
Davilmar, dur, dur!

Celebrations and dancing!
Tooting horns to right and left!
The city is in an uproar,
It is Davilmar who is coming in!
Davilmar, hard, hard!
The cacos were nothing to laugh at!
Papa Da is hard, hard!
Leconte's army was nothing to laugh at!
Davilmar is hard, hard!

175
648
[662]

In 1915 came the United States intervention in Haiti, with the prime objective of freezing out German commercial and political interests. A president named Guillaume Sam had assassinated his political enemies in the prison at Port-au-Prince and had, in turn, been dragged out of the French consulate and killed. The benefits of the American occupation of Haiti are hotly debated to this day, though it is about thirty years since the United States military forces were withdrawn. Some Haitians think the occupation was a good lesson in politics, and that Haiti benefited in many ways. Others continue to look upon it as an overt expression of American diplomacy by force. One of the early assignments of the U.S. Marines in Haiti was the destruction of the

roaming bands of cacos, generally regarded as bandit elements. Caco 175
chiefs were imprisoned or killed as outlaws, though much of their 648 ●
activity was directed against the American occupation rather than the civil government. Many of the injustices of the occupation were the result of inadequate understanding of the Haitian people and their way of life. There was much unspoken bitterness against the occupation 175
forces, and in some popular songs the Marines were referred to by the 648
peaceful peasantry as "cacos in khaki." During President Borno's ad- 533*
ministration the people in the north were singing: 539*
643

Grand Prevost ou pas tendé cacos Bayé Bouteille?
Grand Prevost n'allé wè cacos Bayé Bouteille!
Ala kilé nen dé nations:
Americains dévant, cacos deuxieme!

Grand Prevost, didn't you hear the cacos are at the Bottle Gate?
Grand Prevost, we are going to see the cacos at the Bottle Gate!
Now we have two species:
The Americans are the worst, the cacos come second!

When President Borno's tenure of office came to an end, it was felt 175
in some quarters that Madame Borno was taking the prospective change 643
of residence very hard: 644
533*

Madame Borno ça ou gainyain ou apé crié? 539*
Ou té tou conné palais a parti pou' ou!
Madame Borno ça ou gainyain ou apé crié?
Ou té tou conné yun jour pou' oté laissé!

Madame Borno, what is the matter, why are you crying?
You always knew one day you would have to leave the palace!
Madame Borno, what is the matter, why are you crying?
You always knew one day you'd have to give it up!

In 1930 Sténio Vincent came into office. He was a generally un- 175
popular executive who managed to hold on to the presidency by sup- 643
pressing the political opposition. When he was elected, the progressives 669
were hopeful, and his supporters were singing: "Sténio Vincent bon garçon." But public sentiment shifted. Times were hard for the Haitian people during the Vincent administration. The darker citizens felt Vincent was "too light" to have their interests at heart. They were violently aroused, too, by his gingerly handling of the massacre of Haitians in the Dominican Republic in 1937. During his administration there were a number of abortive caco demonstrations and an unsuccessful revolt of high-ranking army officers. But in the early days a Meringue

[P.166]



15. Secret-Society Songs

575 Secret societies were once common in Haiti, as they were in other parts of
171 the New World where West Africans settled in large numbers. The institution of the secret society was strong in various parts of West Africa from which the slaves came. The tradition was particularly notable among the tribes of Nigeria.[1] In the New World it offered to slaves and to freed Negroes an opportunity for social organization and fraternal relationships which otherwise had been pretty well shattered by the nature of slavery and the profuse admixture of cultures. A number of elderly Haitians have
● [648] suggested that it was the Haitian secret societies rather than the Vodoun and Congo cults which fomented underground resistance and slave revolts against the French in the last years of the eighteenth century.

174 At this late date it is difficult to reconstruct much of the secret-society
178 picture. Such groups as may have survived until recently did so in vitiated
575 and changed form. They have been supplanted in large measure by the
[476] *société*, a kind of mutual-aid association with both economic and recreational functions. It is exclusive, but not irrevocably so, and it is not secret. The société often corresponds roughly with the membership of a hounfor, or cult temple.

575 Old people still talk about true secret societies, however. There was a
178 Moundongue secret society, separate from the Moundongue cult, whose
266 members were recruited from the survivors of the Moundongue tribe and
173 their descendants. Other secret societies were not based on tribal affiliation but were recruited from the population at large. One such group was the Vinbindingue, also known as the Blinbindingue and the Balbindingue. Its practices were feared. According to tradition, the Vinbindingue was predatory and held cannibalistic rites, as did other groups such as the Moundongue Society, the Cochon Rouge (the Red Pig Society), the Zeaubeaups, the Cochon Gris (the Gray Pig Society), and the Calinda
000 Society. How much of their reputation for cannibalism was deserved is

[1] [Herskovits, Dahomey, I, p. 256. Cf. p. 353, category 116. -- Analyst]

534 The craft
322 of drum making is a very skilled one, but the tools are
[412] simple: chisels, machetes, and fire. The core of the log is removed by
burning and gouging, and the outside is shaped with a machete, or
sometimes a hachet. The wood is selected and processed carefully. Firing
of the core of the log depends a good deal on how dry the wood is,
for the wood must burn slowly. It is believed that wood cut at the right
stage of growth and at the right phase of the moon is resistant to the
[824] ever-present powder-post beetles. Mahogany was once favored because
it was durable and beetle resistant, even though it was heavy. But in
recent decades mahogany has become scarce, and modern drums are
made of lighter woods.

534 Drums made in the nineteenth century not only conformed to the
798 patterns of certain West African prototypes but were also carved and
[531] decorated. Some of these old drums are still to be seen, but there are
[771] not many left. An ancient carved assotor drum (previously cited) has
fortunately been preserved by the Bureau d'Ethnologie. But between the
ravages of the powder-post beetles, age, and the periodic orgies of drum
burning by the church and misguided public officials, most of these
[648] ancient works of art have long since disappeared. During the American
occupation of Haiti—from World War I to 1932—American military
personnel also contributed to the mania for drum burning. And as late
as 1941 there was a massive, cleric-inspired drive to wipe out these
instruments as remnants of *sauvage* elements in Haitian life.

534 The effect of this war against the drum was only to improve the
178 business of the professional drum maker. Drums had become expendable,
hence they were made simpler. The carved decorations disappeared.
531 Paint was substituted, and less attention was given to detail. The important thing was to produce a good functional instrument. But the
creative instincts of the drum makers sometimes still take over, and
many of the modern drums are beautifully proportioned, with delicate
geometric patterns carved around the base, or foot. Among certain
categories of drums the painted decorations consist solely of the name
of the loa to whom the instruments have been dedicated—St. Jacques
perhaps, or Papa Pierre, or Ézilie.

534 Drums differ in design according to the use for which they are in-
171 tended. The Arada or Vodoun drums are used primarily in connection
794 with the dances and rituals of the Vodoun cult—the cult built around
796 the gods and rites of Arada and Yoruba theology. They resemble closely
drums which are used today in Dahomey, Nigeria, and Togoland. They
534 usually come in sets of three. The largest, the ***manman*** (also called
hountor or ***hountogri***), may be three to four feet high. The middle-sized drum, or ***second*** (also called ***grondé*** or ***moyen***), is about two feet

[Text continues on p. 193]

534 [177] the Haitian word for "twins." They are used primarily for secular music of the Cuban type, and may in fact be an importation from Cuba. The marassa is one of the few drums on which a finger technique is used; that is, striking with individual fingers rather than with grouped fingers. Marassas are often played in concert with guitars and marimbas.

The *basse* is the shallow finger drum resembling what in the United States is called the tambourine. Constructed in the pattern of an African prototype, its head is usually fifteen or eighteen inches in diameter and made of goatskin. Small metal disks sometimes are inserted in the frame [314] [237] to act as rattles. The head is kept well coated with resin or beeswax and is tapped and rubbed with the fingers. The *basse* is used only for secular music, except in the rare instances when it is used in Congo services. Some Haitians believe that the name of the instrument comes from the word *Basque*.

534 202 It is reported that signal drums were still in use a decade ago in remote sections of the southwestern peninsula. One of these instruments, according to description, is distinguished mainly by its large belly and small mouth; like the Juba drum, it is played on its side. Another style of signal drum has a slit in the side and is played erect, much like an African slit-log drum standing on end.

534 [171] Another percussion instrument is the bamboo stamping tube, called the *ganbo* or *ti ḳanmbo*. It is African in origin and probably takes its name from the Loango term for the same device, *diḳanmbo*.[2] The stamping tube is simply a length of bamboo, open at one end and closed at the other by a natural joint membrane. The closed end is struck sharply upon the ground, and the tone comes from the open top. The device works like an inverted drum, the closed end functioning like a drumhead. A battery of four or five ganbos may provide the percussion music otherwise played by drums. The musician corresponding to the *bulatier* of the drum orchestra plays two small stamping tubes, one in each hand. The other musicians have one each, thicker and longer than the bulatier's and producing deeper tones. Cupped hands are manipulated over the open ends for varying the sounds. This instrument [171] has survived in various parts of the New World where Africans were settled, particularly other West Indian islands, Brazil, and Venezuela. In Venezuela the stamping tubes are called *quitiplas*.[3] They have recently been reported from various areas of West Africa, including French Equatorial Africa.[4]

534 648 798 ● The ganbos had a singular burst of popularity in Haiti during the United States military occupation of the country after the first World War, when drums were often seized and destroyed. Drums could not

[115]

[2] [Informant: Joseph Lengo, Brazzaville. Cf. P. 354, Category 116. --Analyst]

[3] [Library of Congress album, *Folk Music of Venezuela*. Cf P. 354, Category 116. --Analyst]

[4] [Pamphlet accompanying recording *Music of Equatorial Africa* (New York: Ethnic Folkways Library, 1950). Cf. P. 354, Cat. 116. --Analyst]

easily be hidden, but the ganbos were simply slipped into the straw 534
roofs and thus put out of sight. Moreover, by some strange process of 648
reasoning, military authorities regarded the bamboos as "harmless," 798
though they were used for the same purposes as the contraband drums.

There are numerous other kinds of simple percussion devices. One 534
such instrument, now less commonly seen than previously, is a length of open bamboo laid in the crotches of two Y-shaped sticks set in the ground. Like other *catas*, the bamboo is beaten with two sticks. Some Haitians believe that in former days such bamboos were played in batteries like a xylophone.

Sometimes a light-weight wooden cylinder, or perhaps a drum de- [461]
nuded of its playing head, is carried by the timekeeper of a coumbite. [476]
It, also, is played on the side with sticks.

Woolen mortars for pulverizing grain take on the character of musical 534
instruments when used in combination with voices. When two or more 533
mortars are used, with two men or women wielding the long polelike 412
pestles in each mortar, the rhythmic effects can become fairly complicated.

The *claves* or *palos* (small hardwood sticks) are used primarily in 534
connection with secular dances of a Cuban type, or to accompany such 535
instruments as the guitar and the marimba. One stick is held loosely in [177]
the natural fold of the hand, so that it is free to vibrate, and is struck
sharply with the second stick. The tone is almost metallic because of [824]
the hardness of the wood, usually lignum vitae. The name of the in-
strument is recognizable as a form of *clavar*, or *clavo*, Spanish for "peg"
or "nail." It is thought that wooden shipbuilding pegs provided the [171]
name for this device, which has equivalents in West Africa.

Among the folk instruments there are various kinds of horns and 534
trumpets. Cows' horns are played musically in some parts of the southern 184
peninsula, though usually they are used as ritual instruments and signal-
ing devices. Wooden trumpets called *pistons* are carved from the stems [824]
of the papaya tree. Conch-shell trumpets, known as *lambis*, are com- [202]
monly used as signaling devices by fishermen. They are also to be
found among the coumbites, in Rara festivities, and occasionally in
rituals, where they are usually identified with sea deities. In carnival [541]
times the old fashioned phonograph horn makes its appearance as a com- [216]
bined trumpet and voice amplifier.

Probably the most important of the trumpets is the one made of 534
bamboo. It is called a *vaccine*[7] or *bois bourrique*. Both names have in- 755
teresting origins. The cow's horn was at one time used for magico- [237]
medical purposes. The leaf doctor used it as an "applicator" of powders
and potions. A small opening was made in the point of the horn, and

[7] [See plate 8, P. 112-F. --Analyst]

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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114 very favorable reception by Haitian scholars and intellectuals. As its
author and others have pointed out, few countries in modern times
have received as bad a press at the hands of foreign observers as Haiti.
105 A small, rugged nation, born of an exhausting and destructive revolution,
its people poor, disease-ridden, illiterate, and erratically led,
independent Haiti gives the impression of having drifted aimlessly
110 for more than a century. Observers from "more developed" lands
have had a field day—and still have—bemoaning the evil consequences
of a mass of African slaves having turned on their French
masters to destroy them and their works. It is still fashionable to allude
to Haiti in deploring independence movements, racial desegregation,
indigenous political leadership, and economic sovereignty.
114 But too little scholarship has since been invested, as Leyburn invested
it, in delineating the national and international forces which have
operated to keep Haiti poor and backward. Nor has contemporary
research led to sufficiently revealing comparisons between the social
history of Haiti and that of her more colonial neighbors in the Caribbean
area. Leyburn's work enhanced the possibilities for such comparisons
and drew some morals which Haiti's detractors often ignore;
but in making his case, the author carefully avoids lapsing into romanticism,
or into the inaccuracy born of uncritical sympathy.

The book was published as the final steps were being taken to end
175 the official United States presence in Haiti. The occupation had begun
● 648 in 1915, ostensibly to restore order in a situation marked by
[652] political chaos. Haitian defaulting on debts to the French and Germans
had raised the specter of foreign—that is, European—occupation,
which created considerable North American anxiety; and there
were large Haitian debts outstanding to United States banks as well.
When the United States decided to move militarily, the abstract issue
of justice was ignored, to be raised for contemplation only after the
occupation itself was a fact. Military occupation continued for nineteen
years, and the complete termination of United States controls
over the national affairs of Haiti did not come until 1946, long after
Leyburn's book had appeared. Twenty-five years have now elapsed
since Leyburn wrote, and the events of these years are relevant to any
retrospective view of the author's interpretations.

175 Much, indeed, has happened in Haiti since 1941: the United States
105 withdrawal and the fading of the effects, both good and bad, of the
occupation; the positive economic consequences for Haiti of World

Leyburn noted that the United States occupation affected the nature 114
and rigidity of the barriers separating the yeomanry from the 565
elite. For instance, he calls attention to the fact that the presidents 648
elected during the United States occupation were light-skinned members 643
of the elite. It seemed almost inevitable that, when the North 175
Americans sought men through whom to prosecute their plans for "stabilizing" Haiti, they would settle on educated and worldly politicians, men who were both sufficiently trained and sufficiently pliant for the task. That these men were predominantly light-skinned was a corollary aspect of Haitian social history. In this way Washington played some part in reinforcing and expanding elite power; and herein lies a paradox with which the author of *The Haitian People* has dealt well. While the elite had been able to maintain their wealth and power in Haiti for nearly a century, the presidential succession before the United States occupation had largely been one of military chieftains, principally dark-skinned men from the north of the Republic. Michel Oreste, who had ruled for nine months in 1913–14, was the first civilian to be chosen president in Haiti's entire history up to that time; and Sudre Dartiguenave (1915–22), the North Americans' choice, was the first president since 1879 who was both a southerner and light-skinned. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century until the occupation, in other words, Haiti's presidents were almost entirely dark-skinned northern provincial leaders who literally seized power by invading Port-au-Prince and deposing their predecessors.

Hence, in describing the separation between elite and yeomanry, 701
it is essential to notice the traditional special role of the military, with 565
its particular overtones of color. Here was one institutional feature of Haitian society which was not directly dominated by the elite, and through which nonelite folk were able to attain special power. But in Haiti's case it is significant that the army itself was not firmly institutionalized; regional warlords, rather than a centralized officer corps,
made the decisions. Leyburn cites Auguste Magloire, who enumerated 114
sixty-nine "important" revolutions between 1806 and 1879; had 175
this enumeration gone forward, it would have been much longer. Of 643
Haiti's twenty-four chief executives between 1807 and 1915, only 669
eight were in office for a period equal to their elected terms, and 565
seventeen were deposed by revolution. Before the United States occupation, 701
then, the continuing power of the elite could be seen as somewhat separate from the succession of nonelite generals who seized office over the years.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966

SV3 Haiti SV3

● 648 669 565 701 439 The financing of these many revolutions was usually provided by foreign merchants, bent upon installing a government that would grant them special economic concessions (Munro, 1964:326–31). The United States occupation ended this doleful succession of regimes and, by throwing its weight to the elite, by suppressing military activity in the countryside, and by reforming the army, the United States gave a new meaning to the separation of the elite and the yeomanry. Leyburn's interpretation is consistent with these events; yet some Haitian scholars have differed with Leyburn's analysis.

114 564 563 671 144 In a lengthy review article, the dean of Haitian historians, Dr. Jean Price-Mars (1942:1–50), questions the applicability of the term "caste" to the social groupings of Haitian society. He notes that Haitian law after the revolution never legitimized any distinction on grounds of physical type, unlike a society such as the United States—that in fact, the very basis of Haitian polity was the absence of such distinctions. Furthermore, Leyburn's interpretation is qualified by the fact that the elite and the rural masses are not entirely distinctive physically. In some parts of rural Haiti, particularly in the southern peninsula, there are many light-skinned people; and many individuals who qualify as members of the elite on all other counts are very dark in appearance. The fact that being "Negro" or "white" in Haiti is viewed as a matter of degree, rather than of kind, complicated by all the other criteria of social position employed in drawing distinctions, has important implications for the way social barriers have operated in that country.*

114 565 Leyburn did not contend that all the effects of the United States occupation were in the direction of increasing the gap between the

ELITE AND THE YEOMANRY.

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568 564 171 144 * In this regard, Haiti is aligned with most of Latin America, in contradistinction to the United States, where many persons believe that "one drop of Negro blood" [sic] makes a "Negro." The failure of North Americans to distinguish between sociological and genetic categories of physical type has led to considerable confusion in their dealings with Latin America and in their understanding of Latin American societies. North American race prejudice at its most extreme sees color as the primary basis for social ranking, and no individual accomplishment (for instance, in terms of economic or intellectual success) can overshadow the inferior status undeniably bestowed by certain physical traits. In Haiti—and generally all Latin America—social distinctions do not rest solely on considerations of physical type; a black skin does not "doom" an individual if his attainments make him otherwise the equal of his lighter-skinned fellow citizens. Hence, it might be argued that the term "caste" would be more appropriate when applied to the Negro people of the United States (regardless of phenotype, and including those "Negroes" who are sociologically identified with the Negro people even if their physical appearance is dramatically Caucasian) than when applied to the peoples of Latin America.

elite and the yeomanry. For instance, he calls attention to one unanticipated (but inevitable) result of the occupation in this connection: the large number of children whose fathers were United States Marines, and whose mothers were members of the Haitian rural masses. In this way the occupation contributed to the growth of the physically intermediate population of Haiti, especially among rural folk, and thus perhaps to some bridging of the gap between yeomen and elite. Much more important, by its contributions to a broadening of the educational system, the occupation enabled talented black-skinned youths to improve themselves and to acquire new aspirations. 114 563 144 565 871

Recent economic and political developments in Haiti, through the period 1941–57, have contributed grounds for modification of the Leyburn interpretation. Though Leyburn predicted that "for the present and near future it is safe to say that there will be no more black non-élite presidents" (p. 101), subsequent developments soon proved him wrong. In January 1946, the government of elite member Elie Lescot fell under military pressure. A junta consisting of Franck Lavaud, Antoine Levelt, and Paul Magloire facilitated the installation of Dumarsais Estimé as president. Estimé was a dark-skinned man from the countryside (the village of Verettes, near St. Marc, in west-central Haiti), who had received a good education, served as a minister in the Vincent cabinet and, as a deputy, married a lighter-skinned woman whose family's elite membership was secure. Estimé might well be considered a self-made member of the elite, but he was not born into it, and his accession to power was the political expression of new possibilities in Haitian life. 114 175 565 643

The changes Estimé's regime symbolized were rooted in the intellectual resistance to the United States occupation and in the search for a Haitian identity in the face of that occupation. The strangely easy domination that the United States wielded over Haitian society for several decades, and the relatively unexploitative but patronizing administration it provided, ended forever a fantasy that had gripped Haitian intellectuals for more than a century. The world of 1804, when a bloodied but defiant Haiti could bar by force of arms Napoleon's dreams of a New World empire (and assist indirectly thereby in the territorial expansion of a still weak United States) had vanished. The time when a Pétion could aid, protect, and politically influence a sick and tired Simón Bolívar was long gone. The world had changed, while Haiti, the Haitians learned under their North 175 186 645

3: Leyburn Z-4,5 (no date) 1966

SV3 Haiti SV3

175 American masters, had nearly stood still. For almost a century,
● 685 Haiti's elite had taken justifiable pride in their ancestors' triumph
116 over Napoleonic France, even while they remained enthralled by
French culture. This strange ambivalence would no longer do. In ef-
[[illegible]] fect, the United States occupation compelled Haitian scholars to
rediscover what it meant to be Haitian.

114 As the writing of Jean Price-Mars (1928) expressed that identity
culturally, so the regime of Dumarsais Estimé began to express it
- 829 politically. For the first time, Africa, and not simply France, became
- 175 an important part of the nationalist dialogue. The Creole language
811 began to be studied in its own right, and a program to end illiteracy
212 through education in Creole was launched. Folkloristic studies, em-
191 phasizing the African component in Haitian rural life, especially as
874 expressed in religion, came into vogue. Haitians began to explore
their own society as a synthesis that was as much African as it was
555 French—and as a synthesis, rather than as a mechanical alignment of
643 two distinct traditions. The term *authentique* was employed to express
what was "truly Haitian," and Haiti herself was viewed as a unique and original blending of two pasts. Under Estimé, rural folk of promise—and they were, in the nature of things, predominantly dark-skinned—were given greater opportunities, especially to be educated and to enter government service. Moreover, these developments took place at a time when Haiti's economic situation was relatively good, and Estimé enjoyed a measure of popular support rare in Haiti's entire history.

175 Furthermore, it was during the Estimé regime that Haitian cul-
- 829 tural life reached some sort of climax. In the 1920s young Haitian in-
186 tellectuals had been deeply shaken by the United States occupation
and had begun to formulate their own answers to the questions it raised. Not only did Africa come into view as the wellspring of much that was Haitian but Haiti's status as an occupied though once-sovereign power dramatized the need for a social and political philosophy that fitted with hemispheric and international realities. French intellectual currents figured importantly in Haitian political thinking, both because the intellectuals of the French Antilles of the time were inspired by Haitian history and interested in Haiti, and because those islands and Haiti shared a curious affinity in their "Gallo-African" cultures. Anticolonial and Marxist points of view were espoused by a few Haitians, but these perspectives were complicated by changing

175 643 66 The course of events leading up to Duvalier's election are difficult to assess. Fignolé, whom the army had permitted to serve as president for sixteen days during the interregnum, had been denied official recognition by the United States, suggesting that this country feared the implications of his political philosophy; his attempts at passing a whole new code of far-reaching social legislation apparently frightened the army, which removed him on grounds of "maintaining order." By the time an election decree was promulgated in August 1957, Fignolé was disqualified, and Jumelle had been forced to withdraw from candidacy. By election day, September 1957, only Déjoie and Duvalier were in contention, while Jumelle had gone into hiding. An attempted general strike, probably led by Déjoieiste elements, was stopped by the army, and Dr. François Duvalier was elected to power.

175 642 66 701 643 The Duvalier régime, beyond any doubt, has added something new to the Haitian political scene. To begin with, it must be stressed that Duvalier enjoys some popular support in the countryside as well as in the urban centers. For many Haitians, Duvalier epitomizes the return of the Estimé philosophy to Haiti, and it would be a serious political error to suppose that the present regime is no more than an elite-hating dictatorship backed by machine guns. At the same time, the readiness of the Duvalieristes to use force probably exceeds that of any Haitian government in more than a century. Its excesses, moreover, appear to break certain traditions of political behavior—for instance, the unwillingness to take familial connections into account when political revenge is being carried out, the violence committed against women and adolescents regarded as political enemies, and so on. The most important break with tradition, however, has been the gradual undermining of the army as a political force—a force created in the first instance during the United States occupation.

175 642 648 643 In carrying out its plans, the Duvalier government has played more creatively upon inconsistencies in United States policy than any preceding regime. It used United States military and economic power to consolidate itself, while employing a posture of anti-North American hostility in its search for other internal sources of political support. Most strikingly, it has capitalized on the deterioration of the United States design in the Caribbean region, both to exact concessions and to enhance an international image of itself as a stalwart "democratic"

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966

SV3 Haiti SV3

regime. That President Duvalier has been able to stay in power in 175
spite of internal dissaffection, sometime hostile United States propaganda, 642
a dire economic situation, personal ill health, and other woes, 648
is a tribute to his political acumen, if not to his principles. None of 643
this means, of course, that such consummate skill will continue to
work; Haitian governments have a way of falling suddenly, and the
Duvalier regime will probably not prove an exception.

Dr. Duvalier's success indicates that he has made certain correct 175
assessments, not only of Haiti's social and political structure but also 648
of United States policy with regard to Haiti. The occupation was 433
notable for its failure to make any telling alterations in the economic 114
structure or level of development of the country. Many beneficial 744
changes were made, as Leyburn demonstrates, particularly in the 20
areas of health and health services, communications, government administration, 871
education, and transport (though the use of corvée labor 489
on the roads led to serious abuses, and stimulated sanguinary
guerilla warfare). But most significantly, the United States institutionalized 175
the army and police forces. The ragged bands of political 648
mercenaries of the past were dissolved; the officer-ridden army was 701
transformed into a small, well-trained, and well-organized force. 643
Eventual firm control by this force of weaponry, communications, 669
and transport ended the era of presidential succession by invasion, 625
turned the army into the major locus of nonelectoral, president-making
power, and may have ended forever the possibility of an
agrarian revolt against the central authority. Another political effect
of the occupation was the importance it imparted to the United
States ambassador, whose political opinions thereafter would matter
significantly in the transmission of power at the top of the Haitian
governmental system. The Duvalier regime has continuously taken
full account of the consequences of United States interest; and its
leaders have been able to watch the operation of that interest in the
political events occurring between the fall of the Lescot government
and the present.

In the view of one acute observer, President Duvalier, in order to 175
consolidate his power, had to cope with three other loci of political 643
strength in addition to the army and the United States ambassador. 66
The business community, located for the most part in Port-au-Prince,
had strongly supported Déjoie's candidacy during the interregnum;
its leaders were mainly members of the elite, and many had strong

175 business and personal ties with North Americans and other foreign
643 groups. Among the families of these leaders are Swiss, German, and
French nationals, and some Syrians and Lebanese who hold United
66 States citizenship. The business community had played a part in the
795 downfall of the Magloire regime, and business strikes were a typical
political instrument for putting pressure on presidential incumbents. In addition, the clergy—particularly the Catholic clergy—exerted political influence. Duvalier, while well aware of this, also attended to the importance of vodoun* in Haiti, and to the influence wielded by its cult leaders, particularly in the countryside and among the urban poor. Finally, the President understood the strength of groups such as the university students, the small but politically aware labor unions, and certain professional associations, whose political strength could be felt particularly in times of crisis. The Duvalier regime has displayed intelligence as well as ruthlessness in dealing with these diverse centers of political strength and potential opposition.

175 The official request for a United States Marine Corps mission to
648 "train" the Haitian Army was a brilliant political move by Duvalier,
apparently designed to serve several objectives simultaneously. It is
701 entirely correct that the renewed presence of the Marines in Haiti
702 created considerable rancor in some circles, but it also strengthened
66 Duvalier's hand in his dealings with all sources of internal opposition.
To some extent it apparently reassured the business community; and it turned out to have reduced, rather than to have increased, the maneuverability of the United States in developing a "corrective" or "restraining" policy toward the Duvalier regime. Perhaps most important, it helped Duvalier in his plan to build a praetorian guard to counterbalance the power of the army itself.

625 The *tonton macoute*—a Creole epithet for the bogeyman—is an extremely interesting variation on the security police theme. Its members wear no official uniform (though blue denim pants and felt hats
[701] are affected). Members of the "TTM" carry out acts of terrorism
against groups and individuals and have seriously weakened the po-
[652] licing function and prestige of the regular army. Some calculations
put the operating costs of the TTM as high as one third of the governmental budget. Though small groups of the TTM are distributed

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* Or, as it is more commonly called, "voodoo." Creole words employed in this introduction are transcribed in Laubach orthography (see Hall, 1953). It was not possible to extend this transcription to the original Leyburn text, where a "Gallic" orthography is followed.

643 771 795 At the same time, the President has expressed his favorable interest in vodoun and is said to practice it; this statement, however, has overtones of malevolence that are not appropriate. Vodoun is a religion, though it lacks a centralized priestly hierarchy or administrative organization. Outside the elite, Catholicism in Haiti has always been colored by vodoun elements. The Haitian people as a whole invest no effort in distinguishing what is "really Catholic" from what is not, in their religious practices; in this regard Haitian countrymen do not really differ from folk practitioners of Catholicism anywhere. By its misreading of the piety of the Haitian masses, and its unceasing hostility to vodoun—quite different from the church policy in the so-called "Indian countries" of Latin America—the Church had failed to secure its influence over the Haitian people. In contrast, Duvalier's understanding of Haitian religious sociology has proved superior, and is consistent with the *authentique* ideology of the 1940s, though doubtless much more extreme in its implications.

642 871 467 204 661 Finally, the Duvalier regime has invaded such institutions as the National University and the trade unions, and maintains close surveillance over any individuals it regards as politically suspicious. Loyalty oaths are required at the university; a public press no longer exists; the unions, never strong, are now entirely powerless. But it should be clear from this description of the Duvalier regime that repression is not the key to Duvalier power so much as the means for perpetuating that power under Haitian conditions. 642 ●648 The key to Duvalier power is to be found instead in the structure of Haitian society, in the social history of the past two decades, and in the policy of the United States, weakened by its inescapable preference for "stability" over "radicalism." In his own way, President Duvalier is as radical as he can be; but he is no Castro. It is now an open secret that Haiti's support for sanctions against Cuba approved at Punta del Este was matched by economic concessions from the United States; that the Marines, knowingly or not, immobilized anti-Duvalier opposition in a period when its supporters could be picked off, driven into exile, or jailed; that the official Duvalier offer of Môle St. Nicholas to the United States as a substitute for Guantánamo, though irrelevant, was warmly reassuring to some North American political thinkers; and that Duvalier, while he employs considerable "blackmail diplomacy" in his dealings with the United States and is now out of favor, is still considered "reliable" in that most important respect.

Nor is it sufficient to label *Duvalierisme* "pathological" or "paranoid." 642
The roots of this ideology are to be found in Haiti, not elsewhere;
its supporters are the product of Haitian times and ideas; and
their social identity, while not entirely clear, would probably pose
few enigmas if enough data were available.* In order to make clear [114]
these assertions, however, it is necessary to look again at Haitian society,
the Haitian society Leyburn has described so well, and to reexamine
the terms that have been used by him and by others to describe it.
174

Though the societies of the Caribbean Sea differ significantly from 175
each other, many of them share certain general historical experiences. 171
Unlike the colonial areas of the Old World, these islands were largely 648
populated from abroad, and in this regard they resemble the Atlantic
lowland areas of mainland America. However, the colonial history of
the islands meant that they would long remain the instruments of
policy formulated in foreign capitals. Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and other
islands were, during most of their postconquest history, the outposts
of far-flung colonial empires, and the design of their societies was
conditioned by this dependence and subjugation. As "plantation islands,"
their agriculture, demography, mode of settlement, and social
structure were attuned to metropolitan needs and objectives. Unlike [161]
most of Africa and Asia, the Antilles lost their native populations almost
entirely, owing to enslavement, overwork, disease, and war,
early in the era of conquest and settlement. There remained the vestiges [177]
of native traditions, assimilated into the new, growing cultures
of the postconquest period. The Indians themselves, wherever they [563]
were able to survive, were also assimilated through interbreeding
with Old World migrants.
174

The newcomers came from Europe, Africa, and Asia, bringing 175
with them what they could of their ancestral traditions, but never 171
able to transfer their social heritages as intact bodies of belief and behavior. 167
Hence the cultures of the new Caribbean societies were built
up out of elements originating in many different places, while their
social forms took shape under conditions of colonial control. The ooo
peoples of the islands were able to maintain some continuities with

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* One interpreter of the Haitian political scene (Bastien, 1960:845–48) has suggested that Leyburn's analysis of Haitian society as a "two-caste" system greatly influenced local political thinking by strengthening one idea: "the black intellectual must regain political power for the benefit of the country's majority."

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342
322 unchanged from an earlier era. The prevailing quality of Haitian
178 rural and craft industry, then, is one of great stability and conservatism.

493 At the same time, of course, major events since the revolution have
463 left their imprint on this part of life. Hardly a roadside village in
Haiti today, for instance, lacks an automobile mechanic, even though
these men are mostly self-educated and work with hardly any tools.
Their skills became part of Haitian culture in this century and are often
383 of a simple order no longer typical of more developed areas. Tire
tubes, for instance, are "vulcanized" by the use of an ingenious device
177 made from a board and an old piston, kerosene providing the
heat to make the seal; this technique, along with the sewing of damaged
truck tires, was almost certainly introduced and diffused by the
United States Marines.

47 But these quaint additions do not alter the fact that shop and factory
31 industry are nearly absent, and extractive industry virtually nonexistent.
178 Haiti's one alumina extraction enterprise, foreign-owned, is
now shut down. There is but one flour mill, and that is foreign-
[258] owned as well. One or two textile mills and sugar factories, established
[339] with foreign capital, still function, as do a modern cement
[464] factory and a few other small plants established in the 1950s. These
industries, scanty as they are, were of great importance to Haiti, since
they represented substantial investments, held out the promise of reduced
dependence on imports in significant categories, and contributed
to the beginnings of an industrial proletariat. However, they involved
only a tiny fraction of the national labor force, and they have
not proved entirely successful. As a result, Haiti lacks any reserve of
labor acquainted with modern industry, even though many people,
both urban and rural, work at tasks that might be considered more
industrial than agricultural.

-47 Most important for the present discussion, the minor developments
433 in Haitian industry have not led to an expanded market and have not
resulted in any firm increase in productivity. Industrial growth, in
-178 the sense in which it has occurred in countries such as those of Western
171 Europe—or for that matter in Mexico or Argentina—is entirely
lacking. The absence of such growth is perhaps especially significant
if Haiti be compared with a neighbor such as Jamaica or Puerto Rico.
● [648] These countries, one now independent, the other a North American
dependency—have both gained real increments from the investment
activities of outsiders;

433 activities of outsiders; Haiti has experienced few such increments, even
as a result of the United States occupation. Its citizens cannot readily
47 migrate anywhere; its educational system cannot prepare its people
171 adequately for the modern world; its civil service has proved neither
178 stable nor reliable; its labor force has limited experience with the factory
648 system; and even two decades of active North American intervention
did nothing to remake the economic and political structure
of the nation. In more recent years, some of the "development projects"
foisted on the people of a sovereign Haiti by foreigners working
with Haitian officials would not have been tolerated by the colonial
representatives of any foreign power obligated to report its
activities before the United Nations Trusteeship Council. In view of
these things, one is tempted to claim that Haiti has suffered from all
the disadvantages of political sovereignty while enjoying none of its
advantages.

Unlike those colonial dependencies that were able, over time, to develop internal political ideologies through which to face the pressures imposed by the colonial powers, Haiti was tested by hardly any challenge but its own lack of development. In this sense only can it be said that the freedom Haiti had won in an incredible revolution against powerful enemies came to be a punishment. The struggle brought the Haitian people justified admiration in many quarters, but its price has been isolation and virtual abandonment.

648 It was the United States occupation that made a lie of Haitian sovereignty,
72 and even of the invincibility of its people. The Haitian
"bandits," variously estimated to have numbered from 2,000 to
6,000, who died in what is probably best described as a war of resistance
against the North Americans, were barely able to maintain even
a brief local conflict against several well-armed companies of United
States Marines. Yet that occupation gave Haiti little in return for its
denial of the claim of national sovereignty. The public works and reform
programs instituted by the United States, designed to give the
country roads, schools, hospitals, a disciplined army, a "legitimate"
government, and a schooled civil service, hardly endured longer than
the occupation itself, since nothing had been done to transform the
social and economic base of the society. Within a decade of the
North American withdrawal, the gleaming superstructure the occupation
000 created had begun to decay. The major effect of North Amer-

The major effect of the North

Amer-
648 642 ican tenure seems to have been to make possible a much more telling centralism in political control than had been operative in Haiti at any time since the fall of the Christophe regime; and the consequences of this change are still being felt.

241 565 433 178 185 511 472 Small-scale rural cultivators are famous for their tendency to confine their consumption to culturally conventionalized levels—that is, to live as their predecessors lived before them. Though they are involved in commercial spheres larger than the communities in which they live, they seek to limit that involvement and to maintain their cash expenditures at a low level. It is in this sense that Haiti might be called a "quasi-capitalistic" society. To put it another way, yeomen of this sort do not seek to change or to expand their production—rather, they aim to conserve a way of life set by tradition. The ideology of resistance to social and cultural change is one of the major obstacles to development; but it would be rash to damn such an ideology without reflection. In Haiti, for instance, there has long been pressure upon the rural masses to expand their production of coffee, the major export crop. However, this pressure has not been accompanied by any serious grass-roots attempt to improve coffee production or to offer genuine incentives to the cultivators. The yeomanry has no assurance at all that any expansion of effort will lead to gains *for them*; and they are little prepared to invest such effort merely because they are told that it will be good for Haiti. In fact, it is likely [439] that the production of subsistence crops has expanded in recent years at the cost of coffee production, for the yeoman knows that he can at least be sure of eating and of selling locally such crops as maize, sorghum, and yams, regardless of what may happen in Port-au-Prince or to the world coffee market. This view, combined with the yeoman's painfully acquired distrust of those who prate at length concerning his welfare, has meant a virtual stagnation of agricultural export production, even though the whole land quite literally depends on this production in order to progress.

241 565 433 185 The effect of this rural resistance is to create an apparent very sharp difference in goals between countryman and bureaucrat. It is perfectly understandable that the countryman should fail to see the connection between heightened coffee production and a higher level of public welfare and social services. His experiences hardly persuade him that it is his surplus-producing capacity that underlies the kind and quality of public institutions with which the state provides him.

241 Nor does his effort in producing more and better cash crops translate
565 itself directly into higher consumption, since he has no say in setting
185 the price for his coffee. Under the circumstances, it is naïve to suppose
433 that "education" alone can make the yeoman's role in economic
or political development a more active one. The disposition to maintain a habitual level of consumption, rather than to believe that an increase in productivity will result in expanding services or improved consumption, is difficult to change; and the quasi-capitalistic quality of Haitian agricultural production is merely one way of saying as much. Economic change, in this sense, has to depend partly on changes in attitudes toward production. Until an agricultural extension service worthy of the name is able to make a massive attack on the shortcomings of yeoman cultivation in Haiti, this conservatism will perpetuate itself. And agricultural extension will not be able to wage this battle for change—even when its services become adequate in quality and quantity—unless the promises of greater economic rewards or of improved social services for the rural masses are occasionally honored.

47 The term "quasi-capitalistic" has much less force, of course, when
433 applied to urban enterprise. But there, too, economic activity has a
565 curiously static quality when compared to enterprise in more developed
countries. The Port-au-Prince capitalist is famous for "playing
178 it safe." Import–export trade, tourist hotels, guided tours, gas stations, and urban slum real estate are more rewarding spheres of investment than shops or commercial farms. A small but economically important Syrian–Lebanese–Italian group limits its local investment accordingly, as do most of those "native" Haitians who carry on their businesses in the towns and cities. Elite families consist largely of siblings who interlock their economic activities with government, the military, agricultural processing and exporting, consumer-goods importing, tourist-connected services, and the professions. A slum block, a post in the ministry of tourism, a colonelcy, or a tour agency, can be a lucrative investment; few indeed are the Haitians prepared to take the risks needed to develop highly productive farms, to produce improved strains of poultry, or to introduce industrial skills through a modern machine shop. And the reasons for this lack of verve and daring are easy to find. Governmental instability, excessive
●[648] taxation, lack of access to markets, and the absence of roads, communication, small-scale credit facilities, and the like mean that special

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intrepidity in enterprise is required. It is striking that those foreign
648 captains of industry—mainly from the United States—who invest in
Haiti, expect (and often get) governmental guarantees of a sort they
could not dream of in their own countries; in this regard, they merely
conform to Haitian expectations.

Haiti's problems, then, are not simply those that face any less de-
433 veloped country, vast though such problems may be. Nor is it intelli-
47 gent to lay Haiti's problems at the feet of the nation's present rulers.
178 The structure of the national economy has not changed significantly
during the past twenty-five years—except that boom years could
provide a temporary aura of prosperity—regardless of the philosophy
648 or popularity of the regime in power. If nothing else, the present
nadir of Haiti's fortunes demonstrates that United States aid averag-
652 ing twelve and a half million dollars yearly over more than a decade
433 has produced no enduring improvements of any kind. It may further
demonstrate that, shockingly poor as the country is, it emphatically
does not depend on such aid. As of 1964, the regime in power was
operating on a monthly budget of $1,800,000, only $400,000 of which
went for purposes other than salaries. In other words, the ministries
[511] do little more than perpetuate themselves unchanged. The yeomanry,
living near subsistence level, continues to produce most of what it
needs, while restricting its cash expenditures even more severely than
in the past. The risks—in terms, say, of public health—of running a
society under these circumstances are great; but there is no reason to
suppose that regimes of the Haitian sort will be destroyed or im-
proved by a show of popular unrest originating in the countryside.
[369] Difficult as life is for the Haitian countryman, and no people in Latin
America lives more poorly, the real pinch is probably being experi-
enced more acutely among the city folk than among their rural fel-
low citizens. It matters politically, therefore, who these city folk are
and what they do.

463 To begin with, there has been a significant loss of professional
167 people, almost all of whom were urban, through migration and ex-
ile, especially since 1958. Haitian doctors, dentists, and other profes-
sionals are widely scattered today, both in the developed and the less
developed countries of the world. Former army officers, journalists,
diplomats, businessmen, and academicians have fled political repres-
sion, perhaps with the hope of eventually returning to their own
country.

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about Haitian society.* It does not, however, take note of the remarkable
114 failure of foreign experts to make any adequate assessment
of the potentialities of that society, or of its most-needed changes.
Some of the problems of development, remarked on by Leyburn in
1941, have never even been explored adequately: the advisability of
primary education in Creole; the need for an effective agricultural
extension; the relationship of nutrition to work habits; and the like.
Even basic sociological studies of a sort that could provide data for
planned change are lacking—"of the process of socialization . . . of
the motivating forces, the dominant wishes, the attitudes and social
● 648 values of the masses . . . of social mobility" (pp. 308–09). Foreign-inspired
development projects have been, for the most part, crash
projects, designed to satisfy Haitian political goals, rather than economic
or social goals. A productive relationship between foreign
development agency representatives and government officials has
never been achieved, nor have the failures ever been subjected to
analysis or reflection. Emphasis has been put on large-scale schemes,
rather than on more modest, long-term programs which would require
actual cooperation with the rural masses on the local level (cf.
Erasmus, 1952; Friedmann, 1955; De Young, 1958). Many—probably
most—foreign planners who have worked in Haiti have never
even bothered to learn the national language, let alone the fundamentals
of the culture of the Haitian people.

114 In these terms, it is not enough merely to bemoan the feeble institutional structure of Haiti. Some attention, at least, should be given to the striking incapacity of outsiders to deal with that structure creatively. Leyburn's book exacts our respect precisely because its author, unlike most foreign visitors, makes plain that he takes Haiti, and the needs of the Haitian people, seriously.

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* Some observers are less pessimistic than the writer. The sons of the elite, many of them
668 educated abroad, elements of a Social Christian progressive movement, and possibly a few
"Castro-left" radicals, may eventually coalesce into a successful opposition, it has been argued.
171 The writer, however, remains unconvinced. Structural changes of the sort wrought by the
114 Castro regime in Cuba were predicated on the existence of mass political opposition to Batista-type
governments, and on the existence of industrial and rural proletarian sectors organized
into large-scale movements. These "preconditions," as I see them, are entirely lacking in Haiti
of today.

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FOREWORD

The United States, embarked upon a policy of good neighborliness toward 648
the other countries of the Western Hemisphere, is beginning to improve 171
its acquaintance with the republics to the south. Most of its efforts at
present are directed toward an understanding of the large and important
powers, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, which, because of their
size and resources, are potentially our greatest allies—or, if we fail in our
policies, our sources of greatest danger. There are, however, twenty republics
to the south of us, many of them small. A truly good neighbor does not
ignore near-by families who are lacking in wealth, even those who are
known to differ among themselves.

Of the twenty Latin-American republics, the second smallest is Haiti. 721
The United States was only twenty years old when the people of this little 648
country (which, for all its diminutive size, had been France's wealthiest 642
colony of the eighteenth century) fought their own war of independence,
and in 1804 founded the second free state in the hemisphere. Haiti has
many claims upon the attention of the United States: its war against
France in 1802–3 was at least a contributing factor in Napoleon's willingness
to sell Louisiana to this country; it was the first independent Negro
state in the modern world; its foreign policy has long been intertwined
with our own; finally, the nineteen-year American Occupation of the
country has brought us into an even closer relationship with Haiti than
independent factors could produce.

When the country was young there was a spate of books trying to 114
answer the question whether a nation ruled by blacks could long endure.
In more recent years, works on the Antillean republic have generally dealt
with single phases of its life, as for example its political relations with the
United States, or its "Voodoo" practices. There is, however, no connected
story of the growth of its social institutions out of the backgrounds of
slavery and French colonial life, or of the slow shaping of these institutions
through the nineteenth century. It is this growth which the present volume 121
undertakes to describe. Political history has been introduced only so far as
necessary to provide the convenient pegs upon which most of us are accus-

565 *caste* is the only word to describe the effective separation of aristocrats
from the masses. The caste system is a vivid fact, for it regulates a
person's profession, speech, religion, marriage, family life, politics,
clothes, social mobility—in short, his whole life from cradle to grave.

175 Haiti won its freedom from the France of Napoleon in 1804,
648 becoming thus the second independent state in the Western Hemisphere.
It had been during the eighteenth century France's most
prosperous colony, its wealth depending upon slavery and the plantation
565 system. With the whites driven out, social distinctions which
642 actually had their roots in colonial times began immediately to
develop among the people, all of whom had some proportion of
African blood in their veins. During the course of the next century,
the criteria for aristocracy slowly assumed recognizable form, so that
now even the most casual observer is aware that Haiti cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be called a democratic country, with an
open class system. The two castes are the élite and the masses. They
are as different as day from night, as nobleman from peasant; and
[162] they are as separate as oil and water. The élite are generally reckoned
to compose at the outside not more than three per cent of the
population.

565 The élite do not work with their hands. This is the cardinal rule of
Haitian society. Upon it rests the whole economic structure of the
463 country, and to this the course of national history has led. All the
[461] professions, most governmental and military offices, and the large
business enterprises are effectively closed to young men of the masses.
Indeed, so completely accepted are caste rules, so practically difficult
would it be for peasant youths to acquire the money and education
necessary for such careers, that at birth a boy's future place in economic
life is, within narrow limits, already predetermined. For the
élite, law is the most popular of the professions, partly because it is the
quickest avenue of approach to high political office; government, in
turn, is the only career which can make a man rich within a few
years. Next in popularity to law comes medicine. Teaching is not
lucrative enough to attract many promising youths, and the priests of
the Roman Catholic Church are almost all white Frenchmen.[2]

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793 [2] An effort was once made by the Catholic Church to train native Haitian priests,
but the peasants would have none of them after they were ordained. They drove them
797 out, saying, "Go away! How do you expect God to listen to you? You are not white;
you don't know anything." And the Haitian priests had to be transferred as missionaries
to Africa.

II

FRENCH COLONIAL ORIGINS

175 FRANCE'S wealthiest colony in 1791 was, and had been for
● 648 decades, the small territory of Saint-Domingue, as Haiti was
known at that time. It had belonged to France for less than a
century. French freebooters and buccaneers of the seventeenth century actually presented the colony to their mother country, for these sea rovers, harrying the Spanish Main, used as a base for their predatory raids the small island of Tortuga (La Tortue, The Turtle) off the northern coast of Haiti. They often came over to the western part of the large Spanish island of Santo Domingo (Haiti), then almost deserted, to shoot wild cattle for food; then they would hasten back to Tortuga for safety. At first Tortuga had been shared by English, Dutch, and French buccaneers, but gradually the French came to outnumber the others, so that when the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 concluded the War of the Grand Alliance, France claimed and Spain ceded the western third of the island of Santo Domingo. The English and Dutch were meanwhile picking up other Caribbean fragments of the decaying Spanish Empire.

175 The early years of this new French colony were unimpressive, the
563 majority of its residents being former buccaneers, who could hardly
have regarded agricultural life as other than dull, and who certainly
24 did not make successful farmers. Only when new immigrants from
France in the seventeen-twenties demonstrated that steady profits
could be made by raising indigo, sugar, coffee, and cocoa, all of
which flourished in the region, did the era of prosperity begin.
[464] Plantations were soon staked out all over Saint-Domingue. The great
problem was to find adequate labor for the fields. Whoever had
[439] crops to sell was sure of a ready market, but crops would not grow
175 without cultivation. Since there were no natives in Saint-Domingue
24 for the French planters to exploit, the colonizers chose the other
567 favorite alternative of the eighteenth century: Negro slavery. In the
1730's Saint-Domingue began to compete with England's North
American colonies for the cargo of the steady stream of slave ships
from Africa. There is no indication that the supply of blacks ever

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175 equaled the demand for them; in 1791 the census listed half a million
24 then living, but no writer seems to have even a vague idea of how
567 many millions were imported during the sixty years of the colony's
heyday.

Production, particularly of sugar and coffee, steadily increased
175 until the tiny colony ranked among the wealthiest regions of the
245 world. The Spanish Indies were declining, so that Saint-Domingue
249 alone far outranked them all combined between 1766 and 1791.
433 Splendid roads were built, extensive irrigation projects developed,
511 and stately mansions erected. Life moved along with ceremony and
display—for the planters; attended by their black lackeys, the white
565 French masters entertained royally or were driven like lords in their
coaches to make formal visits to neighbors. Many of these well-to-do
colonials spent half their time in Paris, ostentatiously spending their
riches. To be "wealthy as a Creole" came to be a common expression
in France.[1] Perhaps nowhere in the Americas was existence at once so
delightful and so ornamental as it was for the wealthy planters among
the 36,000 whites of Saint-Domingue in 1791.

For the mother country, too, this small bit of tropical land was
175 profitable during the latter days of Bourbon royalty. Neither Mar-
439 tinique nor Guadeloupe could compare with it in value. In 1789
505 nearly two thirds of the foreign commercial interests of France
● 648 centred in Saint-Domingue; its combined exports and imports were
valued at more than $140,000,000; its sugar, coffee, indigo, and
cotton supplied the home market and employed in prosperous years
more than 700 ocean-going vessels, with as many as 80,000 seamen.[2]

Where wealth exists, social distinctions generally develop. In
175 Saint-Domingue the evolving class system produced such discord
565 that sparks from the French Revolution eventually set off an explo-
669 sion in the colony. Casual surveys of Haitian history generally record
that in 1791 the slaves revolted, and that out of this insurrection grew
the war of independence. This is true; but it was not the resentment
of slaves against their masters which caused the final explosion; the
175 slaves were tinder used by others to keep the conflagration burning.
545 Negro slaves, of course, did not figure in the "class" system; they
[567] were below the classes of colonial society. The class system, properly

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[1] The word "Créole" means only "colonial born"; there is no connotation of race mixture in the term.

[2] Pamphile de Lacroix, Mémoires, II, 277.

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175 speaking, consisted of the three groups known as *grands blancs, petits*
175 *blancs*, and *gens de couleur*.[3] Although no precise English term will
565 translate either of the first two categories, the former embraced the
important whites—owners of large plantations, wealthy merchants,
and high officials of the state; the latter designated all other whites of
the colony—shopkeepers, artisans, small planters with only a few
slaves, little people busily engaged in social climbing, and shiftless
whites lazily slipping downhill. The 28,000 gens de couleur included
all free persons who had African blood in their veins.

It is highly probable that without this third group there would have been no violent outbreak in 1791, no achievement of final independence in 1804, and no such caste system as exists in Haiti at the present time.

175 That there were free people of color in the colony was due to a
code of laws emanating from Louis XIV, who died in 1715, years
567 before Saint-Domingue had shown any signs of becoming prosper-
641 ous. In 1685 the Grand Monarch had issued a Code Noir to cover all
● 648 colonial dealings with Negro slaves. Article 59 specified that when a
slave secured his liberty, either by cash purchase or by gift of his
white master or parent, he was to be regarded as a full French citizen.
He might own land, dispose of his wealth as he pleased, bear testimony in legal cases (even against whites), marry as he pleased, vote, bear arms, travel where he wished, embrace any career, own slaves or free them. To Louis and his ministers such provisions probably did not seem particularly magnanimous, for race prejudice was not a characteristic of the French, and it could hardly have been supposed that enough slaves would ever be freed to create much of a problem.

175 In the course of the next hundred years, however, many persons of
563 color in the colony achieved their freedom, and with it French citi-
641 zenship. The greatest number had been granted their liberty because
they were the children of white masters by Negro mothers—for race
mixture is always a concomitant of white ownership of black slaves.
[595] Concubinage was so regularly practiced in Saint-Domingue that it
was considered quite normal. If many of the first freedmen were
563 mulattoes (half-white, half-Negro), by 1791 their descendants might
175 be quadroons, octoroons, or near-whites, for consciousness of skin

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[3] The gens de couleur were also often called *affranchis*, freedmen, a term which strictly would be inaccurate as applied to a free colored person of the second or third generation.

lishing their freedom from the taint of any black admixture. Having 175
entered white society by such means, and further diluted their 565
Negro blood by judicious marriages, these social climbers frequently 829
became the most pitiless masters of slaves in the colony, the most [556]
rigid sticklers for a color line, ruthless enemies of recent freedmen and of those who acknowledged the dark strain in their blood; and having now "passed over" as whites, they snubbed the petits blancs.

The rising tide of color prejudice became apparent in the passage 175
of discriminatory laws. The first of any importance was enacted by 671
the representative Council of the colony, sitting at the capital, Cap 565
Français, in 1758. It prohibited all colored people, except police and militiamen, from carrying swords, sabres, or other side arms—thus denying them one of the outward marks of gentlemen. Four years later the prohibition was extended to the bearing of all firearms, except in service, while in 1767 the sale of munitions to colored persons was forbidden unless ordered by a white officer. Obviously the instigators of prejudice had by this time won a number of ruling grands blancs to the notion that the presence of numerous people of color might constitute a menace to the physical safety of the whites.

Louis XV, the reigning monarch, took no steps to enforce the 175
liberal provisions of the Code Noir of his grandfather; on the con- 648
trary, he seems to have favored the passage of discriminatory laws. 563
He made it difficult for colored planters to travel freely in France. 671
The colonial perpetrators of indignities to the gens de couleur, seeing the success of their first efforts, began to propose increasingly severe restrictions, and were gratified by Louis XV's official "Instructions to Administrators" (1771), which stressed the necessity of maintaining a line between the two races which colored people and their descendants might never cross.

For the next two decades the affranchi had to face openly avowed 175
discrimination. One by one his rights in the Code were abrogated. 565
He might not fill any responsible office either in the courts or the 563
militia, for that would elevate him above white persons. Certain 671
careers, such as goldsmithing, were closed to him, because they brought wealth; others, notably medicine and the apothecary's art, were forbidden on the ground that whites might be poisoned;[8] law and religion were barred to him because of their public and honorific

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[8] It was a common belief in slave colonies that all persons with Negro blood had some "instinctive" knowledge of the science and art of poisoning. [829]

175 563 565 671 nature.[9] Colored women were forbidden in 1768 to marry white men. In 1779 began a series of laws designed to humiliate the colored person in public: his clothes must be of a different material and cut from the white person's; he must be indoors by nine o'clock in the evening; he might not sit in the same section of churches and theatres with whites.[10]

175 648 924 [668] [565] Just at the moment when prejudice and hatred seem to have reached their most menacing proportions, when even moderate white planters began to feel that such passions had been aroused among both white and colored folk that only brutal severity could hold them in check, the Revolution began in France. Both sides in the colony hoped to make use of it. The whites saw in the mother country's confusion an opportunity to win self-government for the colony—with themselves, of course, as the untrammeled rulers. The gens de couleur, taking to heart the noble Declaration of the Rights of Man, hoped to regain their full rights as French citizens, guaranteed to them in Louis XIV's Code, but now in abeyance.

175 646 648 671 During the fateful years 1788 to 1793 colonial affairs were intertwined with developments in France. Men and messages went back and forth between Cap Français and Paris, following the startling announcement that after a lapse of 150 years the States-General would be convoked in May, 1789. At a meeting of the colonial assembly in September, 1788, called to nominate delegates, the group of grands blancs who controlled colonial affairs decided on two daring steps, which later proved to be blunders: first, they named thirty-seven deputies to represent Saint-Domingue; second, they drew up a *Cahier des Doléances*—a list of grievances whose sole palliation, it was implied, would be the granting of permission to the white planters to govern the colony without interference from France. These two decisions, be it said, were not unanimously approved in the assembly at Cap Français; cautious minds warned against pretentious demands which might do nothing more than attract concentrated attention to the state of affairs in Saint-Domingue: it might be wiser, they argued, to let sleeping dogs lie, and ignore the convocation of the States-General. The cautious were outvoted.

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[565] [829] [566]

[9] A colored lawyer might win a case against a white man; a colored priest might have to hear the confession of a white woman.

[10] When certain mulattoes arrived at church in Cap Français wearing clothes of the same texture as the whites', constables tore the garments from the backs of male and female alike, leaving them "with no other veil than their shame."

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At Paris the following May, therefore, the thirty-seven delegates 175
presented themselves. Only six were admitted as deputies. And the 648 ●
colonial skeptics proved correct in their apprehensions: revolutionary France soon became very much interested in the state of affairs in Saint-Domingue.

There had recently been formed in Paris a humanitarian group, 175
considered at the time to be ultra-radical, whose announced purpose 648
was the complete abolition of Negro slavery in all French posses- 567
sions. Following the principle of demanding much in order to gain
something, these *Amis des Noirs* concentrated their most serious 648
efforts on regaining for colored colonial freedmen their former political rights. The recently promulgated "Rights of Man" made it very difficult for the French National Assembly[11] to deny the proposal of the Amis;[12] moreover, at this juncture the colored landlords of Saint-Domingue sent to Paris an offer to make the new French Republic a free gift of one fifth of their wealth on condition of being no longer subject to the creole tyranny of caste.

The strategical blunder of the self-assertive white planters having 175
now become entirely apparent to their deputies in Paris, these left no 642
stone unturned to thwart the objective of the Amis des Noirs. By 648
indefatigable manoeuvring they at least partially succeeded, for the National Assembly passed an ambiguous resolution which, while apparently granting political rights to colored people, nevertheless left the interpretation of the grant to already existing colonial authorities.

In the colony complete confusion reigned when news of the resolution was received. Colored people everywhere joyfully demanded their rights, only to be indignantly refused. The whites, with no intention of yielding an inch, were nevertheless undecided as to a proper course of action to pursue: one group wished to announce the colony's immediate independence from France, offering the familiar argument that only white planters knew how to manage the colony's peculiar affairs; the other group still cautiously counseled inaction and waiting for the storm to blow over. A young mulatto, Ogé, educated in France and encouraged by the Amis des

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[11] The National Assembly had succeeded the States-General.

[12] The *Assembly* was finding "liberté, égalité, fraternité" as uncomfortable a motto to live up to as Americans were finding their own declaration, in 1776, of belief in the "self-evident" proposition that all men are created free and equal.

175 Noirs, having returned to Saint-Domingue to campaign for the
● 648 political rights of his group, led with his friend Chavanne a demon-
642 stration at Cap Français. The white authorities seized and executed
them with notable brutality.

175 This occurred in March, 1791. In May came the news that the
648 National Assembly in France had finally yielded to pressure, and had
563 decreed that men of mixed blood born of free parents should be
565 admitted to representation in colonial assemblies. The chagrin and
anger of the whites at this decree was so violent that the governor-general of Saint-Domingue immediately suspended its operation.
175 The issue was now clearly drawn: free colored men knew that they
567 would never secure their rights except by force. But before they
669 could bring to maturity their plan of action, suddenly the calculations
of both parties were completely upset. The Negro slaves revolted.

If ever slaves had reason to rebel, the Negroes of Saint-Domingue did. The same harshness which the whites showed to free colored people marked the treatment of black slaves; and as racial antagonism deepened, white masters seemed to become utterly heartless in their treatment of the inarticulate blacks. Allowing for the exceptions which accompany most generalizations, it is clear from the record that the planters were, in the main, callous, ruthless, some of them even fiendish, in their treatment of slaves. Flogging a man to death was not uncommon; certain slaves were buried alive; pregnant women were forced to work so hard that miscarriage resulted. Some of the punishments meted out were merely brutal; others were torture; and some were sadistic, the masters relishing the pain they were causing. A certain slave in the North was nailed by his hands to a wall, and then, after standing all day in the burning sun, was made to eat his own amputated ears. A woman planter had the tongues of all her slaves cut out; another woman caused the starvation of her maid by having a gag fixed around the child's head.[13] Visitors to the colony in the 1780's often commented on the general want of self-control on the part of the planters—their violent gusts of anger and passionate outbreaks over trifles; and the victims of these outbursts

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[13] An officer of the court of the Negro king Christophe later wrote in two volumes a gruesome account of the treatment of slaves by French masters in the latter days of the colony. Although certainly exaggerated, it probably contains a measure of truth. See Baron de Vastey, *Réflexions politiques sur les noirs et les blancs* (Sans Souci, 1817); and *Essai sur les causes de la révolution et des guerres civiles d'Hayti* (Sans Souci, 1819).

were the slaves. Most of the blacks accordingly needed only leader- 175
ship to arouse them and direct their vengeance. 567

Very little of the background of the insurrection is known. The 669
certain facts are these: on the night of August 14, 1791, at a pretended Vodun ceremony in the woods of the Turpin plantation, during a violent storm, several wily and powerful slaves laid plans for a general uprising. Their intentions were communicated, apparently by drum signals, to neighboring plantations. Six days later the attack began, the blacks in that section of the North indiscriminately slaughtering every white man, woman, and child on whom they could lay their hands. From this centre the massacre spread, accompanied by general arson, until practically every plantation in the fertile northern plain was a shambles. The whites who had escaped destruction cowered in the capital city.

The insurrection of 1791 returned measure for measure to the planters for their previous cruelties. Whether one reads accounts written by Haitian patriots or by white apologists, the story is the same: the ferocities on both sides were almost incredible. Blacks gutted children and raped women, whites broke captured Negroes on the wheel, poured boiling oil in their ears, and flayed them alive. The Reign of Terror in France was decorous by comparison. The pent-up hatred of decades was working itself out.

Against half a million riotous blacks the handful of whites had no 175
chance. All who could leave the country fled precipitately. The gens 669
de couleur, on the contrary, although at first alarmed, soon discovered that the revolting slaves were inclined to be friendly to them. They accordingly tried to turn the insurrection to their own purpose, to seize the rule of the colony now being depopulated of whites.
France, herself in turmoil, sent over various commissioners whose [648]
thankless duty it was to try to restore order; but they were incompetent, often worked at odds with each other, and sometimes engaged in actual treachery. Matters were, if anything, complicated by their ministrations.

In addition, Spain and England, always ready to harass the French,
sent troops into Saint-Domingue on the pretext of trying to put [648]
down the slave insurrection lest it spread to their neighboring colonies of Santo Domingo and Jamaica. The French general in the colony, Laveaux, would shortly have been defeated if help had not come from two natives, one a well-to-do mulatto, the other a black

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175 669 ex-slave, each of whom aroused his own group to fight off the invading Spaniards and English.

These two men emerging from the maelstrom were the cultured colored general, Rigaud, and the powerful Negro, Toussaint. United in purpose in 1793, they soon began to oppose each other. Their dissent foreshadowed the rift which was permanently to divide free Haiti.

175 159 669 Rigaud, born at Les Cayes in 1761,[14] had been brought up in Bordeaux, France, where he was taught the trade of a goldsmith. Like many other colored colonial youths, he went briefly to Georgia to fight on the side of the Americans in their revolution against England. Gifted with extraordinary military talent, he rose to prominence in Saint-Domingue following the slave insurrection, and played a major part in expelling the British from the colony. He was fiery, intellectual, and brilliant, but lacking in self-control and political subtlety, which put him at a disadvantage with Toussaint. Rigaud's admirers—almost the whole body of free colored people—included all the influential persons in the colony once the whites had been cowed or driven out; the South was devoted to him body and soul, and he had numerous partisans in the provinces of the North and West. But Toussaint was the idol of the half-million blacks.

Born a slave, Toussaint was fortunate in having a kindly master who permitted him the sort of work which gave him leisure for reading. He studied eagerly, devouring all accounts he could find of the military exploits of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. Apparently he took no part in the slave uprising; on the contrary, he helped his master escape to the United States and later regularly provided him with money. Then he himself went to the Spanish part of the island, where he made a military reputation in the Spanish colonial army. When General Laveaux sought his aid against the invaders of harassed Saint-Domingue, the ex-slave accepted his overtures. Detractors of Toussaint call him a "cunning hypocrite" for joining and then deserting the Spaniards, and for accepting high rank under a French general whom he was even then (so it is asserted) planning to supersede. His decision to return to Saint-Domingue was certainly crucial, for it began his meteoric ascent to power.

● [648]

Accompanied by the black troops he had captained in the Spanish

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[14] Les Cayes, the third largest town in modern Haiti, was even in colonial times an important seaport. It is located on the southwestern peninsula.

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colony, he fought engagements with several Spanish detachments on the way back to Saint-Domingue, and soon achieved the return to France of all the territory Spain had recently won from her. Seeing that his ineffectively trained black troops were as yet no match for the disciplined British, he temporarily withdrew from public sight in order to build his army into a coördinated, smoothly functioning machine. Then he not only defeated the British, but forced their complete withdrawal from the island. He freed General Laveaux, whom they had imprisoned in Cap Français, thereby putting his own commanding officer under personal obligation to him. By 1796 Toussaint was the undisputed hero of his soldiers and, through their praise, of the mass of black ex-slaves; moreover, the French commander trusted and respected him; even the whites of the former régime looked to him with hope, for they had grudgingly to concede that, black though he was, he alone had the power to restore peace and order in the colony.

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Only the colored group looked askance at him. They had welcomed the insurrection of the slaves in 1791 as an invaluable, if bloody, aid in their struggle for equality with the whites; but they were not inclined to be ruled by an ex-slave whose eminence was already a threat to the social order they wished to establish. When, in 1793, the French commissioners had abolished slavery in Saint-Domingue,[15] the action had been as distasteful to the free colored people as it was to the whites; both groups wanted to continue to own slaves; the gens de couleur merely wanted their share also in governing the colony. In their opinion, the struggle was getting out of hand. They gave their allegiance, consequently, not to Toussaint, but to their own man, Rigaud.

The black general now began to show himself as astute a politician as he had been a skilful soldier. He had a romantic streak, which made him assume the prophetic surname Louverture;[16] but beneath the romanticism was a peculiar diplomatic realism. When a newly arrived governor-general tried to stir up dissension between blacks and colored people, on the principle of divide and rule, Toussaint

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[15] In order to pacify the blacks and to win their support against the invading armies of Spain and England.

[16] The name Louverture, now generally written L'Ouverture, is ordinarily conceded to imply Toussaint's conviction that he would provide the opening through which his fellow blacks might achieve freedom. According to another account the name was given him because of his ability to make a breach in the ranks of the enemy; still another explanation refers to his missing front teeth.

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of inordinate vanity, and would brook no interference. His henchmen had to endure merciless tongue-lashings. His own people's freedom, about which he was publicly so solicitous, was in many respects little better than slavery. 175 642 643

What he did is more easily told than what he was. Emerging, after a long reign of terror, as a leader in a land which had once been a paradise for whites, he checked among his people the passion and fear which had led to violence. With the restoration of peace, labor began once more on the plantations. The Negroes, though no longer slaves, were ordered back to work, and they docilely obeyed. The return of prosperity between 1799 and 1802 was amazing.

But the brilliance of Toussaint's rule was first dimmed and then completely extinguished by the rising star of Napoleon in France.[17] Haitian history between 1802 and 1804, although apparently incidental to the story of the contest between blacks and colored people which here concerns us, is nevertheless significant for an understanding of what was to transpire in Haitian social affairs. Napoleon was irritated beyond measure at the effrontery of Toussaint's seizure of power in the colony. The black leader had shown canny statesmanship in winning the friendly coöperation of the president of the United States, John Adams. The supplies and ships that Adams sent enabled Toussaint not only to defeat Rigaud but to achieve independence from France in all but name. With American assistance, Toussaint negotiated an advantageous treaty with England. Probably even more annoying to the First Consul than these political triumphs was Toussaint's audacious success in aping and even anticipating the spacious actions by which Napoleon was trying to make himself majestic in the world's eyes.[18] 175 648 669

It is possible that Napoleon might not have paid so much attention

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[17] It seems strange that this black, a veritable genius whatever his faults, should be so mildly honored in modern Haiti. True, he is regarded with respect, and there are a few statues of him; but the homage of the people is paid rather to his successor, General Dessalines, the antithesis of Toussaint in everything but courage. It was Dessalines, of course, who struck the final blow for Haitian freedom, but even this triumph seems to the foreigner small in comparison with the very real achievements of Toussaint. [643]

[18] For example: Napoleon had given a new constitution to France after his *coup d'état* of the 18 Brumaire; similarly Toussaint, having effected his own coup in Saint-Domingue by deposing the French civil agent, citizen Roume, immediately thereafter gave his people a new constitution. In it he not only assumed all political power for life, but also ascribed to himself the right of naming his successor. Bonaparte was unable to take so daring a step for another year. There is ample evidence to show that meanwhile he chafed under the idea of being imitated and anticipated by a "gilded African," as he called Toussaint.

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175 to Toussaint if Saint-Domingue had been merely a colony like
● 648 Martinique, and not the single centre from which measures for
rebuilding the French colonial system could radiate. France was once
669 more taking over Louisiana from Spain; but before Bonaparte could effectively reach Louisiana to establish his New World empire, he must make sure of Saint-Domingue. The very real power of Toussaint had to be crushed, and through the whole of 1801 Napoleon was making preparations for the annihilation of the black governor.[19]

175 The plans were as follows: to send his brother-in-law, Leclerc,
648 with a formidable French army to "succeed" Toussaint as governor;
721 to try to persuade the blacks that the new régime was entirely benevolent to their race, so that no armed resistance would be offered; if persuasion and diplomacy failed, to fight and conquer the Negroes, subduing them once more to slavery; and, above all, to capture Toussaint with all his black counselors and send them as prisoners to France. Napoleon undertook to prepare the way for Leclerc by writing personally to Toussaint: "Assist the Captain-General [Leclerc] with your counsels, your influence, and your talents. What can you desire?—the liberty of the blacks? You know that in all the countries where we have been, we have given it to the people who had it not." He repeated this assurance in his message a week later to the French legislature (November 22, 1801): "At Saint-Domingue and at Guadeloupe there are no more slaves. All are free there; all will remain free." Still further, the proclamation he drew up for Leclerc to publish upon his arrival, as a reassurance to the blacks, ran: "If you are told that these forces are destined to ravish your liberty, answer: The Republic has given us liberty, the Republic will not suffer it to be taken from us!"

Leclerc with his army arrived at Cap Français late in January, 1802. He hoped to be received at the capital as a friend, but Christophe, the black general in charge of the city, repulsed his advances. Leclerc was obliged to attack; on February 5 Christophe set fire to the city and withdrew to the neighboring hills. The war of independence had begun.

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[19] The part played by Toussaint for a brief moment in the history of the United States is full of significance. Certain historians are of the opinion that if Napoleon had been successful in the reconquest of Saint-Domingue he would have turned his attention to America rather than to Europe, for he had great colonial schemes. His failure in the colony, according to this theory, made him try to withdraw gracefully from the New World by selling Louisiana to the United States.

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For three months Toussaint's vigorous fighting broke the force of 175
the French attack; one white army was swept away. But Toussaint 648
made two fatal errors of judgment: he relied upon his trained army 726
with its Negro generals, instead of arming his half-million Negroes 728
for guerrilla warfare; and he trusted the pledged word of honor of Leclerc. His army fought bravely enough against the French legions, but the consensus of military experts is that Toussaint's officers, jealous of his domination and feeling that eventually France must win, treacherously gave over their posts and forces to Leclerc. Christophe surrendered on April 26, and Toussaint had no alternative but to put himself in Leclerc's hands.

Napoleon's private orders to Leclerc were positive and precise: 175
"Follow your instructions exactly, and the moment you have rid 648
yourself of Toussaint, Christophe, Dessalines, and the principal brigands, and the masses of the blacks have been disarmed, send over to the continent all the blacks and mulattoes who have played a rôle in the civil troubles. . . . Rid us of these gilded Africans, and we shall have nothing more to wish." Leclerc set himself methodically to carry out these instructions; by April, 1802, he had disarmed the blacks and received Christophe's surrender; the next task was to rid himself of Toussaint. By an apparently innocent invitation to dine and discuss the affairs of the colony, he lured Toussaint into his headquarters on June 10.[22] In the course of the meal Toussaint was seized, bound, and hurried on board a waiting ship. Haiti never saw him again; within a year he died of cold and starvation in a dungeon high in the Jura Mountains of southeastern France.

With Toussaint out of the way, it was now in order to proceed to 175
the second part of Napoleon's plan—the reëstablishment of slavery. 648
Leclerc was to use his own discretion as to the precise moment and 727
manner of announcing this. His instructions from the Minister of 567
Marine, Decrès (June 14, 1802), read in part:

> As regards the return of the blacks to the old régime, the bloody struggle out of which you have just come victorious with glory commands us to use the utmost caution. Perhaps we should only entangle ourselves in it anew if we wished precipitately to break that idol of liberty in whose name so much blood has already flowed. For some time yet vigilance, order, a discipline at once rural and military, must take the place of the positive and pronounced slavery of the colored people of your colony. Especially the

[22] There is evidence to show that Christophe suggested this stratagem to Leclerc.

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175 master's good usage must re-attach them to his rule. When they shall have
648 felt by comparison the difference between a usurping and tyrannical yoke
727 [apparently he means such a yoke as Toussaint's] and that of the legitimate
567 proprietor interested in their preservation, then the moment will have
arrived for making them return to their original condition, from which it was so disastrous to draw them.

175 The plan to reëstablish slavery, however, was never carried out,
648 nor was its scheduled sequel, the occupation of Louisiana. The French
soldiers in Saint-Domingue began to succumb to an invisible assailant
727 —yellow fever. The first French army of 17,000 men had been
largely consumed in the task of conquering Toussaint's armies; the second was now being swept away by disease. Leclerc's letters to Napoleon pleading for reinforcements soon became frantic in their despair. Fever was weakening the army at the very moment when rumors of impending reënslavement were strengthening the number of active antagonists to the French. The black generals who had deserted Toussaint for Leclerc now swung back again to the opposition. Then Leclerc himself fell ill of the fever. Apparently all-conquering in June, 1802, by November he was dead.

175 This was the turning point in Napoleon's whole American policy.
727 The war had ruined Saint-Domingue economically; it had destroyed
721 plantations, paralyzed labor, and reduced the population to bar-
barism. To resume the conquest would have cost France heavily; the
648 army dreaded service in a region where death was almost certain; the
financial expense had been frightful: one year of war had consumed 50,000 men and several million dollars, yet at least as many men and as much money would still be needed before any return could be expected. Consequently, Napoleon decided to withdraw from his whole American experiment, saving face as far as possible. He appointed the brave but incompetent Rochambeau to succeed Leclerc, promised him reënforcements—and then broke the Peace of Amiens, so that France became embroiled in a European war. Affairs in Saint-Domingue (including the troops promised to Rochambeau) were conveniently forgotten after March, 1803; and the whole Louisiana territory was sold to the United States.

175 The end of French control in Saint-Domingue came shortly.
648 Rochambeau, as well as he could, waged desultory warfare, hanging,
shooting, drowning, burning all the Negroes he could catch; hunting them with fifteen hundred bloodhounds bought in Jamaica for more

than a hundred dollars each; wasting money, squandering men. On the other side, Dessalines and Christophe massacred every white within their reach. Rochambeau held on until November, 1803, when he surrendered with his few remaining men to the English in Jamaica. 175 648

On January 1, 1804, Dessalines proclaimed the independence of Haiti, choosing this aboriginal Indian name (meaning "mountainous") rather than the French Saint-Domingue. What the colored people had begun with their petitions to the French Assembly in 1789 had now worked itself out, but along lines entirely different from their hopes or plans. The whites were gone, but the blacks were in control. Now a struggle for precedence was to begin between the ruling blacks and the still aspiring people of color.[22] 175 642 648

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[22] The historical details rehearsed in this chapter are summarized from the many documented monographs and histories of the period cited in the Bibliography at the end of this volume. It seems unnecessary to quote such entry for each historical statement made in this sketch of background material. [11.4]

The former affranchis fully intended to keep their lands once the
175 French were driven out. They could not but be alarmed as they saw
423 the steady direction of Dessalines' moves toward a complete mo-
nopoly of land ownership by the state. On the very day following
425 independence, a decree proclaimed that all lands owned by France
471 in colonial days now belonged to Haiti. Next (February 7, 1804)
Dessalines canceled all sales and donations made to mulattoes and ex-slaves by fleeing French who, in a last despairing effort to salvage something from the wreckage of olden days, had "entrusted" their lands to non-whites. By these two strokes all lands owned by white men before 1803 became state property,[5] but only the second clipped the wings of socially ambitious colored people.

175 Serious uneasiness was caused by the next measure, an order for a
421 general verification of property titles. This would have been a deli-
cate task at best, considering the disorder of the past thirteen years.
[693] It was made more complicated to carry out by the serious lack of men trained in law. A few like Balthasar Inginac, later an important adviser and trusted friend of two presidents, were scrupulously conscientious, but by the same token highly unpopular with those whom they deprived of newly (and shadily) acquired "estates." The majority of officials, according to report, listened to the pleading of many who had managed by hook or crook to secure a tenuous claim to vacant properties, validating their fraudulent titles for them. It has been claimed, without rebuttal, that most of these officials were not above taking bribes. When complaint was made to Dessalines of such actions he took steps to make his appointees do their duty, but each confiscation made new enemies for Dessalines.

Some of the mulattoes, citing their French paternity, claimed land formerly owned by their French fathers, even though these parents had never regarded their sons as more than bastards. Dessalines once
broke out in furious answer to such a claimant: "*Et les pauvres*
175 *nègres dont les pères sont en Afrique, ils n'auront donc rien!*"

425 The state took over thousands of acres. Those Haitians, colored or
556 black, who aspired to landownership as the foundation of position,

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[642] [5] The hatred of the Haitians for the French, and because of them, for white people
[641] in general, was seen not only in these confiscations but in commitments for the future. A proclamation of April 28, 1804, suppressed to "all foreigners" the right to own property in land. The first Haitian constitution, May 20, 1805, took an even more drastic step in saying that "no white man shall henceforth set foot in this country as a landowner," and that "all property formerly belonging to a white Frenchman" was now confiscate to the profit of the state.

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171 feudal holdings to absolute ownership of land by the influential. It is
175 strangely paradoxical that an aristocrat, the light-skinned Pétion,
631 representing the cultured group in society, broke the economic
power of his own aristocratic class and made the former slaves not
serfs but peasants. It is doubtful whether he intended either result.

175 Alexandre Pétion was the antithesis of Haiti's three eminent blacks
643 in all but military skill. Toussaint's genius as a fighter lay in his
surprise moves, Dessalines' in his recklessness, Christophe's in his
159 bulldog determination; but Pétion was a great general because he
knew when to retire and so lead his enemy into an exposed position. The three Negroes had been born in slavery; Pétion, coming of a cultured and sophisticated affranchi family, grew up in France. Dessalines was a crude ruffian by comparison, while in the face of Pétion's suavity Christophe's impetuousness seemed rankly uncouth. Where they bludgeoned, Pétion persuaded; where they hacked their way through opposition in the determination to gain an end, he graciously yielded and so won new friends. Tactful at every point, he survived even such contretemps as his refusal of the hand of the Emperor's daughter.

As leader of a young nation, Pétion might almost be said to have had too broad an understanding of human nature. He was a gentle ruler over his people; when they erred he did not punish or upbraid, but excused their misdeeds by assuming the cause to be some fatal compulsion over which they momentarily had no control. He had no wish to drive the nation to "success." Neither did he care to use his position for personal aggrandizement. His mind was supple and practical, disdainful of abstractions, undeluded by resounding slogans, fertile in compromise, not finical as to means, always unsurprised, exquisitely tactful. When crises arose to dismay his ministers, Pétion's philosophic calm was undisturbed.

Cynically tolerant, he gave office to political enemies if they
chanced to be able. A representative of the topmost class of society,
● [645] he managed to moderate antagonisms based on color. He gave
sanctuary and financial succor to the Spanish-American liberator,
[87] Simón Bolívar; he established the foundations of an educational
[423] system; he defended the state against Christophe's power; he ruled
constitutionally; and he gave land to his people, even to the humblest
of them. When he died, his subjects for miles around came into
Port-au-Prince, where they stood weeping about his palace, refusing

175 114 433 Practically every contemporary foreign visitor contrasted the divergent policies of Christophe and Pétion to the overwhelming advantage of the former. One Englishman, intent upon defending the Negro against the charge of "natural indolence," went so far as to say that the majority of the people in the republic, although "possessed of small estates, on which they earned their living," were yet no less diligent than the forced laborers on Christophe's plantations in the North.[34] His only proof of this contention, however, was the greater volume of commerce at Port-au-Prince, capital of the republic, than at Cap-Henry (now Cap-Haïtien), capital of the kingdom.

175 433 652 642 The economic case is strongly against Pétion. The decline of large-scale agriculture, the empty treasury, governmental purchase of surpluses when prices were low, debasing the coinage[35]—by such practical proofs, the republic was vastly less efficient than the stern dictatorship of the kingdom. But Pétion's people had freedom, while Christophe's were serfs. And Pétion's republic endured, to become reunited Haiti. The kingdom perished with Christophe.

4. *The Final Effort toward Plantation Life (1818–1826)*

175 643 642 The mantle of Pétion fell in 1818 upon the shoulders of his meticulous secretary and minister, Jean-Pierre Boyer. Two years later, upon the death of Christophe, the kingdom of the North was once again united, without a struggle, to the South.[36] It is conceivable that the refined mulatto Boyer might have infused into his people a spirit of industry and ambition, now that tranquillity reigned after fourteen years of separation and warfare. The people of the North had had a long experience of intense activity, while those of the

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[34] W. W. Harvey, *Sketches of Hayti; from the Expulsion of the French, to the Death of Christophe* (London, 1827), pp. 361 ff.

[652] [35] Pétion's coins were so easily imitated that the country was inundated with counterfeit money. The government issued only five million dollars worth of this currency, but in 1818 twelve millions were in circulation, the surplus having been fabricated in Europe and the United States.

[175] [643] [642] [648] [36] In 1822–23 Boyer likewise succeeded, with little fighting, in bringing the Spanish two thirds of the island (Santo Domingo) into the republic. For the first time since 1697 the whole island was really unified under one rule. Toussaint had held it in 1800–2 and the Haitians claimed it thereafter, but real unity did not come until Boyer's time, when all the Spanish colonies in the New World were breaking away from their mother country. Santo Domingo regained its independence in 1844 shortly after the abdication of Boyer.

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up so many of these, there was no way short of a revolution to reconstitute the now parceled estates. Obviously the Code did not envisage the control of serfs by small property owners, yet there were more small owners than large.

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In the third place, the Spanish-speaking masses of the eastern part of the island had never experienced the kind of forced labor with which most Haitians had been at one time or another familiar. Their noncoöperation made enforcement difficult.

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Finally, the administration of so detailed a plan called for the establishment, at once and yet in complete order, of a fully trained corps of bureaucrats, perfectly coöperating with each other, most of them educated, and all incorruptibly honest. If every literate person in the state had been drafted for service, Boyer could not have filled all the offices required by the Code.

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After brief and piecemeal experience with the law in operation, moreover, even the few remaining large landholders turned against it. While they approved the provisions for forced labor, they discovered that to turn over to the workers a quarter or half of the annual crop, in a falling world market, gave too slim a profit.[42] Without the support even of its original sponsors, failure of the law was inevitable.

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These factors alone would have been enough to kill the Code; but its real death blow came from an entirely different quarter. The year before the agricultural laws were passed, Boyer had achieved what he considered to be a political master stroke. He had made a financial settlement with France whereby Haiti, in return for a large sum in cash and regular annual payments for sixty years thereafter, should receive full recognition of independence from France; also the former mother country would renounce all claims to any properties in the country. Boyer had felt that the chief debilitating influence on the political and economic life of his people was the constant dread that France might one day return to claim her lost colony. To rid the nation of that incubus, therefore, seemed to him a high feat of statesmanship, no matter what the financial cost.[43]

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[42] Coffee, now the staple crop of Haiti, was meeting competition from the other coffee-producing countries of the world. To put the sugar manufactories into working condition again called for more money than was available.

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[43] Boyer's hand was forced to a certain extent by France, which had been exerting diplomatic pressure upon Haiti; the President, however, seemed to regard the settlement as a distinct coup.

175 Suddenly, without warning, he reversed what had been mistaken for
643 docile inactivity, and assumed complete personal command of the
reins of office. By means of a well-organized body of secret police,
[625] he inspired his own counselors with fear not only for their positions
but for their lives. Although illiterate, Soulouque never signed a
bill presented to him by his ministers until he was sure he knew its
essential core. The hopeful "understudies" were forcibly awakened
to the realization that they were hoist on their own petard.

175 The colored element was particularly apprehensive at Soulouque's
643 amazing activity, for the President was clearly setting himself against
563 their group, both in the cabinet and out. Determining clandestinely
669 to get rid of their puppet before he became a Frankenstein's monster
to destroy his creators, they fomented a new revolution. This, however,
proved to be a strategic error of the first magnitude, for the
President was already much stronger than they imagined. The insurrection
was quashed with massacre and attendant frightfulness. In
the aftermath, as Bouzon mordantly remarks, "the republic was
calm—with all the tranquillity of a tomb!" By their ineptitude, the
colored group had now made themselves completely insecure.

175 In the second year of his régime Soulouque decided to imitate
565 Dessalines by turning the state into an empire. His coronation was
643 extremely gaudy, as well as expensive. Calling himself Emperor
Faustin I, he created a peerage drawn chiefly from among his black
642 generals—four princes, fifty-nine dukes, and numerous counts,
[555] barons, and knights. This was merely outward pomp to gratify their
craving for prestige, for they had no functions to perform, nor even
the necessity of Christophe's peers to pay for their regalia. As nobles
they were given no responsibilities in directing economic activity
nor any increased political power over districts of the empire. The
Emperor's own vanity was flattered by having a peerage. He ruled
175 as an autocrat with blatant despotism. For ten years following the
643 coronation Haiti had to accustom itself to costly expeditions against
721 the Dominican Republic, nearly all ending in defeat for Haiti. The
outcome of these intermittent wars was neither gain nor loss of
645 territory by either side, but only temporary rule of occupied districts.
728 Haiti likewise had to accustom itself to sudden executions, to the
shabby grandeur of court display, and to financial trickery which
would not have deceived a schoolboy. While the heads of his opponents
and even his loyal counselors fell, Soulouque's infantile
"empire" tottered to economic ruin.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966

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Haiti was in constant financial straits. Money had to be borrowed

abroad; then paid back at the promised time or a foreign warship 175
would appear at some Haitian port. The steady drain of annual 652
indemnity payments to France,[7] the cost of subduing revolutionary movements, and the large sum eaten up even in times of peace by wages to the army made successive presidents continue to yield government land for small sums of ready cash, in spite of Geffrard's announcement that no more state lands would be alienated. Nissage Saget, coming to power by a successful revolution, paid out fifteen
acres to each soldier who fought in his campaign in the South.[8] The [171]
straits of the government resembled those of the Continental Congress in America during the Revolution.

Another impulse to parcel the land came during the administration 175
of President Lysius Salomon (1879–88). The debt to France had 643
finally, after half a century, been paid off; that incubus removed, 671
Salomon instituted numerous reforms, financial, military, educa- 423
tional. On February 26, 1883, he signed a law by which every citizen [648] ●
of Haiti might conceivably become a landowner even if he lacked money to buy land. Upon receipt of a written agreement to cultivate certain tropical crops—specifically, sugar, coffee, cotton, cacao, and tobacco—the government would grant provisional title to a portion of fifteen to twenty-five acres of land taken from the public domain. The grant became final if, after a period of from two to five years, three quarters of the land had been effectively cultivated.

Five hundred requests were made in 1884 for such grants, and twelve hundred in the following year.[9] Thereafter one finds no records of applications for land; the peasants had discovered the hidden trap in this apparent generosity. How could a peasant with a tiny farm lacking implements and tools, not to mention ready cash, be expected to cultivate important crops on fifteen or twenty acres of land? He would have to cut down trees, uproot wild plants, fertilize the ground, purchase equipment and seeds, and then wait several years for a crop. As Thoby says, "And even then he was not a

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[7] See above, pp. 70–71.

[8] Law of July 12, 1870. In August of the same year, Nissage required an inventory to be taken of state lands remaining.

[9] J.-C. Dorsainvil, *Manuel d'histoire d'Haïti* (Port-au-Prince, 1924), p. 317, cites these figures. They are contested by Dr. P. Dalencour, *Le Sauvetage national par le retour à la terre*, p. 31, who maintains that only two applications came in altogether. Here, as elsewhere, Haitian records are incomplete. [118] [425]

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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[p. 99]

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CASTES SINCE THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF 1915

IN 1915 American Marines entered Haiti. One of the major reasons for their intervention may have been economic; certainly this explanation or accusation has been frequently made by opponents of American dollar diplomacy. Nevertheless, the ground was well prepared by political incompetency in Haiti in the years preceding 1915, and the reason given to the world by American statesmen to justify the Occupation was essentially a political one: Haiti was in a state of anarchy. 175 648 642

As has been abundantly shown, Haiti never had a semblance of democracy. From its beginning the country was governed either by a despot—the president, who might or might not be benevolent—or by an oligarchy. The failure of Haitian politics from 1843 onward was the inability of the titular ruler and the oligarchy to work in harmony; indeed, the oligarchy was continually divided against itself. Only three of Haiti's presidents from 1843 to 1915 were more than mediocre statesmen.[1] It is merely a question of degree, whether such phrases as "political and economic stagnation" and "social inertia" are more accurately descriptive than words like decay and degeneration. 175 642

A brief résumé of politics between 1900 and 1915 will set the stage for a view of the Occupation in relation to the development of caste. 175 643 642

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[1] With this judgment by a foreigner Haitians may obviously disagree. In the author's opinion the presidents Geffrard (1859–67), Salomon (1879–88), and Hyppolite (1889–96) were relatively distinguished men. To Geffrard may be credited the following: increase of educational facilities; construction of much-needed public works; an attempt to form a true middle class, even by importing Negroes from the United States; reduction of the size of the army by half; healing of a sixty-year breach with the Holy See, so that Haiti might once again have approved priests; the opening of closed ports to commerce; and improvement of agricultural methods. Salomon was an educated man with European experience; his achievements were to create a national bank, establish a sound currency, retire the public debt, lower tariffs, bring in schoolteachers from France, open rural schools, bring Haiti into the International Postal Union. Hyppolite's chief triumphs were in the field of public works—much-needed buildings, bridges, docks, telephone and telegraph lines. 175 643 65

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The twentieth century began inauspiciously with a succession of dull incompetents in the presidency. General Sam's administration (1896-1902) had been distinguished only by lethargic calm. Nord Alexis (1902-8), over eighty when elected, prolonged the peace by doing nothing to disturb it; he solved his financial problems by issuing paper money, while his political "policy" involved nothing more significant than the sponsoring of festivals to celebrate Haiti's hundred years of independence. The mild revolution which displaced him substituted a president more puerile than oppressive, Antoine Simon (1908-11), who is best revealed in a terse comment by a Haitian author: "When he passed by on a street or through a public square, everyone, foreigners as well as Haitians, must stand still, even stop smoking, and respectfully salute the Head of State. At any instant, without reason, the functionaries of the capital might be called to the Palace to endure his interminable and insipid discourses."[2] A revolution cut short his tedious régime.

Within the next four years six presidents rose and fell. Their administrations were worse than ephemeral; indeed, they hardly deserve the name of governments. Not one of the six had a happy time in office; the first was blown up with his palace, the second is generally thought to have been poisoned, the next three were quickly deposed by revolutions, and the last, after massacring his imprisoned political enemies, was horribly cut into small bits by an infuriated mob. Anarchy then ensued.

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For years Haitian presidents had staved off financial collapse by heavy borrowing abroad. United States financial interests were involved in the Bank of Haiti and in a railroad company, while the American government, through its Monroe Doctrine, was disturbed by French and German threats to collect their Haitian debts by force. When President Guillaume Sam[3] was hacked to pieces by the mob, the United States landed Marines from gunboats which were conveniently just outside the harbor of Port-au-Prince. Beginning on July 28, 1915, the Occupation lasted for nineteen years.

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With the question of America's justification in the matter of occupying Haiti this book cannot pretend to deal. As with most large matters of policy, convincing arguments can be offered on both sides. The important fact for this study is that the presence of white

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[2] J.-C. Dorsainvil, *Manuel d'histoire d'Haïti*, p. 238.

[3] Not to be confused with Simon Sam, who had ruled twenty years earlier.

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American Marines in Haiti during the next two decades had definite 128
effects upon the social life of the country. 648

One of the most immediately observable results was the termina- 175
tion of the long political domination by the blacks, and reëstablish- 648
ment of the colored élite in government control. The four presidents
since 1915, Dartiguenave (1915–22), Borno (1922–30), Roy (1930), 643
and Vincent (1930–41), have all been light-skinned. The United 563
States forces had a definite hand in the election of the first two of these men. America's concern was certainly not to return the government to the colored group, but rather to have as titular heads of state men who were educated, temperate of mind, civil in manners—and, of course, mentally "supple" enough to carry out policies agreeable to the State Department at Washington. Since education had for long been a perquisite of the élite only, and since colored élite outnumbered black élite, the chances were good that the choice should fall upon a colored man in 1915 and 1922. Even so, it may have been pure coincidence that the Americans supported mulattoes rather than Negroes; it can hardly be coincidence that the mulatto presidents since 1915 have filled the key offices with colored men. They would assuredly maintain that they had tried to select persons best fitted for office. The fact remains that there are few blacks in the important ministries.

This return to political power of the colored element was one of the most sweeping transformations effected by the Marines, for once again, as in the golden days of Pétion and Boyer, political prestige accompanied and fortified social position. Since 1843 one black or almost black general had succeeded another as president of the republic, and the élite class had perforce to endure them. Socially tolerated these parvenu generals had been, but accepted never. When the Marines arranged the election of President Dartiguenave they effectively reversed the tradition of a century. Since 1915 there have been several Negro candidates for the presidency; in coming elections there are sure to be others; for the present and the near future it is safe to say there will be no more black non-élite presidents.

Such a prophecy is made with a certain assurance because of an- 175
other result of the Occupation: reform of the army. All true friends 701
of Haiti knew, as most Haitian statesmen had understood for a 648
hundred years, that the huge standing army was an unmitigated 177
burden to the economic, political, and social stability of the country.

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701 Since it was an entrenched interest, however, no responsible statesman
648 had dared to threaten its hold. The Marines swept it out of
177 existence, undertaking to substitute for it a trained constabulary of
625 only 2,000 men who should combine routine military tasks with
652 police duty in the scattered towns. Results were immediately apparent:
669 the weighty incubus of soldiers' wages was lifted from the
treasury; thousands of men were deprived of sinecures and put back into productive economic activities; the constant threat of armed revolution was removed; better order was kept by 2,000 trained men in trim uniform than by twelve times that number of ragged loafers who called themselves soldiers; and since the army was no longer the great steppingstone to political office, the élite felt more secure from assault by ambitious but uneducated army men. From 1843 to 1915 the élite had endured many lower-caste presidents because these were able to control the army; now the army had disappeared.

175 The Marines did much that was of indisputable benefit to Haiti.
648 This was acknowledged even by the most vocal patriots who soon
[943] began to campaign for an end of the Occupation. Where there had
been no real work in public health, Americans now built hospitals,
[744] established clinics, cleaned up the sources of many diseases, laid down
sewage systems, gave the towns pure water. In 1915 there were only
[365] three automobiles in the country, and no roads for them to travel;
[491] the Americans built many miles of paved roads. In 1915 there had
been only one wharf, two short stretches of railroad, two lighthouses,
[45] one electric plant; the Americans undertook electrification, telephone
systems, the construction of administration buildings, and other public conveniences. Whether in such visible matters or in the obscurer realms of currency, banking, and budgets hardly a phase of daily life was left untouched. And judged by the standards of civilization the Marines improved what they touched.

175 But rancor against the Americans began early and continued to
648 the bitter end in 1934. The pride of all Haitians was deeply wounded
642 by the Occupation. For 111 years they had governed themselves and
had assumed themselves to be a sovereign nation; the Marines patroling the countryside were vivid reminders that Haiti had never been independent except by sufferance, and that white men were once more overseeing the destinies of colored and Negro men. Nevertheless, the reasons proclaimed for opposing the Occupation were not those of hurt vanity. Some of those given were entirely

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plausible, such as the race prejudice displayed by many individual Marines;[4] the unnecessary slaughter in the suppression of *caco* (guerrilla) rebellions in the North; the continued holding of offices (and salaries) by Americans too impatient to train Haitians, as by the Agreement of 1915 they were supposed to do; the fostering rather than elimination of military psychology among the people by the presence of armed Marines.

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The campaign against the Occupation was generally on the highest level of patriotism, for it threw out one variation after another on the same theme: We Haitians are not being allowed to govern ourselves. Some realists knew that their hurt national pride was accompanied by disappointment that certain salaries were not reaching Haitian pockets, certain prestige of office not redounding to the credit of Haitian men. What if the real reason for opposition were not the openly avowed one? The Marines must go! Order had been restored and government reëstablished. It was patent that any administration which could effect the withdrawal would be immensely popular: it was equally patent that if the Americans left the country, the benefits of their efficiency and material improvement would remain as a tangible boon to Haiti.

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President Sténio Vincent, elected in 1930 after a campaign in which the Americans did not interfere, began the negotiations with Washington. With President Hoover he made headway toward reforms, but President Roosevelt's attitude was more actively coöperative. In 1934 Vincent had a series of conferences with the President of the United States; the latter, in pursuit of his good-neighbor policy, persuaded the American Senate to order the Occupation at an end and turn over without cost to Haiti many buildings, supplies, and equipment used by the Marines. Vincent personally benefited from the withdrawal of 1934. He called himself Haiti's "second Liberator,"[5] and made the anniversary of the American departure a national holiday. Indirectly the élite also benefited for now, entrenched in office, they could govern without white supervision. The material equipment was there to be enjoyed by the whole people at no further expense to them.

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[4] The United States government in the early days had sent Marines from the Southern States to Haiti, on the theory that they would, from long acquaintance with Negroes, know how to "handle" them. This stupid blunder was shortly rectified.

[5] Dessalines had, of course, been the first.

175 The Occupation had had other far-reaching consequences. It had
648 removed from the Constitution an article which had endured from
642 the very first—the prohibition against ownership of land by white
423 people. Americans argued that since Haiti's greatest potential source
of wealth was agricultural (sugar and coffee in particular), new
563 methods were needed if rehabilitation were to occur. Only foreign
whites had both the necessary wealth and the requisite agricultural
knowledge: therefore, whites must be attracted into the country by
an opportunity to establish plantations. Although the Senate of Haiti
protested violently against this reversal of tradition, which struck at
the people's long pride in their complete ownership of the land, the
Americans yielded only on the point of requiring five years' residence
of the white landlord in the country. The influx of foreign whites has
not been large, but in the Plaine du Nord and Port-au-Prince the
white "colonies" are considerably larger now than in 1914.

175 Up to the present moment the white element in Haiti has not
648 exerted any noticeable pressure on the government. Its mere pres-
563 ence, however, is bound to be a restraining influence on politicians,
for most of the whites are Americans, and the government at
Washington may not always follow a good-neighbor policy. With
the clannishness so usual in white colonists living among darker
people, the Americans in Haiti have their private clubs and their
closed social set. For the first time since 1804 the élite are socially not
the highest-ranking persons in the country.

175 The physical presence of several hundred white Marines for nine-
648 teen years had also one unplanned but inevitable result: an increase in
563 the amount of white blood in the population. For many decades
144 numerous élite had rested comfortably beneath their light skins,
knowing that only they, with their greater mobility in the world,
had any real chance to sustain a white strain. The Occupation, how-
ever, brought white men in contact with black women; there was a
steady average of 2,000 white Marines in the country for two
[554] decades. The light skin of resulting offspring suggested to many the
possibility of a climb up the social ladder now that the most difficult
rung had already been achieved. No figures are available on the
number of children born in Haiti between 1915 and 1934 of white
fathers, but it was a perceptible influx in the lower class.

175 Haitian businessmen enjoyed a greater economic prosperity during
458 the Occupation than they had ever known before. It is commonly

reported in Haiti that although they joined patriotically in the cheering 175
when the Marines embarked in 1934, many of them shed tears to 458
see the departure of 2,000 monthly salaries, most of which had been
enriching the local tills. Indeed, the country came much closer to
establishing a mercantile middle class during the Occupation than
ever before. The only real control left behind by the Americans was [648]
an overseer of the national budget, destined to leave as soon as Haiti's
external debt was finally paid off. To that end the government saved [652]
rather than spent, so that businessmen found no comfort in the state
of economic affairs, particularly during a decade of world depression
and European disturbance. Nationalist economic theories in Europe
have upset Haitian markets, so that the élite thriftily save their pennies
against hard times instead of spending them freely on present
luxuries. The American overseer of the budget withdrew in 1941.

At many points the forces of the Occupation touched unwittingly 175
upon deep-rooted prejudices of the Haitian people. In order to 648
secure laborers for road construction the Marines revived an old 466
corvée law of Christophe's time, requiring forced labor on public
works at the need of the government. Many of the ill-nourished 669
peasants were taxed beyond their physical powers by work on the 653
roads, so that an armed revolt by caco guerrillas broke out. Its suppression
required months of time and cost many lives, leaving in its
train a great deal of ill will.

The efficient Americans also came to grief when they attempted to 175
make Haitians orderly in the American way. Land titles were in 648
chaos, as we have noted. American experts wished to find a basis for 423
internal taxation, so that economic reform might be effective and
permanent. The effort to have people declare their claims so that
these might be properly registered had to be given up after a few
weeks, for the peasant owners knew without written deeds their
local boundaries, and among the squatters those who realized their
title might not stand under strict investigation were understandably
averse to having questions of property tenure raised by the authorities
of an alien and interfering government.

Wherever Marine barracks were located, there were centres of a 175
cultural dissemination which was bound in the long run to affect 648
Haitian ideas and practices. Automobiles, radios, amusements, even 177
the daily conversation of the Marines, all left their mark upon a
people who had been effectively isolated from the world for more
than a century.

sive mood, will speak of the peasant and his contributions to Haiti: 175
he thinks only in terms of his own caste.[8] Upper-class Haitians dread 178
the sight of tourists taking pictures of native scenes, fearing that the 565
travelers will return to their own country and label these pictures, 829
"Typical Haitian Scenes," when, as anyone should know, typical
Haiti is upper-class Haiti.[9]

The American Occupation failed of many of its ends because it did 175
not recognize the social situation and its implications; or, realizing 648
them, did not consider them worthy of attention. Roads, telephones, 177
mail service, and improved agricultural methods seemed patently desirable to progressive Americans; to install them for the Haitians seemed generously wise. Yet many well-meant efforts came to grief, for the mass of people, lacking a tradition of orderly free government, did not always understand what the Americans were about, while the élite saw in the activities of the Marines a threat to their own dominance as rulers of the country.[10]

The antiquated, but prevalent, notion of the superior mentality of 563
the white race also flourishes in certain quarters among the élite. 829
Many of them say that the Negro can never originate a civilization, and that with the best of education he remains an inferior man, utterly unfitted for government, utterly incapable of making progress.

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[8] Witness Marthe Oulié's paragraph (*Les Antilles, filles de France* [Paris, 1935], [114]
p. 254): "My amiable host (a member of the élite) was triumphant at my surprise and [829]
enchantment. 'You did not expect to find a civilized country. What have the spiteful wits told you? That the Haitians worshipped serpents and made human sacrifices? True, the peasants on the mountain-sides are still very primitive and ignorant, but in the cities you will find many families like ours, cultivated in letters and music, careful and proud of their French culture, and absolutely set against American de-civilization.'"

[9] "Should you like a European to take pictures of the slums of your American cities and of the most degraded of your share-croppers, and then circulate these photographs as typical American scenes?" asked one sensitive Haitian.

[10] See the *Report of the Forbes Commission to Haiti*, 1930, pp. 18–19. "Illiteracy keeps [114]
the peasant masses politically inarticulate, except in case of mobs or bandit gangs, [648]
which formerly infested the countryside and often furnished the forces of revolution. These bandit gangs have been broken up and have disappeared under American rule, but the social forces that created them still remain—poverty, ignorance, and the lack of a tradition or desire for orderly free government. It has been the aim of the American Occupation to try to broaden the base of the articulate proletariat and thus make for a sounder democracy and ultimately provide for a more representative government in Haiti. Hence its work in education, in sanitation, in agencies of communication such as roads, telephones, telegraph lines, and regular mail routes. These things naturally are deemed of secondary importance by the Elite, who see in the rise of a middle class a threat to the continuation of their own leadership."

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to appoint curés to the vacant parishes. His independence of action 175 643
could not fail to give offense to Church authorities. One of his first 659
appointees was a black ex-slave, Félix, who had been a drum major 795
in the native army. Félix was made curé in the important town of [793]
Saint-Marc.

The constitution of his empire (May, 1805) indicates that Des-
salines did not intend to make himself head of the Church, but rather 175
planned a complete separation of Church and State. Article 50 reads: 795
"The law admits no dominant religion"; while the next article 642
grants freedom to all cults and refuses state support to any denomina- 659
tion or minister. No attack was made, therefore, upon Catholicism,
yet the disestablishment of that Church was a serious blow to its
prestige. Not in the specific provisions regarding religion was the
Church most weakened, but rather in the "liberality" of articles
dealing with actions upon which the Church had taken a firm moral
stand. Thus Article 14 declared that "marriage is an act purely civil [582]
and authorized by the government," while Article 15 permits [586]
divorce by the state. Early laws of the empire still further under-
mined the position of Church doctrine. Illegitimate children were [848]
granted the same legal rights as legitimate ones—a generous provi-
sion which removed one of the strong reasons for marriage; separa-
tion of husband and wife except by divorce was forbidden, and this
prohibition practically encouraged the divorce disapproved by the
Church; finally, the grounds upon which divorce might be allowed
were broader than those existing anywhere else in the Western
World at the time: mutual consent, application from one party to
the marriage, or simple allegation of incompatibility of tempera-
ment or character.

From the promulgation of this constitution in 1805 and for the 175
next fifty-five years, Haiti was in open schism from the Roman 795
Catholic Church. The Holy See refused to recognize either the 648
Haitian state or the provisions of its constitution, and it declined to 771
allow priests to enter the country. Certain Haitian presidents were 178
friendly enough to Catholicism, and others were openly desirous
of reëstablishing a state religion, but the breach once made was not
healed by mere good wishes. The longer the schism endured, the
farther the people grew away from the doctrines and practices of a
religion in which they had never been firmly grounded. At the
moment of independence, when all minds were more open to new

795 ideas than in later years, the habits of regular attention to religious
● 649 duties might have been fixed; by 1860 it was too late. Religion
771 existed during those years, but it was a strange gallimaufry of
171 Catholicism and folk belief.

175 On the whole, the rulers of young Haiti were tolerant of the
Catholic Church even to the point of advancing its interests, in so far
795 as these might benefit the state. Their pronouncements and actions,
642 nevertheless, were not those of ardent personal believers. Pétion's
643 constitution of the republic in 1806 once more established Catholicism as the official Church. What it gave with one hand, however, it
659 took away with the other. Thus:

> *Art. 35.* The Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion being that of all Haitians, is the religion of the state. It and its ministers will be protected.
>
> *Art. 36.* The law assigns to each minister of that religion the extent of his spiritual administration. These ministers may not, under any pretext, form a body within the state.
>
> *Art. 37.* If in the course of time other religions are introduced, no person shall be hindered, so long as he conforms to the laws, in following the cult he has chosen.

The Catholic, then, is the state religion, but only because the Haitians have heretofore been nominal Catholics. It occupies a position of practical fact which it would lose if by the introduction of other cults Haitians should be drawn away from it. Its ministers will be carefully watched to see that they do not, as a group, try to exert political pressure. And what freedom of action is possible to a church whose ecclesiastical parishes can be limited or extended in size by the civil legislature?

Pétion no more fought religion than he fought any other conventional institution approved by civilized people; but he did little to foster it. He received certain Wesleyan missionaries with considerable hospitality, remarking that "education increases the dignity of
[848] mankind." He appeased the good Catholics by repealing the law
[871] concerning the rights of illegitimate children, substituting for it a more moderate French rule.[4] Likewise, he invited the Catholic Church to participate in the education of Haitian youth.

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[848]
[878] [4] The French practice allowed an illegitimate child recognized before a wedding equal rights of inheritance with legitimate offspring, while giving only quarter rights to a child recognized after marriage.

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Christophe had a great deal more to say about religion than any of 175
the other early Haitian rulers. In a speech following the promulga- 643
tion of his constitution, after severe censure of the government of 795
Dessalines, he said: 659

> It is necessary to raise again the dignity of religion, for weakened morals 642
> leave young people open to the licenses of their age. Liberty has been assailed by traitors, enemies of their fellow citizens, and sold to our cruelest enemies. It is assured to you now, have no doubt! Shortly you will see these vicious men and their criminal efforts vanish like clouds.
>
> Public education, after religion and liberty the most precious benefit [871]
> mankind enjoys, will be reanimated and sustained by morality; it will [586]
> again be held in honor and reverence amongst us. Divorce, that traitor among customs, is rigorously prohibited and proscribed forever.[5]

Like Pétion, Christophe made the Catholic Church official, but he indicated the dictatorial path he intended to follow by adding that no ecclesiastical decree or law might become effective without the
consent of the President.[6] He completely overturned the law of [848]
Dessalines concerning illegitimate children; his decree deprived such offspring of any claims of inheritance whatever.[7] In a country where practically no one had been legally married such a ruling was severe, but Christophe hoped that his severity would force his subjects into wedlock, and this the Catholic Church was bound to approve.

Making the Church official did not strengthen its hold upon the 175
people. In 1814 (seven years after he had promised "to raise again 795
the dignity of religion") the kingdom was served by only three 793
priests, one of whom Christophe had named archbishop. The King 659
was preoccupied with form, and having created a nobility he needed 648
a church to lend dignity to his realm. Consequently in 1811 he reorganized the clergy in his kingdom, establishing an archiepiscopal see and three bishoprics. The reorganization, except for the archbishop, remained a paper plan because the Pope refused to coöperate by giving the schismatic church his approval.

All the early rulers seem to have been rather innocent in their dealings with Rome. They felt, apparently, that as heads of state they had but to express a desire in order to have His Holiness ap-

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[5] This speech, made on February 18, 1807, is cited in Thomas Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti* (Port-au-Prince, 1848), II, 334-335.

[6] See the law of March 18, 1807.

[7] Law of March 25, 1807.

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175 prove. Dessalines had sent a small number of Negro youths to Rome
775 to receive consecration and ordination from the Pope, so that they
793 might return to initiate a black priesthood for the black state. Pius VII
659 (through the interference of Napoleon, it was held by the Haitians)
648 refused to consecrate the aspirants to holy orders, and they had to
return as they had come. Christophe thought to avoid such a snub by presenting His Holiness with a *fait accompli*. Having in his kingdom a Spanish Capuchin named Brelle who had formerly anointed Dessalines emperor, Christophe made this friar head of his reorganized church as "archbishop of Haiti and grand almoner to the King," giving him a "palace" and a yearly income derived from the revenues of his "see." This achieved he asked papal approval, but had sorrowfully to announce, "*Le roi d'Haïti eut la douleur de ne pas même recevoir une réponse de Sa Sainteté et passa outre.*"

Pétion's legislators were even more naïve. Their constitution of 1816 (of course, really the President's) granted to the President the right to have a bishop come to Port-au-Prince "to elevate to the priesthood those young Haitians who feel called to embrace the ecclesiastical state."[8] It was apparently assumed that without the approval of the Pope any bishop could come in and forthwith "make" priests. The insertion of this article in the constitution confesses the disadvantages of schism. The last surviving priests of the old régime, those few who had remained in spite of the breach with Rome, were dying off; no new priests were being sent in; therefore, if the Catholic Church was to endure in the republic, it must have Haitian priests. Certain clerics fleeing political revolutions in South America came to Haiti, but since they spoke French badly, did not improve the religious situation. It was impossible to get sympathetic priests from France, in view of the relations of the two countries at the time. The provision of the 1816 constitution, however childish, was at least an effort to perpetuate the church in Haiti.

It is nowhere recorded that either Pétion or Boyer had any opportunity to persuade a bishop to come and consecrate the desired priests. Deprived of support by the Papal See, in open schism, the Haitian republic was forced to make all regulations governing religious affairs. Boyer carried on various negotiations with Rome looking toward rapprochement, but the schism endured. Organized

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[8] Article 30 of the 1816 constitution.

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> The men seldom or never go to mass, except on the days particularly set 175
> apart by the government as public fêtes. On these occasions the president 114
> and all the officers of Hayti go in procession, but the idea of devotion, I 771
> believe, never enters their contemplation. Such days are merely set aside 776
> for celebrating some particular event, which it is wished should be handed
> down to posterity. These occasions present only the external symbol of 184
> religion, the whole people being either ignorant or careless of its real
> character. Their manner and appearance during the celebration of the mass
> shew that they have no inward feelings of piety or devotion.[13]

Catholicism in Haiti, then, had fallen on evil days; Protestantism, 175
on the other hand, was unable to gain any foothold. Boyer, indiffer- 795
ent to all religion, did not even care to tolerate Wesleyan mission- 797
aries as Pétion had done, for when certain of them arrived and were
met with "persecution and stoning by a mob," it required persuasion
to gain his assent to freeing those the police had taken into custody.
He forbade any further meetings of Wesleyans, on the ground that
they stirred up riots. At the close of Boyer's administration it was [162]
estimated that there were only about 1,200 Protestants in the coun-
try, mostly Methodists and Baptists, and these primarily Negroes
who had come from the United States to settle in the republic.

Although the Haitian government probably derived a certain 175
satisfaction from controlling a state Church, Boyer was impelled 795
both by circumstance and his own temperament to obtain the ap-
proval of the Holy See. His own tepid spiritual zeal had nothing to 648
do with the case; Haitian public order would benefit by a superior 659
group of priests, and Haitian prestige would rise, he thought, with 643
recognition by Rome. Having already in 1826 settled the conflict between France and Haiti in the political sphere, Boyer tried assiduously to end the schism from Rome. His propositions were examined with benevolence by the Pope, who conferred upon the primate of the Indies, archbishop of Santo Domingo, the title of archbishop of Haiti. This personage, however, was a Spaniard already established in the comfortable city of Santo Domingo amidst people of his own nationality. He could not be persuaded to move to Port-au-Prince. The failure of Boyer's efforts is due more to this ecclesiastic than to uncoöperativeness on the part of Rome. From 1834 to 1860 the Court of Rome had official representatives in Haiti, but they cannot have been very effective men, for conditions in

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[13] James Franklin, *The Present State of Hayti*, pp. 394–395.

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175 religious life were not improved and the schism endured. The arch-
795 bishop of Haiti seemed to regard his new title as applying vaguely to
● 648 the island, not the country, of Haiti, and since all his vicars were
657 Spaniards unable to speak either French or the Créole dialect, they
643 did nothing for religion in the Haitian republic.

[772] Ties broken by a single radical action may require endless patience and persistence to knit together their severed threads. The impetuosity of Dessalines caused the rupture; it was prolonged by indifference to religion, absorption in economic and political matters, fear that France might use to her profit any *rapprochement* with Rome, and a certain complacency in subordinating Church to state. Inertia, however, was the real obstacle in the way of healing the breach. It is much less trouble to let conditions remain as they are than to make a change whose results no one can foretell. But the longer the rupture, the less understanding the people had of steps necessary to reëstablish the Church.

175 When in 1847 Faustin Soulouque, the ignorant, became president,
771 the horizon had never seemed darker for organized religion. The
black general, suddenly impelled by a quirk of fortune into high office, was a man of the people in his religious attitudes. All their belief in magic, in the mystical power of certain rites, in charms and spells—all their "superstition" as the Catholics called it—Soulouque shared. For the first time in Haitian history one is aware that the folk beliefs brought over from Africa had become welded into a recognizable form, under the name of Vodun. To colonial writers "Vaudoux" had been primarily a name for certain dances; to the early Haitian élite it seems to have connoted either occult rites or vulgar claptrap compounded of gibberish, old wives' remedies, and sensual dances. But in the long and deepening twilight of Catholicism, the various elements were fused, until by Soulouque's time the Haitian was familiar with the general beliefs, rites, and "priesthood" of Vodun. As Soulouque had broken with the tradition of presidents who wished Haiti to be recognized as one of the community of civilized Western nations, so he allowed the traditional respect for Catholicism to die. As an emperor he was a transplanted African chief; as a believer he was a follower of Vodun. The rites were practiced and the sacrifices made openly now. Men in high places dared to reveal their belief in native tenets. For twelve years Vodun flourished with official approval.

175 795 648 659 643 The depths to which Haiti descended under Soulouque made the task of his successor relatively simple. It would prove wise and generally popular to reverse the Emperor's action, in whatever respect. President Geffrard was the more successful as an antidote to the Emperor because of his practical intelligence. The best time to strike for the revival of Catholicism would be immediately after the heyday of Vodun. In 1859, the first year of his incumbency, Geffrard consequently undertook negotiations with the Holy See, sending two plenipotentiaries for the discussions. Because the Haitian delegates persuasively depicted the sorry state of religion in their country, because they showed themselves and their President willing to defer to papal wishes, and because the new Pope was filled with missionary zeal to reclaim Haiti for the Faith, all problems were overcome. An early agreement was reached, and the Concordat, signed in Rome on March 28, 1860, was approved by the Haitian Senate on the first of April. A commission was dispatched to Haiti immediately, one which did thoroughly and well its task of delimiting the boundaries of dioceses, allocating bishops and other clergy, and founding a seminary. An archbishop of Port-au-Prince was consecrated, and the Catholic Church, Roman and apostolic, at long last became officially established once more in the republic. The breach of fifty-five years was healed.

175 771 In one sense the reform had come too late. All the peasants were by this time thoroughly imbued with the ideas of Vodun, as were the lower orders in the towns. Most of the élite either clandestinely practiced Vodun or ignored religion altogether. On the other hand, practically no Haitian was opposed to Catholicism, not even the most ardent devotee of the obscurer cult. The native faith had grown up quietly enough, making its adjustments to the outward forms of Catholicism which still existed in the country. To every Vodun worshiper there were simply two hierarchies of spiritual beings, each with its own powers; to believe in one was not to deny the other. The new Catholic priests, then, met no hostility; what they had to deal with was an ineradicable folk religion which accepted everything and rejected little in the spiritual realm.

175 795 [346] The Archbishop, his band of forty priests, and a small group of Brothers and Sisters set to work with fervor. Nearly everything had to be rebuilt from the ground. Church buildings were in such disrepair that it was considered more economical to erect new ones than

The truth is, marriage and moral conditions differ from economic
and political conditions in that they are not so immediate and pressing
in their effect upon individual lives. If these are not attended to
today, tomorrow will find our bellies empty and our state overrun
by enemies. But sex relations go on willy-nilly, and children are born
into families: there will still be marriage and a moral problem to
175 attend to when order has been brought into practical affairs. Tous-
643 saint was involved in a diplomatic battle in which the participants
were the best minds of France, England, and the United States.
● 648 Beside these mighty problems upon which depended the economic
and political future of his people, the question of a standard of sex
831 conduct was definitely secondary.

So it must have seemed to Dessalines, the founder of the state and
175 first "law-giver" of Haiti. By his official actions it is evident that the
643 economy of the country was his primary concern, with defense
831 against a return of the French a close second. In his pronouncements
he bowed respectfully to religion and then postponed action until
some more convenient season. He pronounced likewise some very
proper sentiments on marriage and morals, calling attention to the
benefits of wedlock, piously deprecating sensuality and voluptuousness.
[582] His imperial constitution of 1805 encouraged lawful unions,
treating marriage as a socially virtuous state to be cultivated.

This was all words, however, and came strangely from the black
175 general who was, as everyone knew, a notorious libertine. He lec-
643 tured his people on the danger of yielding to their passions, yet
159 showed no intention of controlling his own impulses or those of his
831 favorites. He was, indeed, the last man in Haiti to make a gesture
toward sexual morality among the people, for although he was
married his daily life was a complete negation of moral precept. In
every town he habitually visited he established mistresses, bestowing
large sums of money upon them. He employed every sort of seduction,
honor, and gift to conquer the virtue of females who valued
their "respectability." Actually, he did not often need to use violence,
for the prevailing moral tone was not so high but that most young
and attractive women would yield to their Emperor.

114 The sternly upright Haitian historian, Madiou, has a formidable
643 paragraph on the vices of Dessalines. He tries partially to excuse him
159 on the grounds of his fury at discovering conspiracies against his
831 authority among his colored lieutenants, asserting that his early gen-

must pass to an illegitimate child if recognition is accorded. It is 175
likewise strong in its harmony with actual conditions: in the absence 671
of legal marriage among the people, it would have been manifestly 848
unfair to favor a few fortunate children. Dessalines argued that the 428
revolution had legitimized all Haitians; that it was unjust to prevent
a child's inheriting from the person who had given him life; and that
since all Haitians had come out of slavery and degradation into
freedom, no new inequalities should be instituted.[4]

If this law encouraged family life, it weakened marriage both of 175
the civil and religious kind: where was the sense in the expensive 581
luxury of a wedding when children were just as legitimate without 671
it? By conforming to folk practice the Emperor confirmed it. Only 565
the aristocrats disliked his law, for it seemed to make light of one of
the distinctions they cherished—the formal wedding. It irked them
to have the State place a casual child upon an equal plane with one
born after proper marriage.

At still another point the law accorded with living conditions at 175
the time. During the years of fighting many men had been killed, 593
and always the large standing army kept thousands of others away 671
from settled farm life. Home, then, was for a child the abode of his
mother—a fact recognized by the law's insistence upon maternal
relationship rather than paternity. Such a word as "matriarchate"
has no place here; but from the days of Dessalines to modern times,
the lowly Haitian thinks of his home primarily as where his mother
lives.

As if the advantages of formal wedding were not already suffi- 175
ciently weakened by this law, other enactments of the empire struck 671
at other phases of marriage. Divorce was permitted for adultery, for
incompatibility of temperament or character, and by mutual con- 586
sent. Such provisions not only broke away completely from Catholic
practice, but made getting out of wedlock a casual matter of taking
an oath. The complaint of incompatibility need be made by only one
spouse; "mutual consent" as a ground for divorce was probably not
allowed in 1805 in any other country of the Western World.

Dessalines did not appear to care one whit for the good opinion 175
of white foreigners. It sufficed for him if Haiti endured, whatever 643
Europeans thought of her. Christophe, on the other hand, was ex- 648
tremely sensitive to foreign disapproval. Many of his official acts can

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[4] According to the testimony of Madiou, op. cit., III, 116.

175 be explained only as efforts to win outside respect for his kingdom of
648 blacks. He was aware of the scorn in which white people held the
648 apparent absence of all sexual morality in Haiti, and so set about
introducing reforms. Even as a general he had opposed the dissoluteness of Dessalines.

175 In an early pronouncement Christophe proscribes concubinage
643 (by which he meant the unmarried unions of the people), libertinage,
and "all those disorders which weaken the family." To proscribe an
582 evil is not necessarily to put an end to it, however, and so he tried
671 also to persuade and educate his people to the habit of full legal
581 marriage. His steps at persuasion were various. In speeches he urged
[595] weddings upon his subjects; yet a man could see little reason for
tying himself to one woman for life, assuming *legal* responsibilities at an expense, when already from experience he knew that he could have a woman's loyalty without the ceremony. Although weddings somewhat increased after 1806, Christophe's verbal campaign was a failure. He next tried force. In one town he made all the females assemble in the public square; then, separating the married from the unmarried, commanded his royal guards to advance, each to select an unmarried woman who should become his wife. At other times he selected young men and women by lot and had them married "by their King's authority." No nobleman in the kingdom could long remain unwed: indeed, Queen Victoria might have approved Christophe's solicitude for the moral uprightness of the Haitian court.

175 Another means by which Christophe forced his people into formal
marriage was the indirect one of attacking property rights. Realizing
671 that Dessalines' law by guaranteeing inheritance to natural children
848 encouraged people to remain unmarried, he rescinded it by one
428 of the first acts of his rule.[5] This act reëstablished French practice, making it all but impossible for illegitimate children to inherit anything. Most persons of property found this law persuasive where words had left them cold. Madiou thought the law "excessively severe in a country where nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand of the population were born out of wedlock,"[6] and he spoke of its disharmony with general practice at the time. Actually,

it seems not radically to have affected the masses but only the fairly well-to-do,

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[5] Law of March 25, 1809.
[6] Madiou, op. cit., III, 412.

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669 ary, 1843, Boyer realized that it was futile to oppose the revolution-
[645] aries and departed for exile, going by way of Jamaica to Paris.

[189] Now came the test of the revolutionary leaders.[11] The state was in
their hands; their own representative, Rivière Hérard, was the new
175 president. They proceeded to concoct a ridiculously naïve constitu-
642 tion which by granting a popular vote alienated large bodies of their
648 mulatto support; to insult the black army leaders; and to allow the
669 defeat of Haitian forces by Dominican revolutionaries, thus losing
two thirds of the island's area. Every act weakened the party favoring representative government. Within a year Rivière was ousted and a black general was ruling Haiti with a rod of iron. The Revolution of 1843 from which so much was expected had by its very success ruined the parliamentarians, for with power in their hands they showed themselves utterly inept.

175 A succession of black generals now came to the presidency. When
642 Faustin Soulouque became president in 1847, the fourth Negro
within four years, and made himself emperor two years later, Haiti
643 found herself once more back at the strong-man principle. The élite
were out of office, relegated to inferiority in all phases of political life.

175 In the middle of the nineteenth century the groups upholding the
665 conflicting principles in politics became organized political parties.
Those favoring parliamentary rule called themselves Liberals; those
565 believing in the sole rule of a strong dictator were called Nationalists.
But by no stretch of the imagination could the Liberal party be considered democratic. The noble principles expressed in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Declaration of Independence were uncongenial to Haiti. One of the prime tenets of the Liberals, indeed, was that men were not created equal; rather that certain men (the élite) were clearly the superiors of others. Liberty

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[669] [11] The revolution was almost wholly an affair of the élite caste. The mulatto Boyer was deposed, and the mulatto Rivière Hérard took his place. If anyone thought of the peasants, it was only to use them to manipulate and manoeuvre the "outs" into office. Boyer's secretary-general, deposed along with the President, appealed to his countrymen against their accusation of treason against him, saying "My last wishes will be for the prosperity of Haiti and the regeneration of the African caste, to which I have consecrated myself wholeheartedly for forty years, without ever thinking of my own interests." (Joseph Balthasar Inginac, *Message à ses compatriotes, et principalement à ceux qui ont dirigé les affaires populaires de la république depuis la fin de janvier dernier* [Port-au-Prince, March 18, 1843], p. 6). Yet if these are more than hopeful words, they refer only to the distribution of the land which made peasants of the "African caste," and to Inginac's pamphlets on how to raise coffee and other products—which none of the peasants could read.

The era from 1883 to 1915 was Haiti's worst, politically. Revo-

lution succeeded revolution; the country sank deep into graft and 175
scandal; foreign powers made Haiti debase herself before them. Some 669
of the élite, backed by foreign merchants resident in the country, 668
went so far as to urge annexation by the United States rather than 645
endure continued disorder in economics and degradation in social 642
life. They felt matters had come to such a pass that only so radical a 643
change could clean the Augean stables. This was the period of a succession of political pamphlets[14] written by élite thinkers to set forth the necessary steps of reform. Every president was a black autocrat, holding power by his control over the masses. If an occasional one was more than mediocre (Hyppolite, for example), his good qualities were sure to be more than offset by the ignorant boors (such as Nord Alexis) who followed him.

True, even the most incompetent of the Negro presidents was 175
obliged to employ a few élite, for literacy was necessary in the foreign 643
office if nowhere else. The aristocrats were impotent, however, for 645
Haitian problems had tremendously increased at the very period 565
when they were losing control of government policy. Reforms were imperative, as every member of the élite knew; but no black president saw the need, or seeing it, had the vaguest idea how to proceed toward effecting them. Beyond the shameful disgrace of Haiti's [648]
position in the world of independent nations, the thoughtful could glimpse the anarchy which must inevitably result from continued ineffectiveness.

Reforms were not forthcoming. Rather, anarchy came, bringing 175
international complications in its wake. The American Marines 642
occupied the country. An era was ended. 648

It had been a strange journey in political ideas from the time of 175
Pétion and Christophe to that of the Occupation. The early leaders 643
seemed to envision triumphs for Haiti in a world of great powers, and to see themselves as men with a mission. After Boyer the vision dimmed. We have Soulouque, whose tinsel empire was mere stage setting for the act of a neighborhood bully; the tyrant Domingue; the senile Nord Alexis; the utterly incompetent fly-by-nights in the decade before the Occupation. Even Geffrard the reformer, prob-

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[14] Among the most lucid of these were: Démesvar Delorme, *La Misère au sein des richesses* (1873); Edmond Paul, *Les Causes de nos malheurs* (1889); Léonidas Laventure, *Haïti: le danger de la patrie* (1893); Alcius Charmant, *Haïti, vivra-t-elle?* (1905); and Auguste Magloire, *L'Erreur révolutionnaire et notre état social* (1909).

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A revolution directed by a general of real ambition was likely to involve an appeal to foreign powers. Haiti being almost roadless, ships were important for moving troops and blockading seaports. Many a chieftain has purchased six or eight ships abroad, and with this "navy" won his fight. Financial intrigue was frequent. By borrowing money from France, Germany, or England, with the promise to reshape Haitian financial policy to the benefit of the creditor country, several revolutionaries have secured funds for arms and the necessary soldiers to effect a coup. Sooner or later also one might expect to see the Môle Saint Nicolas, which guards the Windward Passage pathway between Cuba and Haiti, come into the picture. Cession of the Mole has frequently been held out as bait for foreign support, but popular opposition to white ownership of any Haitian land has always stopped actual cession. When Haiti's debt to Germany was due, she borrowed from France to pay it, and then later borrowed from the United States to pay France. All such appeals to foreign powers have merely drawn attention to the defenseless position of the country; many a successful revolutionary chief has lived to regret his appeal for aid.[19]

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The one time between 1804 and 1915 when political opinion was vocal and truly significant was in the latter years of Boyer's administration. Then it took pains to attack specific evils with steady persistence, even though the cures suggested were vague. Yet after the successful elimination of Boyer, politicians who had worked so brilliantly in the opposition showed themselves even more incapable. Political thought, at a low ebb for the next forty years, revived only when, after 1883, the Liberals were eliminated from politics. Their complete defeat seems to have given élite thinkers time for sober reflection upon the plight of their country. Before 1843 the critics had been in a position to make their words effective; after 1883 they wrote—soberly, brilliantly, persuasively—but their books and pamphlets were read only by a small group of fellow aristocrats who already thought as they did, or disagreed with them in print. Political homilies made no impression upon the minds of the peasants left uneducated by all the élite presidents of Haiti.

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In the crucial days of the American Occupation, once again political debate rose to brilliant heights. The rude shock of seeing foreign [648]

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[19] See, on this whole subject of Haiti's foreign relations, an excellent chapter in Montague, op. cit., chap. IX.

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175 whites patrolling the streets seems to have given reality to criticism
665 which before then would have been academic. The élite were back
208 again in the political forum. Unreflecting patriotism urged the
●648 immediate withdrawal of the Marines, but a considerable number of the legislature saw that it would be years before they left. The problem, then, they saw variously: some wished to be eloquent spokesmen for the patriotic anti-whites and did their best to embarrass the Occupation; some, feeling that the Americans were benefiting the country, tried to make things move smoothly; while others, seeing a fertile field for gain, tried to ingratiate themselves with the American authorities.

175 The twenty years between 1915 and 1934 heard many eloquent,
643 impassioned speeches, not all of them coming to the same conclusions. The élite were divided in most issues raised by the Occupation,
642 so that the old neat dichotomy between élite and army no longer
648 prevailed. The President, Dartiguenave (1915–22), was for the first
662 time since 1879 a Southerner and a mulatto; yet in 1922 when he was a candidate for reëlection it was Southern élite votes which defeated him. Executive, legislature, and judiciary all had just enough power under the Occupation to make subtle manoeuvres, and all three branches of the government displayed a real genius for the political game. They often succeeded in putting the onus of an unpopular act upon the Americans, and in taking the credit for popular measures with which they had had little to do. They prodded and pricked all the weaknesses in the logic of the American State Department. They forced numerous concessions. If at times they seem to have been overclever, playing the game of politics merely for an opportunity to display their skill, at other times many of them showed a deep understanding of realities which had to be faced.

175 The Occupation, ordered by that high prophet of democracy,
648 Woodrow Wilson, professed its determination to give Haiti her
666 first opportunity to be democratic. Yet the Marines really dictated
642 the choice both of Dartiguenave in 1915 and of Borno in 1922 and 1926. The constitution of 1918 was prepared in Washington; it was submitted to a plebiscite, but the farcical vote—69,337 for and 335 against—was clearly the result of electioneering by the Marines. The presidents of Haiti ruled with executive councils, subject to Ameri-

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can "advice and approval," rather than with the legislature subject to 175
popular control. Even under such restrictions the politically minded 641
found ways of exerting pressure on the Marine authorities. 666

Out of the darkest days of military subjection by a foreign power 642
came a changed order of politics in the country. The practically unbroken 175
line of dull incompetents who had come into the presidency 643
ended; instead of ignorant army leaders, educated men were once
more in office; instead of Northern Negroes, élites of Port-au-Prince;
instead of benighted mariners bewildered by world affairs, men
who, if not great statesmen, at least had minds capable of understanding
Haiti's relation to international economics and politics.

The élite were back in power. In the mind of every friend of Haiti 175
arose the question whether the events between 1879 and 1915 had 642
taught them lessons which would make their return to responsibility
productive of great things for the country. Because of the abnormal
situation resulting from the Occupation, the world depression, and
the briefness of their new ascendancy, one cannot yet speak with
assurance. Nevertheless, there are few encouraging signs. Political [641]
office is still regarded by most candidates in terms of their own [666]
advancement rather than service to Haiti. Very little has been done
to extend the base of voting by developing local responsibility and [565]
education among the masses. Élite youths still receive a classical
education, still disdain manual labor, still cherish the ideal of a
graceful life of ease. The president still rules as an autocrat supported [643]
by the gendarmerie—substitute for the army of former days. One
can see no decrease in social distinctions or in the disdain of the élite [565]
for peasant people; on the contrary, there has even been an increase
of this feeling because the Occupation (through its Agricultural
Service particularly) seemed to open paths of development to the
peasants. Social antagonism, not social responsibility, still underlies
political life.[22]

To every one of these strictures there is a plausible reply. It is no 178
light matter to unsettle the minds of nine tenths of a population by 65
education, to cause an economic revolution by improving agricultural
techniques, to admit to political life a people unaccustomed to

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[22] Dr. Jean Price-Mars, in *La Vocation de l'élite* (Port-au-Prince, 1919), *passim*, [114]
especially pp. 51 ff., urges the élite to accept their responsibilities rather than rest upon [565]
the debilitating assurance of their innate superiority.

178 65 it. Moreover, the Haitian budget is in the neighborhood of seven million dollars, for which sum not much in the way of great improvement for three million people can be expected. The task of regenerating Haiti calls for self-sacrificing genius—at present the élite hardly qualify either as self-denying servants of the public or as geniuses.

175 643 642 ● 648 241 Haitian affairs during the 1930's were under the direction of President Sténio Vincent, an able man to whose credit much can be said. He devoted himself to his task with assiduity, talking face to face with the peasants in Créole, urging them to assist in reforestation and to use wisdom in crop rotation. He settled serious disputes with the neighboring Dominican Republic in amicable fashion. It was he who carried on the delicate and successful negotiations with President Roosevelt to give Haiti control of her own affairs once more. In coffee culture, assistance to trade, financial matters, and other economic details, he often proceeded expertly, particularly in view of the world depression which began as he assumed office. On the other hand, Vincent made the legislature his servant rather than a partner. He was a dictator (fortunately a benevolent one) who changed the constitution by highhanded methods in order to gain his own reelection. His régime rested upon his alliance with the efficient Garde d'Haiti. There were few signs of democracy or of respect for civil liberties, as Americans understand those terms, in Vincent's eleven years.

175 643 The spectator has a feeling that he has seen all this before, when for example Geffrard was elected to assure parliamentary government, only to become an effectively benevolent dictator as soon as the legislature opposed him. Geffrard was on the whole a good president, as Vincent was; but the former did not succeed in setting Haiti upon the path of economic and social security, and one hardly dared expect it of his modern counterpart.

175 643 648 In April, 1941, Élie Lescot, former Haitian Minister to the United States, was elected as the thirtieth president of the republic. Vincent had refused to call a plebiscite to approve an extension of his presidential term for an additional five years, as he had done in 1935 near the end of the six-year term to which he was elected in 1930. Lescot had begun his presidency with many advantages, chiefly the friendly support of his predecessor, his acquaintance with United States officials, and a recent negotiated pact by which American aid will

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be given to Haiti for vast rubber plantings."[21] Opposition to Lescot 643
comes chiefly from those who consider him too friendly with the 648
Dominicans who killed hundreds of Haitian workers in 1937,
Lescot having figured prominently in negotiations that led to the
Dominican government's agreement to pay indemnities to Haiti
for the slaughter.

Reviewing the whole course of Haitian history, the field of 642
politics seems to have marshaled itself behind a few regularities. In 105
every case there have been voices raised to protest, yet the ruling
clique, whatever its grouping, has effectively supported these characteristic political customs:

1. Complete dominance of political life by the president. Strong 643
men seem to be necessary to rule ignorant masses. Even the revolu- 642
tions precipitated by parties campaigning for parliamentarianism
have, when successful, become governments by the president. This
concentration of power in one man's hands makes the next revolution possible, for it is easier to overthrow one man than to eliminate a party based upon wide suffrage and diffused responsibility.

2. The inferior position of cabinet ministers. These have resembled 645
neither European nor American secretaries of state in their responsi- 642
bilities, but have been little more than clerks appointed by the
president to serve as heads of a bureau. The treasurer-general, for example, during most of Haiti's history has merely received the moneys, while the president disbursed them. The secretary-general has neither originated nor conducted the details of public policy. Often as not, the minister has made a convenient whipping boy when the president has got himself involved in internal or foreign complications: by demanding the minister's resignation the president remained unscathed.

3. The unimportance of the legislature. It has made useful patron-

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[21] The European War, threatening the supply of rubber coming to the United 249
States from British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, has made the American 433
government seek new sources. The Department of Agriculture established an ex- 654
perimental station and breeding gardens for rubber plants in Haiti, and the results
were so successful that extensive areas were planted with rubber trees. Haiti and the 648
United States in May, 1941, reached a long-term agreement for "the development of
agriculture and economy"; the projects embraced under the agreement include not
only rubber but the further development of Haiti's banana plantations, the planting of
oil crops, drug plants, spices, fiber plants, the stimulation of handicraft industries, and
the development of forestry resources peculiar to the tropics. A further extension of [312]
an additional $500,000 in credits will be made for use on highways, irrigation proj-
ects, and to provide transportation facilities for the areas to be planted to rubber trees. [491]

175 ment that two thirds of the members of either Chamber must be 642 present before a law could be voted—a stipulation making it possible [646] for any clique to hold up legislation by absenting itself.

1874. The constitution of Domingue who, having defeated the [643] Liberals, promulgated a constitution "profoundly modifying" the language of the 1867 document. It legally concentrated power in the hands of the president—where, indeed, it had always been in spite of constitutional declarations.

1879. Salomon's first constitution, which professed to be a reexamination of Haitian institutions, but was actually not different in essentials from the document of 1846. The line from Pétion to Riché to Salomon and his successors was the main one from which deviations, such as those of Soulouque, occurred.

1886. Salomon's second constitution, a mild revision of his first.

[178] 1889. Hyppolite, the new president, felt it necessary to have a new constitution, although like the constitution of 1886 this was little more than a revision of that of 1879. Under the 1889 document Haiti continued to function, more and more haltingly, up to the time of the American Occupation.

[648] 1918. The constitution drawn up in Washington[7] and forced through in Haiti by a farcical plebiscite. Its most debated provision [423] was the elimination of the prohibition against ownership of land by foreign whites, thus ending the one common point in all previous constitutions since 1805. For the rest, it changed little of the actual [641] structure of Haitian government, but provided a great number of unaccustomed democratic rights: freedom of assembly, trial by jury in political cases, direct election of senators, submission of amendments to popular vote, freedom of the press.

1927. Although this is considered merely a revision of the 1918 [641] constitution, its changes were actually more noteworthy than many expected by the so-called new constitutions. Thirteen amendments were carried by popular vote, again so overwhelming as to be ridiculous, restricting many of the democratic liberties granted in 1918 which had proved embarrassing both to President Borno and

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[7] Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his campaign for the vice-presidency of the United States in 1920, claimed that he had written most of this constitution while he was Woodrow Wilson's assistant-secretary of the navy. (See the *New York Times*, August 19, 1920.) The constitution was approved in Haiti by a vote of 69,337 to 335.

175 701 [512] Saturday to use their time cultivating the soil, pursuing some mechanical craft, or acting as day laborers.

682 703 175 It must be once more emphasized that the civil was everywhere subservient to the military power. The administration of justice in tribunals was carried out only at the pleasure of the army chiefs. No person would have dared bring suit against a high officer; the only efficacious way of obtaining justice against petty offenders was through summary decision and corporal chastisement by the commanding officer.

701 625 175 By the close of Boyer's rule, during which he had kept the army up to its full numbers while pursuing a policy of economy, the outward appearance of the troops was almost ludicrous. They appeared at review wearing generally what pleased them or what they could scrape together, for they had to supply their own clothing and arms. The only effectual employment of the soldiery was as armed police, for Haiti never had to fight external powers. The soldiers drummed and fifed, mustered on parade and went through the formations, but otherwise merely stood (or sat) sentry at the doors of public offices, hunted up at the command of the magistrates *les mauvais sujets*, guarded prisons and prisoners on chain-gang duty, loitered at barriers, collected tolls, and examined permits.

175 701 [664] [703] A large army, practically idle, could easily be seduced into the support of revolutionary movements. Principles of discipline and loyalty current in European armies of the day were nonexistent in nineteenth-century Haiti. The numbers in the army varied from twenty to forty or fifty thousand. A strange estimate was made for the year 1867: 6,500 general officers and staff; 7,000 regimental officers; and only 6,500 soldiers.[15] It was said that "*tout Haïtien qui n'était pas général de division était au moins soldat.*" The higher grades became rewards for political service; the lower ranks had to be filled up by recruiting parties—when these were abroad, all men who did not desire a period of enforced leisure away from home remained in hiding.

● [648] While the army was not alone responsible for the tragedies of insurrection and mismanagement which consistently befell the country, it was never uninvolved in these misfortunes. Only the radical reforms undertaken by the American Occupation saved modern Haiti from continued military domination.

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[15] Sir Spenser St. John, *Hayti, or the Black Republic*, p. 310.

175 Haiti under Dessalines seemed to be flourishing, although it was
433 less productive than under the French colonial régime. This was
partly because the material damage of the wars had been too great to be quickly repaired; partly it was because many of the free Haitians had discovered ways of disappearing into the remote valleys, there to live the life of independent squatters, safe from the blows of Dessalines' overseers. Tables of exports showed that sugar production was rapidly declining, and that coffee was now becoming the principal crop of the country.[4] Many cane fields, indeed, were turning into rugged thickets, their mills and refineries falling to ruins beside the clogged irrigation ditches.

175 It was a bewildering "system," then, this instituted by Dessalines:
466 intense activity of serfs on government plantations, but an increasing
439 number of deserting squatters; foreign trade encouraged, yet run by
579 principles of local favoritism. Even the old-fashioned practice of
piracy was reëstablished, for the Emperor gave letters of marque to some of his subjects who owned ships, allowing them to pursue French and Spanish vessels as the rightful prey of an enemy country. Sometimes these Haitian corsairs even disturbed smaller English merchant ships. Finally, it was Dessalines who said to his favorites, "*Plumez la poule* [that is, the Haitian people], *mais prenez garde qu'elle ne crie pas.*"

175 Christophe, upon his accession to power in the North, completely
439 abandoned the fantastic schemes of Dessalines for putting an end to
437 all contact between Haitians and foreigners. Among his earliest acts
were efforts to undo the economic measures of the Emperor. In his first address he proclaimed certain free ports, announcing that the flags of all nations would be respected and property protected.[5] Next he abolished the consignment system of trading, allowing all foreign traders free access to Haitian merchants. This open system did away with the need of smuggling.

175 Because Christophe was almost pathetically anxious to make a
439 good impression upon Great Britain, he was scrupulous in living up
648 to his promises of security of property and justice in commercial
dealings—to British merchants. The United States fared ill at the King's hands, for it was a young republic which had by refusing

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[4] See note on this chapter, p. 320, section 4.

[5] His constitution of 1807 likewise makes this promise: "The government solemnly guarantees to foreign merchants the security of their persons and property."

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175 recognition to the kingdom specifically failed to pay him proper
439 respect. Moreover he seized the property of American merchants in
648 his kingdom to make good a sum of $123,955.19 he could not recover from a Baltimore firm.[6] Agriculture flourished in the North, but the English were not yet certain whether Haitian credit could be trusted. The demand of the traders for cash was allowed, and so with almost no risk British dealers supplied the steady demand for staple trade goods,[7] taking in return either coffee and sugar or the equivalent in cash.

175 Christophe was chary of publishing any specific figures on the economic life of his kingdom: we have no way, therefore, of esti-
439 mating either the annual production or the annual income. One of his statesmen, Baron de Vastey, affirmed that in 1817 more than 150 ships were supplied with cargoes of coffee and sugar at the Cape alone.[8] This number is equal to that which sailed from the port during its most peaceful and prosperous periods in colonial times; one suspects the baron of exaggerating. We know, however, that Christophe was the chief merchant in his kingdom, setting his own prices and disposing of his own goods before others could sell; we know, too, that he left a large fortune in his coffers when he died.

175 Like Dessalines, King Henry Christophe had his pirates, and re-
579 doubtable ones. But he warned them to prey only on French ships
439 bound for ports in Pétion's republic in the South; he did not wish his trade interfered with in the North.

The policies of Dessalines and Christophe were personal, based upon their subjective prejudices and preferences; those of Pétion were more in accord with the practice of other civilized nations of the time. They had to be, perforce, in view of the economic and political position of his republic.

175 Southern Haiti had never, even in colonial times, been so intensely cultivated as the North. Foreign traders were accustomed to deal at
439 the Cape, now the capital of Christophe's dominion, while Port-au-
648 Prince was but a secondary market. After the civil war Christophe had practically allied himself with Great Britain. If this coup were to be counterbalanced, Pétion would have to choose for allies among

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[6] See Ludwell L. Montague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714–1938*, p. 48.

[7] Christophe did not encourage his people to purchase any of the extravagantly rich manufactures of Europe, but rather to keep their wants simple.

[103] [8] Formerly Cap François, then Cap-Haïtien, but under Christophe renamed in his honor Cap-Henry; it is now Cap-Haïtien.

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the still weak United States, France—the traditional enemy of Hai- 175
tians, and moribund Spain, who was in fact shortly to lose most of 439
her empire in the New World. Since he did not mean to drive his 648
people to work, he resolved to exploit to the full the benefits of
foreign trade in the hope that profits from exports would stimulate
production. As for allies, he cultivated the friendship of the United
States, but also sought to wean British merchants from the Northern
ports. To this end, although he levied duties of twelve per cent on [651]
goods of other nations, he reduced duties on English goods to
five per cent.[9]

Pétion, content to govern without an impressive court, gave the 175
greatest encouragement possible to trade; he sheared expenses and 439
managed to balance his budget. In 1818, for example, his revenues 652
were $2,646,000 and his expenses $2,144,000, giving the republic a
respectable surplus of $502,000.

Because Boyer was Pétion's disciple he followed in his predeces- 175
sor's footsteps, thus fixing in his quarter-century administration the 439
pattern of foreign trade under a tariff system. The Haitian élite seem 652
never to have taken to commercial enterprise, nor has the country
ever developed an economist even of fifth rank. Haitian thought, so
eloquently articulate along political lines, has simply never turned its
attention in any solid and serious way to economic problems. Nearly [441]
the whole of the foreign commerce of the republic from the earliest
days was conducted by foreign merchants resident in Haiti. This was [452]
partly because the credit of the Haitians was not so generally estab-
lished as to inspire confidence, but mostly it was due to lack of
interest of the people in foreign trade.

In the eighteenth century Saint-Domingue had been almost the 175
only colony producing such tropical products as sugar and coffee on 439
a large scale; the absence of effective competition accounted for most
of the prosperity of the French colony. In the nineteenth century, 656
however, competition developed rapidly; and at this very time the 441
laws and court decisions of Haiti began to hamper the business of the foreign merchants dealing there. By Article 21 of Boyer's Law of Patents, all persons engaging in any trade or profession except that of cultivation of the soil must be provided with a license or patent; all foreigners admitted as merchants into the republic must first secure the president's permission to acquire a patent; and when

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[9] See the Arrêté of October 15, 1814.

175 452 453 If contemporary testimony can be credited, the complete indifference of the Haitian élite to business was matched by their ignorance of finance when this was anything more complicated than cash payment transactions or face-to-face exchange. They seem to have been wholly unfamiliar with the uses of commercial paper, the meaning of overdrafts, or bills of exchange. Individual credit was not understood, nor was a signature enough to start a flow of business. As one person from France put it in 1846, "It takes 10,000 francs of money to do 10,000 francs of business."[14] If a merchant doing a good business found his purse empty and needed only to borrow in order to purchase other goods, that circumstance offered to his mind "a redoubtable extremity enveloped in profound mystery; and it is a rule of loyalty and of honor to which Haitian commerce is never false, that the paper on which a man has placed his signature should remain, until the day the loan is paid back, impenetrably shut up in the portfolio of the lender."

[426] Interest, if money could be borrowed at all, was at the rate of one per cent a day, three per cent a month, and from sixteen per cent to twenty per cent a year. Thus letters of credit and promissory notes never moved the slightest business transaction in the country. To seek credit was to confess one's financial embarrassment.

175 45 The economic ills which harassed Haiti under Boyer were, to a greater or less degree, the same that bedeviled the country for the rest of the century. It seems worth while to list them, for they reveal the mentality of the ruling clique and caste—a mentality which could see no reason for altering of these basic matters, and which during administration after administration devoted itself to superficialities. Haiti's weaknesses were not entirely due to folly and clumsiness, however, but to a perfectly natural ignorance. There was no background for economic thinking: how should ex-slaves with a handful of old freedmen be familiar with credit, banking, overdrafts, and the like? Even education in France would not necessarily offer enlightenment on these matters. "Culture" meant literature, not economics.

These, then, have been the major economic defects of Haiti, 1806 to 1915, due partly to ineptitude, partly to imperfect education:

175 454 648 1. The exclusion of all foreign or white investment, industry, and capital. One article in every constitution was given over to this

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[14] R. Lepelletier de Saint-Remy, *Saint-Domingue*, II, 187.

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quarantine: "Haiti for the Haitians." At first the prohibition on white ownership of land and financial investment in the country was attributable to a fear of reënslavement; then to a fear that financial commitments (which no Haitian really understood) would somehow lead to political subjection; and always the feeling of pride, combined with a desperate need of self-justification, made the Haitians want to keep their country entirely under control of their own people. It is, of course, possible that if white people had been allowed free access to the country, they might have destroyed the "Black Republic"; excluding white men altogether, however, seriously curtailed economic activity.

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2. Overmilitarization. The army, numerous out of all proportion to the population, took the ablest men out of production, drained the treasury, and was a constant source of revolutionary activity.

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3. Poor methods of agriculture. Critics often complained that Haiti ought to return to the system of large estates and forced labor; it apparently occurred to no one to suggest that education of the peasants might have made the land productive once more, by teaching the people new methods. Dividing up the land was an inevitable necessity unless every ruler were as willing as Christophe to be a dictator and as capable; but to keep the peasants in ignorance was not a necessity. Peasant landowners in Europe frequently tend their acres with skill, while in Haiti, with neither experience nor instruction in methods of tillage on small farms, the people developed steadily more destructive ways of farming.

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4. Inefficient marketing. Assuming Haiti's dependence upon the staple crop of coffee and the handling of this crop by foreign merchants, every government seemed intent upon putting obstacles in the path of efficient marketing procedure.[15] The white trader could deal only with Haitians (who were ignorant in matters of international trade); although the foreigner had to pay a huge license fee in order to deal at all in Haitian products, he got no security in return, for he might not own land or obtain a lien on the real property of a citizen.[16] Banking and exchange facilities were wholly lacking.

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[15] In 1833 Boyer thought to "encourage" Haitians to commercial effort by gradually expelling foreign traders, refusing to grant them any new licenses to trade. His scheme failed, for the élite were not interested. Indeed, the actual effect of his plan was to disrupt the steady flow of exports and increase discontent with Boyer on the part of the élite plantation owners whose small profits were momentarily interrupted.

[16] See James Franklin, *The Present State of Hayti*, pp. 374 ff.

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441 Justice in the courts was administered by Haitians whose narrow
.439 patriotism biased their decisions.

648 5. A temperamental tariff policy. Not only were imports subject
175 to a tariff which might be changed at the whim of any president, but
exports also were taxed. When an administration was in need of
651 funds it might suddenly, without warning, raise the tax on coffee
489 exports and so disrupt a merchant's business plans. The customs-houses were in charge of Haitians who steadily became more inefficient and grasping as the century progressed, until many foreign merchants felt that the only way of getting business dispatched was by means of bribes. Examinations at customs were long drawn out, often there was open thievery, and erroneous valuations were common.

175 6. The burden of the indemnity to France. Contracted by Boyer
657 in 1825, this annual payment for sixty years was an incubus to every
[648] administration, leaving no surplus in the treasury for public works, education, or any internal development; likewise, it made the threat of foreign interference all the more imminent.

7. A debased currency. Pétion was the first president to devalue money, and his example was frequently followed thereafter. Counterfeiting was general. When a country's monetary system is unstable, its officials accustomed to bribery and graft,[17] and its financial structure almost nonexistent, there is little chance for sound economic development.

175 8. Dependence upon a single crop. Haitian economy was tied to
245 the staple coffee, grown with indifferent care, prepared for the market in outmoded fashion, and sold in competition with coffee from more scientifically run plantations in other tropical countries.

175 9. Political instability. The recurrent revolutions in Haiti made
foreigners chary of participating in the country's business, since the
439 government which made a contract might be out of office before the
66 ink was dry.

175 10. Indifference of the élite to economic pursuits. What profits
were obtainable went into the pockets of foreign merchants, not
439 those of Haitian businessmen. In 1842 the comparative exports of the
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[643] [17] Sir Spenser St. John, always a bitter critic of Haiti, remarked (*Hayti, or The
Black Republic*, p. 88) sardonically that "Boyer had the rare quality of being honest,
[159] and left in the treasury, on his departure, the sum of £200,000, the first and last chief
[661] who was ever guilty of so unaccountable a weakness."

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United Kingdom, the United States, and Haiti, in proportion to 175
population, were 185, 165, and 125,[18] yet Haiti had no carrying trade 565
while the other two countries had, and so the profits were drained 439
from the land.[19]

In short, as Haiti became accustomed to managing her own affairs, 178
she became content with—or at least, reconciled to—little things. 433
Inertia and tradition worked in their persistent fashion, with no effective stimulation from outside to combat them. From tradition and seclusion springs prejudice, and this became obvious whenever a change was proposed, particularly one which suggested bringing white people back to the country. To the élite it might mean the end [461]
of their social supremacy; to the masses, the end of their independence of daily action. The prejudice against sugar making was rooted in the same kind of suspicion. When a large landowner tried to institute a sugar mill on his estate, he met an adamant refusal of his hired workers to labor in it: "*Moué pas esclave!*" (I'm no slave!) The Negroes even disliked a bell to ring them to work on a plantation, for it suggested the slavery of the old régime.

Just before the Civil War in the United States a humanitarian 175
gentleman developed a project of conducting numerous free Ameri- 649
can Negroes to Haiti in a planned migration. He dis[illegible]ed in a 105
pamphlet[20] all the possible trades which might flourish in that country, if the migrants were to assume the position of a middle class; but his list is significantly small—sixteen occupations, on the order of tailoring, coopering, and blacksmithing, were all he could think of.[21] He made three comments which he hoped would attract the Negro Americans, as to a virgin field of opportunity: that in the

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[18] John Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti*, pp. 111–113, cites these figures, and says: "[Thus] Hayti, poor, and despised as she is, has a commerce, *in native produce*, nearly three-fourths as large, *in proportion to her population*, as our own United Kingdom, which is the great manufacturing part of the world; and seven-eighths as large as that of the United States, where the staple exports are produced by the labour of 3,000,000 slaves!" [433]

[19] Mackenzie (*Communications Received at the Foreign Office* [of Great Britain] *Relative to Hayti*, Document V) reports that in 1825 exports were valued at $5,793,758, and imports at $4,660,174; the trading was carried on in 552 *foreign* ships, of which 374 were American, 78 British, and 65 French. No Haitian ship traded abroad.

[20] Benjamin S. Hunt, *Remarks on Hayti as a Place of Settlement for Afric-Americans.* See particularly pp. 3–9.

[21] His complete list is: tailor, shoemaker, baker, cabinetmaker, carpenter, mason, lime-burner, distiller, cooper, wheelwright, saddler, blacksmith, tinner, hatter, small-boat maker, potter.

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towns there was a surplus of shopkeepers, but nothing like enough producers of goods; that in the country few Haitians of intelligence and capital paid any attention to agriculture; and that Haiti needed more than anything else people of brains, not afraid of physical activity, and people with capital. The author had observed well. His characterization of the Haiti of 1860 was still true fifty years later.

XV

HAITIAN PROBLEMS

FOR a citizen of the United States or a European country, 178
national problems have to do with external as well as internal
affairs. Foreign relations, armaments, international trade, 66
treaties and commitments, loom as large as do unemployment, business 648
depression, labor troubles, and social maladjustment. Political parties
rise and fall with their promises or failures to deal successfully with
matters arising from the country's position relative to world movements.
In Haiti such generalizations do not hold. Her international
relations have been and are comparatively minor, while her internal
problems have been of a different order from those which trouble
most of the rest of the Western World. This is not meant to imply
that a world depression leaves Haiti unscathed, or that the country
does not suffer when its trade in coffee is interrupted, but rather that
its persistent problems would continue to exist whatever the state of
world politics and economics.

Contacts of the Haitian people with the outside world between 175
1804 and 1915 were meagre. The slaughter of whites by Dessalines, 648
the economic decline of the country, unwillingness of white nations
to treat with a Negro state, the schism in the Catholic Church,
restrictive legislation against white foreigners, general illiteracy of
the people—all these shut Haiti off from the world. Christophe, it is
true, invited in a few English schoolmasters and agricultural experts, [871]
but these remained only a short while and had little influence even [242]
among the élite. For a century Haiti saw no foreigners except the [797]
few traders at seaports, an occasional Wesleyan missionary, a limited
number of consuls and ministers, certain travelers interested in odd
corners of the earth, and, after 1860, Catholic priests and sisters. For
the peasants there ceased to be any knowledge of the world outside
of Haiti; for the élite France once more became the centre of the
social universe, as it had been for the affranchis in colonial times.
From Boyer's time onward élite youths went to Paris for an education, [871]
if they could afford it; the "culture" they acquired there had
little relationship to Haitian problems.

Foreign relations, in the political sense, revolved during most of

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Foreign relations, in the political sense, revolved during most of

175 648 18 the nineteenth century about loans and insurrections. Haiti maintained legations in those countries to which she exported most of her coffee and from which she might obtain credit. Revolutionary leaders sometimes promised as a bait for foreign assistance either tariff preferences or the cession of Môle Saint Nicolas for a naval base; if successful, they might fulfill the first promise but, because of the Monroe Doctrine and the watchful jealousy of the big powers, the Môle was never ceded. The United States had varied dealings with Haiti. Before the Civil War there was more than one movement to transplant freed slaves from this country to Haiti; after the war the United States came very near annexing Haiti; and negotiations over the cession of the Môle did not end until America acquired Guantanamo Bay, across the Windward Passage in Cuba, as a naval base to guard the entrance to the Caribbean.[1]

It was finally the combination of complicated economic affairs and political collapse which produced the Occupation of 1915. In the 175 652 457 preceding year both France and Germany threatened to send warships to collect loans due them, and were stopped only by the outbreak of the World War. An American bank held as its subsidiary the Bank of Haiti, in which the government deposited its funds; when in 1914-15 the presidents followed each other in rapid succession, the bank on instructions from New York refused to allow the government to withdraw its funds. Haiti in retaliation threatened to seize its deposits by force, but the New York bank persuaded the United States government to send a ship to transfer the gold from Port-au-Prince to New York. There were other financial complications, particularly those relating to defaulted payments to a railroad 175 648 [579] company. What finally precipitated the Occupation, however, was anarchy. When, in July, 1915, President Sam slaughtered 168 political prisoners and was himself mobbed and murdered, the American government ordered the landing of its Marines from a warship conveniently anchored in the harbor near Port-au-Prince.[2]

From 1915 to 1934 the foreign affairs of Haiti were under the direction of the United States, whose main concern was to order the economic relations of the country in such fashion that Haiti should

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[1] The foreign relations of Haiti with the United States have been clearly treated in Ludwell L. Montague, *Haiti and the United States*, 1714-1938.

[2] One of the best accounts of the events leading up to the Occupation is that of H. P. Davis, *Black Democracy*.

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not find herself constantly embroiled with European states and 175
American financial interests. The Haitian debt was funded, and a 648
financial adviser remained in the country even after the Occupation [457]
came to an end. It is expected that by 1943 the last debt will be paid;
the financial adviser, however, withdrew in 1941. Since the Occupation, although the republic has been free to manage her own affairs, she has consulted frequently with the State Department in Washington.

Nineteen years of occupation ended the century of Haitian isola- 175
tion. The Americans built roads, conducted health campaigns, made 648
their presence felt even in remote hamlets and valleys. American
authors, political, romantic, and sensational, discovered the Antillean
republic. Steamship companies stopped their cruises for a few hours [491]
at Cap-Haïtien to allow tourists to visit the Citadel, and at Port-au- [744]
Prince to see the sights of the capital. Every Haitian now realizes
that there is a world outside.

Whatever crises have arisen in Haitian affairs, certain problems 175
have persisted. For whom do they constitute a source of worry? Since 642
the government has always been a dictatorship, limited or absolute,
subject to no party control, the incumbents of office have never had 65
the experience of being constantly reminded by their opponents of
the misery or daily worries of the population. After a hundred years
the people have learned that relief is not to be expected from politi-
cians. Occasionally a dramatic revolutionary leader has persuaded [669]
some of the people that the officials in power were responsible for
their distress, and so worked up a following; yet even when such
movements succeeded, the masses never benefited. To most govern- [669]
ments of the past century Haiti's problem has been only one: to
frustrate insurrection. There is evidence that recent administrations
have busied themselves assiduously with the country's internal problems, although none of them has been adequately solved. The élite,
at least as a group, do not feel any apparent responsibility for the
maladjustments, nor obligation to effect the necessary reforms. A
few patriots, and those almost without exception not in office, know
what ails the country and say so; a smaller number propose reason- [161]
able solutions. The problems remain. Of these the three outstanding [164]
are overpopulation with all its accompanying ills, health, and [871]
education.

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To grasp the import of Haiti's problem of
270 over-population one

THE HAITIAN PEOPLE

161 should imagine the number of Vermonters sextupled, working with
433 hand tools and using methods which their great-grandfathers would
171 have considered antiquated; imagine the state with only a hundred
511 miles of paved roads, with no harnessed water power, no substantial
fortunes, no middle class; imagine the farms gullied and worn out; ninety-five per cent of the people illiterate and undernourished; the state having no industry and practically no goods imported from New York, Massachusetts, or any other part of the United States. Under such conditions the low standard of living would be readily understandable.

Haiti might also be compared with Mississippi. Less than a quarter the size of that American state, it nevertheless has a larger population. Both Haiti and Mississippi are agricultural, with few towns, although no part of Haiti now has land as richly fertile as that of the Yazoo Delta. The low standard of living of the Mississippi share-cropper, whether Negro or white, is notorious—yet he has access to a few of the perquisites of civilization, whether these be elementary schools or moving pictures; the Haitian peasant lacks even these. In America the undercurrent of feeling is that something should be, probably eventually will be, done to improve the lot of the share-cropper. Certainly there is wealth enough in the country at large to alleviate conditions where they are deemed to be socially unhealthy. Not so in Haiti: the land is poorer, the numbers even greater, the area much smaller; and there is no wealth in the country, nor enough social vision among the upper classes to deal with the relentless increase of numbers.

168 How conceivably might this problem be dealt with? The first answer which would occur to many Americans, namely, birth control, is out of the question at present. Expense would stand in the way of its use by people who hardly ever see money; the peasants, unable to read, suspicious of new-fangled ways, untouched by all efforts to "uplift" them, and with no educational agencies, could
hardly be converted to the use of contraceptives; while the Catholic
[795] Church, which until now has not had to raise its voice against birth
control in Haiti, would fight any proposal to introduce it as it fought the campaign in Puerto Rico.

167 Another possible answer is migration. This solution many Haitians
648 have tried without prompting. With little money available for

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travel, the peasants are limited in their migrations to near-by countries; specifically Cuba, which can be reached by sailing vessels, and the Dominican Republic. For many years there was a seasonal migration from Haiti to each of these neighboring countries, where wages on the sugar plantations, although low, have been better than nothing. Native Cubans and Dominicans, however, have quite understandably resented the influx of cheap labor which throws them out of work, depresses the wage scale, and thwarts efforts to improve working conditions; as the tide of Haitian immigration to the two adjacent countries increased during the 'twenties and the depression period of the 'thirties, resentment flamed into action. Murders occurred; ships to Cuba were not allowed to land; workmen were beaten and otherwise persecuted. In 1937 the Cuban dictator, Batista, expelled thousands of Haitians from the island. But the climax was reached in the autumn of the same year when the news gradually leaked out that in the Dominican Republic thousands of Haitians had been murdered in cold blood. It was estimated at that time that as many as 60,000 Haitians were living across the border; of these, certainly as many as 5,000 were butchered or drowned, and it is likely that 20,000 would be a more accurate figure if the whole truth were known.[4] In the world at the present time there seems to be no haven for penniless migrants, particularly illiterate blacks. 167 648

Even if Haiti could devise within her tiny budget a way to finance a whole series of public works, the problem of overpopulation would not be solved. Expenditures for internal improvements would merely lessen unemployment for the time being; it would not prevent the people from having large families of undernourished children. 161

It is easy enough to say that the problem of overpopulation could be solved by a combination of birth control, education, improvement of the soil and of agricultural techniques, introduction of manufacture, and public works projects. Each of these "solutions" is a major problem in itself, considering the limitations of the country. 165

[4] This massacre was protested with all diplomatic vigor by Haiti. The gendarmerie, since the American Occupation the only military force in the country, numbered only 2,500 men and was no match for the military power of the Dominican Republic, so that diplomatic protest to the American nations was the only course open to President Vincent. A joint committee of the United States, Mexico, and Cuba investigated and awarded Haiti damages of $750,000, of which the Dominican government (meaning Trujillo) immediately paid $250,000, promising the rest in installments. [648]

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These figures seem moderately impressive by comparison with those 175
of 1875; but a government report of 1931 states[22] that of the 361 rural 87
schools visited by investigators, 89 had no seats for their pupils, and 157 had only from one to three benches; 122 had neither desks nor tables upon which the pupils might work; 341 had no maps. Of the total number of 977 benches found in all the rural schools, 303 were almost unusable, and of the 26 maps in existence, 13 were entirely beyond use. Of the 355 teachers examined, 257 could not read, and 278 could not add, subtract, multiply, or divide. The average monthly salary was 32.07 gourdes, or $6.21. Of the 17,679 pupils enrolled in rural schools, only 4,022 attended. In this same report President Vincent claims to have made a radical reform in all these matters. His rural teachers are trained, many of them at the government agricultural school at Damien; school equipment has been distributed; salaries have been raised to 65 gourdes, or $13.

The American Occupation showed itself keen to assist education, 648
but unintentionally the measures taken by the whites ran afoul of 871
politics to a serious degree. The excellent agricultural experiment
school at Damien was filled with élite students who attended it, in [565]
the opinion of many, chiefly in order to receive the scholarships offered; moreover, the class question was raised and bitterly argued: Should peasant students live and study with the élite, and should the curriculum be the same for both? Finally, education was one of the few matters not specifically included in the treaty between Haiti and the United States as under American direction. The result was unhappy: the Occupation was accused of setting up a rival educational "system" to that of the government. Even Bellegarde, most of whose ideas the Americans were trying to carry out, found himself in opposition, chiefly as a result of methods and political implications involved.

If only the budget of the country could be increased, one feels that 871
the rural educational problem might be dealt with, for more and 565
more people are aware of what education might do for the country. Even so, there are still many élite who betray their fear that with education the masses will desert the land and cease to be subservient.

That the élite, who in fact control the country, should receive a training which would fit them for technical skills is a proposal often

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[22] *"L'Oeuvre d'éducation rurale du gouvernement du Président Vincent"* (Imprimerie de l'État, Port-au-Prince, 1934).

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197 a language into their daily speech. What the Americans have done to
English, the Haitians in general have done to Créole. It is pertinent briefly to review the early history of Créole in order to comprehend the distinctly Haitian contributions to the language.

175 Through most of the seventeenth century Caribbean waters were full of pirates and buccaneers preying upon Spanish shipping. The
579 effective monopoly which lordly Spain held in the preceding century over the trade of Europe with her rich Mexican and South American colonies began, in the early years of the new century, to crumble before the ingenious, speedy, and daring assaults of non-Spanish raiders. French, Dutch, and English sailors were all ready to try their hand at capturing laden Spanish ships. The rich cargoes of gold, silver, and merchandise were alluring enough to make the risk seem worth taking. And indeed the risk was not too great, for Spain's stately galleons were antiquated and cumbersome, generally no match for the flyboats[1] which had speed and much greater manageability. More and more Spanish control over the Caribbean, the Spanish Main, declined as the freebooters increased.

175 French sailors were among the most numerous and reckless of the
579 gadflies who made life miserable for the Spanish traders. Drawn from
the northern and northwestern provinces of France, these men had
● 648 been seafarers all their lives. Harrying Spanish shipping was the most lucrative career for French sailors, and as the seventeenth century wore on their numbers in the Caribbean increased. By 1660 they had established a raiding base on La Tortue, an island off the northern coast of Haiti, where they developed a characteristic way of life—economic, political, and social—between raids.[2] Their presence near Haiti gave France a claim, in the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), to the western part of the island. For the next hundred years this region was to be known as Saint-Domingue.

175 Créole was born of buccaneering. In the seventeenth century the
579 French of Île-de-France had not yet supplanted the dialects of the
197 French districts; the buccaneers consequently spoke their native
speech, and since Norman sailors far outnumbered the others

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[175] [1] Origin of "flibustier," "filibuster," and "freebooter."

[192] [2] It was here that they came to be called "buccaneers." They raided the relatively deserted main island of Haiti (then still under Spanish control) for cattle roaming wild. These cattle they cooked over an open fire, with a certain kind of wood; the process was called "boucanning," and they themselves "boucaniers." They imported wives from the seaport towns of Normandy, and families began to be raised on La Tortue.

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a whole people. The Negroes, as distinct from the people of lighter color, are genial or kindly or lighthearted, as white authors have often said American Negroes were. But are they? If so, how does it happen that people of a certain skin color have distinct mental traits? If the generalizations are false, how does it happen that the same characteristics have been attributed to Negroes in both countries? Are the distinctive temperaments of people in different nations merely imagined, or are they real? And if real, are they taken on as a part of culture or inherent in the blood? 157

The United States is gradually beginning to be aware of the republics which lie to the south of her. Haiti is not as large or important as her neighboring states, but more than many others her future depends upon this country. The sociologist will find her three million citizens worthy of study. 648

[p. 312 is blank]

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[p. 315]

NOTES

CHAPTER II

The period between 1789 and 1803 may be summarized as follows: 175

1789–1791. Struggle for precedence between whites and free colored people, with the balance in favor of the whites. [565]

1791–1793. The slave insurrection, with consequent anarchy, and futile attempts of French commissioners to restore order. Both whites and colored people pushed into the background. [669] [563]

1793–1796. Invasion of the colony by English and Spanish; rise of the mulatto general Rigaud and the black general Toussaint. [648]

1796–1799. Consolidation of power by Toussaint; defeat and expulsion of Rigaud; emigration of whites. [643]

1799–1802. Toussaint in full power as governor-general.

1802–1803. Leclerc's expedition, with its initial successes and ultimate failure. Final achievement of Haitian independence under Dessalines and Christophe. [642]

PART III

Various efforts were made by American abolitionists working with Haitian presidents to colonize freed American Negro slaves in Haiti in the period before the Civil War.[1] All these projects came to unfortunate ends, some even to grimly tragic ones. During Boyer's time about 13,000 American Negroes went to Haiti, the government assigning to each family a portion of land upon its arrival. Very shortly most of those who could afford it returned to this country, and within ten years hardly one was still living upon the land. An American writer, Hunt, says that during his seventeen years in Haiti (before 1860) he had known of but 13 Negroes from America who had been moderately successful; of these, 7 were merchants or traders, 4 mechanics, and 2 lawyers; and all were mulattoes. Five others were barely independent, and all the rest were day laborers or worse. In spite of this, Hunt planned another aided migration of American Negroes to Haiti. Warning them not to expect too much in the way of improvements in agriculture, he adds a significant paragraph: "Should the immigrant obtain quiet possession of unoccupied lands, and begin to use the plough instead of the hoe, his new methods of culture would be likely to draw upon him the jealousy and ill-will of his neighbors. For when new ways are too new to be accepted as an example, they are very apt to be felt and resented as a rebuke. More than one of Boyer's old immigrants have told me that they were obliged to give up agriculture and take to trading in towns, on account of annoyances of this sort. They found their fences down, or their water let off, of a morning; or evidences that cattle had been fed on their grounds over night; or the neighboring idlers, of which there are many, had stolen all their plantains and sweet potatoes, fit for the market. I do not mean to say that these Haytian cultivators are worse than any other rude people. On the contrary, I 175 563

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[1] An excellent description of these projects is found in L. L. Montague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714–1938* (Durham, 1940), chap. IV.

3. *Pétion, Boyer, and Inginac as Administrators*

Pétion lived very simply in the South, like a plain republican magistrate. He sat 175
on his piazza, accessible to all his people. He had a quiet way of answering his 643
opponents which did not make enemies of them. He made his secretary answer 159
every letter that arrived, no matter how small; many were simply inquiries about
the President's health. Yet the wars between Pétion and Christophe dragged on [669]
from 1807 to 1812,[8] draining the finances of the republic. Not only the crops
declined: so also did most of the public improvements instituted by the colonial [458]
planters; so did trade; so did habits of industry. Everything seemed to conspire [249]
against hard work. The rich plains of the Cul-de-Sac and the Artibonite Valley
were ravaged by fire and warfare; necessary equipment for sugar making was [464]
destroyed, the money for new machines and buildings was unavailable; and the
men were drawn away from their land by military duties.

Inginac, Boyer's secretary of state, after the Revolution of 1843 had got rid of
both the President and his secretary, wrote his memoirs. There are some revealing
passages. Inginac reports that Pétion told him only forty days before his death that
Boyer was a man of probity and delicacy, "but unhappily he is petulant; he is too
set in his ways to conciliate those who might assist him. In everything *he* wants to
dominate, and he will bring unhappiness to the country if he does not change." [466]
Inginac cites cases to show that Pétion's prophecy was correct. Boyer in 1820
repealed the most unpopular laws, particularly those requiring personal corvée
and the repair of public roads; but instead of taking advice from his cabinet on
important economic matters, he frequently announced that he was president and
would not be run by anybody. Consequently, according to Inginac, he made
mistakes which might have been avoided.[9] Defending himself, the former secretary
offers a clue to the failure of the régime—possibly unavoidable—by showing that
the administration merely suggested, did not require, action:

> "Have I not constantly, not only preached and corresponded about the necessity [464]
> of making agriculture prosperous, but also given work at as high wages as the [214]
> treasury could afford? Have I not created habitations on lands formerly totally
> uncultivated, putting formerly idle men to work? Have I not published at my own [311]
> expense, although I directed the National Printery, methods for cultivating tobacco
> and coffee plants, of which I distributed gratis several thousand copies?"[10]

In spite of all encouragement which the administration could offer, agricultural 433
production continued to decline, while expenses increased, and external trade fell 439
off from a third to a half. The government had to borrow from the banking firm 652
of Lafitte in Paris to find even the interest for

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[8] Hostilities between the two parts of Haiti ceased about 1812 because of the [175]
mutual fear on the part of Christophe and Pétion of Napoleon's ascendancy, and the [669]
threat which this constituted to the whole former colony. Their war had ravaged the
plantations and removed laborers from the soil. Then came the War of 1812 between [648]
the United States and Great Britain, cutting off many of the supplies which Haiti
drew from both countries. There was accordingly an unwritten truce, with no further [728]
hostilities. A neutral territory of ten leagues between the boundaries of the two states
was tacitly agreed upon: neither army was to enter it. This was the rich plain of
Boucassin, once the garden of the island, now a wilderness.

[9] Joseph Balthazar Inginac, *Mémoires* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1843), pp. 32, 34, 38.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

payments due to the French government.